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The South Asian Strategic Environment: Goals, Procurement Trends & Conflict

The Kashmir Flashpoint: Indo-Pakistani Relations

History of Kashmir

Kargil Crisis (1999)

When India and Pakistan conducted copycat underground nuclear weapons tests in May of 1998, bureaucrats and commentators in both countries argued that a new balance of terror would end military conflict between them. Twelve months later, Pakistan and India found themselves engaged in some of the most serious armed conflict of their half-century histories as independent, often antagonistic, nations. The confrontation involves Kashmir, the long-disputed territory where the two countries' heavily armed troops face each other, often in bunkers no more than 100 m apart. For the first time since the two were last at war in 1971, Indian planes last week were in combat over Kashmir, trying to dislodge infiltrators from Pakistan. The intruders had dug in along mountain ridges on the Indian side of the United Nations-imposed Line of Control, which divides the territory. During mid-week raids, two Indian fighter-bombers were downed inside Pakistani-held territory, and on Friday, a Stinger missile fired by the infiltrators felled an Indian Mi-17 helicopter. Indian armed forces spokesmen said the air raids would continue until the occupied land was retaken.

The two sides offered differing views of the air attacks. Islamabad said its surface-to-air missiles had shot down both fighters after they crossed into Pakistani airspace. It claimed that one pilot died and the other was taken prisoner, and that the wreckage of both aircraft was a few kilometers inside Pakistani territory. Military spokesman Brigadier Rashid Quereshi said Pakistan has the right to take whatever action is needed to defend its territorial integrity. India's Air Vice Marshal S. K. Malik accused Pakistan of a "hostile and provocative act" and insisted the planes were flying within Indian air space. He said one of them, a MiG-27, developed engine trouble on the Indian side of the Line of Control and the pilot had radioed that he was falling rapidly. The second aircraft, he said, was a MiG-21 that was tailing the stricken plane when it was shot down by a Pakistani missile. The chopper was attacked by the infiltrators themselves, and all four men on board were killed. This shooting confirmed India's suspicions that the infiltrators had shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles.

India's opposition political parties swung behind the government in demanding that the armed forces be given every support in ending the incursion. A mood of anxiety nonetheless took hold, and newspaper editorials warned of the danger to peace in the region. In Pakistan, the fighting coincided last week with official celebrations to mark the earlier nuclear testing. Triumphalist rallies were held in major cities, and the government gloated at the downing of the Indian warplanes.

Fearing the confrontation was about to spin out of control, Western governments and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan urged caution and appealed to the two sides to pull back. Russia, Delhi's long-standing ally, supported the Indian actions. The U.S. State Department urged both countries "to work to reduce tensions." International concern focused on protecting the fledgling

confidence-building measures, which were set up in Lahore at a February summit meeting, to deal with the two countries' new status as nuclear powers. Diplomats in Delhi and Islamabad were at a loss to explain the timing and reason for the escalating conflict.

The tension raised questions over Prime Minister Mohammed Nawaz Sharif's relationship with the Pakistani armed forces. The military's role in backing the incursion, which analysts said would have required several months planning, contrasted with his government's peace overtures to India. In Delhi, officials seemed to absolve the Pakistani government, as Defense Minister George Fernandes called the strikes "a big conspiracy of the army." The Prime Minister's principal secretary, Brajesh Mishra, went on television to reassure Indian viewers that there was no risk of Indian operations in Kashmir escalating to a full-scale war. India's aim is to flush out the intruders in the quickest possible time, officials say. Over the long term, India faces a permanent military presence in this formerly empty wasteland.

India and Pakistan have gone to war twice over Kashmir, in 1947 and 1965. For 10 years, Pakistan has backed a separatist uprising in the Indian-held part of Kashmir that Indian security forces have fought ruthlessly to suppress, leaving more than 30,000 casualties. In recent years Islamabad has given covert support to battle-trained Islamic extremists from outside Kashmir who seek to liberate the mainly Muslim territory from Indian control. The infiltrators tend to enter Indian-held Kashmir under cover of artillery bombardments from Pakistan. The latest fighting is taking place over a 140-km stretch of mountain ridges 4,500 m high near the strategic Indian garrison town of Kargil. The town lies on the only usable road between Srinagar, capital of Indian Kashmir, to the west and Leh, another military stronghold near the Chinese border, to the east. During the winter, the area is isolated from the rest of India by heavy snow. At the first

sign of spring both armies move in to reoccupy the heights they abandoned during the winter freeze.

This year was different. By all accounts the Indian forces were taken by surprise by the latest incursion. According to Bharat Karnad, a strategy analyst at India's Centre for Policy Research, the Indian military was "lulled into a certain complacency after the Lahore summit." When Indian patrols returned to the mountains at the beginning of May, they found that about 600 infiltrators had taken advantage of the low snow levels to dig in early on the high ground about 5 km inside Indian territory. They had occupied positions previously held by the Indian army and were impossible to dislodge by frontal assault up steep ravines. Pakistani long-range guns also opened up on Kargil with a daily artillery barrage, destroying part of the Indian army's main munitions dump and forcing the town's 10,000 inhabitants to flee. Indian officials said the infiltrators--whom they described as a mixture of regular Pakistani soldiers and mercenaries--threatened India's main supply route to its forces on the Chinese border. "What we are looking at is an orchestrated and well-organized operation by the Pakistani army," said Brigadier Mohan Bhandari, deputy director-general of military operations. On Saturday, the army reported finding a Pakistani soldier's identity card after retaking one position. Pakistan denied that its forces were involved.

Before the air strikes began, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee called Nawaz Sharif to advise him that India would take all steps necessary to push back the intruders, and the Indian leader remained tough when his counterpart called back later in the week to determine how to resolve the crisis. Pakistan has long sought international backing for its case in Kashmir. After the air raids began, Information Minister Mushahid Hussain called on the U.N. to send an envoy

to settle the conflict. By contrast, India considers the dispute an issue between the two countries and has opposed international intervention. As the reality of the conflict hit, both governments seemed eager to prevent the fighting from spreading. But the long history of military confrontation over Kashmir means that the spring surprise could lead to a long, hot summer.

The conflict in Kargil, of course did not happen in isolation: it was a manifestation of a much longer period of tension. Kargil is one of the districts (equivalent to US counties) which make up the province of Srinagar which together with the province of Jammu form the state which is represented in India=s parliament as Jammu & Kashmir, these being the Indian-controlled sector of Kashmir. The state of Jammu and Kashmir retains a special status within the union government: the rest of the states follow the Indian constitution, but Jammu and Kashmir has its own constitution (adopted in 1956) that affirms the integrity of the state within the Republic of India. The union government has direct legislative powers in matters of defense, foreign policy, and communications within the state and has indirect influence in matters of citizenship, Supreme Court jurisdiction, and emergency powers. Under the constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, the governor of the state is appointed by the president of India. Executive power rests in the elected chief minister and the council of ministers. The legislature consists of two houses: the Legislative Assembly (Vidhan Sabha) of 77 members, representing constituencies; and the Legislative Council (Vidhan Parishad) of 36 members. The state directly sends four elected representatives to the Lok Sabha and two members, elected by the combined Legislative Assembly and Council, to the Rajya Sabha of the Indian Parliament. The High Court consists of a chief justice and two or more other judges, who are appointed by the president of India.

Jammu & Kashmir is treated in this way by the Indian central government, different than the other states, due to a different history of incorporation. Some attempts were made in the 19th century to define the boundaries of the territory, but precise definition was in many cases defeated by the nature of the country and by the existence of huge tracts lacking permanent human settlement. In the far north, for example, the maharaja's authority certainly extended to the Karakoram Range, but beyond lay a debatable zone on the borders of the Turkistan and Sinkiang regions of Central Asia, and the boundary was never demarcated. There were similar doubts about the alignment of the frontier where this northern zone skirted the region known as Aksai Chin, to the east, and joined the better known and more precisely delineated boundary with Tibet, which had served for centuries as the eastern border of the Ladakh region. The pattern of boundaries in the northwest became clearer in the last decade of the 19th century, when Britain delimited boundaries in the Pamir region in negotiations with Afghanistan and Russia. At this time Gilgit, always understood to be part of Kashmir, for strategic reasons was constituted as a special agency in 1889 under a British agent. As long as the existence of the territory was guaranteed by the United Kingdom, the weaknesses in its structure and along its peripheries were not of great consequence; following the British withdrawal from South Asia in 1947, however, they became apparent. By the terms agreed upon for the partition of the Indian subcontinent between India and Pakistan, the rulers of princely states were given the right to opt for either Pakistan or India or--with certain reservations--to remain independent. The maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, initially believed that by delaying a decision he could maintain the independence of Kashmir, but, caught up in a train of events that included a revolution among his Muslim subjects along the western borders of the state and the intervention of Pashtun tribesmen, he signed an Instrument of Accession to the Indian Union in October 1947. This was

the signal for intervention both by Pakistan, which considered that the state was a natural extension of Pakistan, and by India, which intended to confirm the act of accession. Localized warfare continued during 1948 and was terminated through the intercession of the United Nations in a cease-fire, which took effect in January 1949. In July of the same year, India and Pakistan defined a cease-fire line that divided the administration of the territory. Regarded merely as a temporary expedient, this partition along the cease-fire line still exists, though warfare between the two contestants was briefly resumed in 1965 and again in 1971, despite the many proposals made to end the dispute. Thus, the "Kashmir problem" has remained intractable. Although there was a clear Muslim majority in the state before the 1947 partition and its economic, cultural, and geographic contiguity with the Muslim-majority area of the Punjab could be convincingly demonstrated, the accidents of history have resulted in a division of territory that has no rational basis. Pakistan has been left with territory that, although basically Muslim in character, is thinly populated, relatively inaccessible, and economically underdeveloped. The largest Muslim group, situated in the Vale of Kashmir and estimated to number more than half the population of the entire state, lies in Indian-administered territory, with its former outlets via the Jhelum valley route blocked. India thus acquired the lion's share of both territory and population and with them substantial linguistic, ethnic, and religious problems. There have been a number of movements seeking a merger of Kashmir with Pakistan, independence for Jammu and Kashmir from both India and Pakistan, or the granting of union territory status to Buddhist Ladakh. To contend with these movements, confront Pakistani forces along the cease-fire line, and support the administrative structure of the state, the union government has maintained a strong military presence in the Indian sector, especially since the end of the 1980s.

Competing claims over Kashmir between India and Pakistan has also been the trigger for two (1948, 1965) of the three wars fought between the rivals as well as the nuclearized war almost fought (1990). Kargil district contains strategic heights on the Line of Control in the Indian section. The Kargil problem is then hardly unique to trigger a conflict in the dyadic relationship. However, actions taken in Kargil did not escalate in the same manner as one may suspect given the history of Indo-Pakistani relations. One factor which may account for increased caution in the weaponization of nuclear programs of both countries in 1998 including the fielding of delivery systems. As other new nuclear powers have done with the acquisition of such weapons, India placed nuclear forces under civilian-political rather than military command (India has strict subordination of an apolitical military to civilian authority, a legacy of the British-officered Indian Army and Indian Marine of the colonial period.) This enhanced the prerogative of civilian authorities to be involved at a tactical level in war planning and execution against nuclear-armed powers. This is an argument for caution in militarizing the conflict[1], yet actions were taken. A model of the Kargil must examine the motivations and decisions of the various key actors which overrode this systemic constraint.

Indo-Pakistani Relations: Moving Beyond the Dyad

Correlation of Forces (transparencies)

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[1] That both Pakistan and India have nuclear weapons and delivery systems does not mean that a situation of MAD has evolved. Neither side has the capability, or will acquire it in the near future, to deliver unacceptable damage (25% population, 50% industry) against the enemy. Large sections of India are not even within range of Pakistan?s most advanced IRBM?s.

Gujral Doctrine—India will be "generous" in dealings with its weaker neighbors in the region; Gujral as chief negotiator : "If India's energies are wasted on fights with neighbors, we will never become a great power" (1996)

Trends in Procurement and R&D

Indigenization Program

Generating Hard Currency

Over 30 years, third world arms manufacturing grew from $2 mln to $1.1 bln in constant dollars. India topped the list of producers building fighter aircraft, armored vehicles, missiles and naval vessels including frigates and destroyers. The hard currency generated the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists claims has been used to fund nuclear programs by leading exporters: India, Argentina, Brazil, Israel and South Africa.

Resupply Under Sanctions

Licensed Production of Russian designs (MiG, Sukhoi, MBT's) for

India

Hard-Currency Imports of US hardware (F-16, etc) for Pakistan;

Sanctions such as Pressler Amm (in response to Pak nuke

programme) demonstrated the

logistical issues like lack of spares, repair facilities; dependency on

extra-regional power which may be uninterested in Pakistani

objectives against the regional hegemon, India

Building domestic skills to break dependency: a procurement swaraj

Hegemonic Interests in the Indian Ocean Basin

Why?

Irredentism (E. Africa, Malaya, Singapore)

The Flag Following Trade (& Investment)

How: Naval Construction

Nehru: "To be strong on land, we must be supreme at sea"

A blue water fleet is one which can operate beyond the range of that state=s shore-based fighters and permits the delivery of military force to non-contiguous states without the need to secure friendly bases within the region. A variety of ships would fit this definition in the late twentieth century: carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates and attack submarines. The vessels can operate under nuclear or conventional power, in which case at-sea refueling capability by fleet auxiliaries is needed. These fleets strike at land-based enemy installations with aircraft and missiles, at enemy trade with anti-ship missiles and torpedoes; defensive capabilities protect the fleet and escorted ships from air, surface and submarine attack.

India has the most powerful third world navy with two aircraft carriers, 18 diesel attack submarines, 7 destroyers, and 11 frigates. Most of these ships were built by Russia and the UK. Sanctioned for construction are two carriers to replace those being retired, 5 nuclear attack subs (based upon the Russian *Charlie-I*), 13 diesel attack subs, another *Type 15 Delhi* class destroyer, and 21 frigates. While this program would increase the size of the fleet, that may not be the most important aspect. Much of the Indian fleet has traditionally been purchased second-hand; the naval expansion seeks to procure new ships many of which will be built domestically. For example the two carriers currently in the fleet are ex-Royal Navy and quite old. The *Virrant* (ex-*Hermes*) was commissioned in 1959 and served through the Falklands War; India bought it in

1986. *Vikrant* was purchased incomplete in 1957 and served 40 years for the Indian Navy, operating *Alize* propeller planes until 1989. The first major surface combatant designed and procured indigenously is the *Delhi* class destroyer of which three are planned with an option for three more (http://www.uss-salem.org/worldnav/asiapac/india.htm). The Indian Navy claims this ship is a technological match for most of those in first world inventories, and a substantial advance over neighboring fleets. Of the two carriers, sanctioned for commission one is the Russian *Gorshkov*, built in the late 1980's, and the other is to be a domestically built *Air Defence Ship* which will operate navalized MiG-29's and Indian LCA=s. This program of indigenization is occurring throughout the Indian armed services to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers for spares and training.

Carrier Debate

The genesis of the Indian carrier experience goes back almost to the birth of the independent nation-state of India in August 1947. The first Naval Plans Paper (Number One) was produced a mere ten days after independence from British rule, though the influence of senior Royal Naval officers who were still steering the Royal Indian Navy was all too evident. Independent India, it was averred, warranted a naval capability that was to be centered around a pair of light fleet carriers and this was endorsed by senior political leaders of the time.1 However the Indian Navy had to wait for another 14 years till it was able to fly its ensign on a flat-top and pride of place goes to INS Vikrant, commissioned in 1961 and decommissioned only recently.

The IN no doubt added to its inventory--a second carrier, the INS Viraat was inducted in 1986—a good 38 years after the 1948 plan, and a lively debate ensued about the utility of carriers, the lack thereof and the whole relevance of carrier air support in the late 1990s when technology had rendered long range missiles even more precise and lethal. Were these two platforms the vulnerable white elephants that their more acerbic critics made them out to be? An objective analysis of naval tactics, the geography of the subcontinent and larger national strategy irrefutably demonstrates the validity of having tactical air support from a carrier—and from all accounts, this is only likely to increase in the post-Cold War years for India.

The last word about the utility of aircraft carriers during hostilities in the late 20th century is yet to be written though the debate between critics and advocates of the flat-top has been intense. The altered techno-strategic context with the advent of the lethal missile and its first use in 1967 in West Asia by an Egyptian fast attack craft in a naval context to sink the Israeli destroyer, the Eilath, has raised the constant specter of all surface units being rendered vulnerable to such attack. Many studies and analyses have been carried out on how best to address this challenge and by and large, the validity of bringing air power to bear on such a threat has been acknowledged. Simultaneously, the submarine has become more potent due to technological advances and this, in turn, has increased the vulnerability of the surface fleet. The net result has been to create a perception that carriers have become liabilities to a navy and that let alone their operational utility, their protection becomes the major priority of not just the navy but all national resources.

A more recent assessment within the Indian context presents both sides of the debate with intense conviction. A former Vice Chief of the Indian Navy notes:

"Aircraft carriers dominated the oceans during the Second World War. Developments in naval technology since then—submarines, precision guided munitions and shore-based high performance aircraft—have tilted the crucial offence-defence balance decisively against aircraft carriers. They retain their value in non-belligerent naval missions such as port visits, disaster relief and peacekeeping, but their role and performance in war-like operations against credible new threats have not received objective evaluation."2

However the counter-view by a former Air Force fighter-pilot and air power exponent is more persuasive and the assessment makes four pertinent points:

(a) The only effective approach to defend against the threat of an anti-ship cruise missile is to intercept the launch platform (whether an aircraft, surface ship, or a submarine) before the missile can be launched.

(b) Essentially, the solution for adequate defence of warships and merchant fleet lies in area air defence capabilities and area anti-submarine warfare capabilities to meet traditional challenges and the new parameters imposed by the induction and proliferation of anti-ship cruise missiles..... In short, what India needs is air defence as well as anti-submarine capability in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal if it is to protect even the minimal key interests.

(c) Given the shape of peninsular India and Indian territories in the Andaman and Car Nicobar group (over 1,200 km from the mainland) and the Lakshadweep group in the Arabian Sea, a land-based airpower solution would require an extensive chain of radars, fighter interceptor bases, and a large contingent of fighter-interceptor force and anti-submarine aircraft. The carrier option is far more cost-effective. Even if India were to go in for a land-based airpower solution,

the fighter-interceptors will be severely limited in the cover they can provide. This is why an integral air-defence and anti-submarine warfare capability is an operational necessity.

(d) Can India afford not to have aircraft carriers for air-defence and anti-submarine roles? The survival of the surface fleet in the modern world is highly suspect without carriers for their defence. Technology has altered the equation and the carrier is (now) needed to protect the surface fleet.3

Changed Geo-Political Context

The complex post-Cold War era with an overwhelming economic orientation is chraracterised by an ambience of uncertainty and steady turbulence. While there is no doubt about the end of the Cold War and the bipolar strategic structure that characterised it, there is no certitude about what semantic has replaced bipolarity. The state itself is undergoing a transformation in the light of the emergence of more potent and efficacious multinational and suprastate entities, and while the US led western alliance remains the most visible and assertive grouping in the late 20th century, the perceived unipolar moment may well be transient.

However multipolarity appears to be an oxymoron even as a physical science analogy let alone a geo-political construct and it is more likely that the world will evolve into a polycentric order with various centres of contrasting political-economic-military relevance. In such a framework, the likely configuration of major actors/states could be a hexagon comprising the USA as the most complete power today, the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the emerging power arousing anxieties about its revisionist potential or intent, and Russia as the inheritor of the former Soviet mantle—–-nuclear arsenal intact—being the major arms of the proposed hexagon.

The other three constituents include the European Union as it aspires towards a greater degree of military-strategic cohesion given the disparate characteristics and tendencies of its individual constituents, the techno-economic giant in Japan, albeit with pacifist leanings, and finally, a diffident India that is yet to decide where it would belong in the global comity. While these six constituents are representative of the major players on the global stage by virtue of their actual stature, potential profile or revisionist-resistant capability in impacting global matters, the choice of members could undergo a change in form and content and this cannot be ruled out.

What is germane here is the manner in which the strategic identity and aspirations of these six arms can be further abbreviated. In the post-Cold War world it may not be invalid to suggest that the strategic configuration of relevance is that of a triangle represented by the USA, Russia and the PRC with all other states either aligning themselves tacitly with the US led western grouping or being of little consequence in the pursuit of strategic autonomy, with some exceptions. It is significant that the European Union and Japan are yoked with the US led strategic alliance as junior partners or subalterns and enjoy the protection of the US nuclear umbrella, as also share the trans-border military strategic capabilities of the alliance. Thus the quest for a certain degree of strategic autonomy outside of the US led alliance rests with Russia and China in terms of actual capabilities, while India is symbolic of a nation which has the pedigree and potential to acquire such a profile but is constrained by its unique blend of a different strategic culture that refuses to grapple with macro-military power and an intense commitment to pacifism and disarmament.

In terms of the post-Cold War impact on state itself as a political construct, a new typology appears to be unspooling. It is now opined that there are three categories of states: (a) the post-

colonial state that is weak and unconsolidated, often in an ongoing condition of flux in trying to cohere its determinants of statehood; (b) the modern Westphalian state—a consolidated nation-state with its own structural dynamic, identity and relative autonomy; and (c) the post-modern-state (the po-mo state?)—a complex, transnationally interpenetrated entity immersed in globalisation and multi-level governance.4Thus it would follow axiomatically that the nature of the pursuit of "security" would be conditioned by contextualising the state as a referrant in the above matrix and this pursuit could vary from issues of survivability and territoriality to more complex issues of asserting nationhood and the realisation of politico-diplomatic goals through suasive military methodologies.5

Transmutation of Security

The term "security " has undergone an interesting transmutation in the transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period. Whereas security in the Cold War was perceived as being exclusive and military—specific with an emphasis on the nuclear weapon and related strategic balance with the state as the primary and sole determinant in the zero sum competitive security calculus, the post- Cold War is more complex.The current interpretation accorded to security is more inclusive and holistic. The dominant view of comprehensive security for a nation-state and it subjects can find its origins in a hoary past going back to Kautilya or Sun-Tzu of the B.C. era or in a recent context to Buzan's 1977 formulation of the five strands of security as including political, economic, military, societal and environmental determinants.

The altered technological nature of the world and its impact on state and subject have already been noted and thus we have a post Cold War interpretation of the security semantic that is

inclusive; exudes a predominant economic focus; state primacy is being steadily diluted or voluntarily surrendered in a complex global matrix where trans-national and/or multi-national forces abetted by technology have come to the fore and where the state has to cope with a whole range of forces and under-currents unleashed by these systemic changes.

Within this altered framework of security, one would suggest that the military strand could be further categorised as a broad bandwidth moving from macro to traditional to micro security issues with specific post-Cold War characteristics. Conceptually the macro security issue would constitute trans-border military capability—both fire power and surveillance—such as missiles, long range aircraft, ships and submarines, satellites and such like. This macro security debate concerns the core members of the hexagon primarily, and the current global debate on WMD or weapons of mass destruction leading to regimes such as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Missile Technology Contral Regime is symptomatic of what I would venture to describe ever so tentatively as Foucauldian panopticism at play in post-Cold War international relations6 —though this is an issue that one cannot digress into at this stage.

The operative aspect of the macrosecurity debate is the manner in which such capabilities are almost always referred within the prevailing politico-military-strategic context and here certain maritime correspondences come to mind such as the 1922 Washington Naval Conference that placed ceilings on 'strategic" naval capabilities, including battleships and aircraft carriers. In a more limited sense for purpose of this paper, the Indian case for a carrier in 1947 and the reaction of the Admirality in London regarding the implications of according such a capability to India is instructive. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, it was evident that Britain

wanted an Indian Navy which would assist in serving the wide Allied cause, and not for independent power projection. 7 Thus the Royal Navy (RN) was willing in that decade to support the Canadian, Australian and New Zealand navies and "was prepared to 'carry' developments in these services to a greater extent because of their integration into the overall British and Allied concepts of naval defence.........India, by pursuing a policy of non-alignment with the Western alliance was not committed to these arrangements."8

If macro security concerns only the active members of the post- Cold War hexagon, traditional security is more applicable to almost all states of the world. This classification in my formulation9 dwells largely on the three or four armed forces that represent the military infrastructure for each nation-state and the relevance of such capability for the aspirations/aims of the state, from which linkage flows the military or defence or security strategy that states adopt.9 Again one notes a specific maritime/naval relevance or strand as far as such traditional capabilities go in the post-Cold War and the debate about "why-navy" and "what-navy" and "how much navy" has to be again contextualised in the ambit of the RMA—the revolution in military affairs and the ability of state policy makers to define adequacy and affordability as part of larger national aims/objectives and grand strategy.

The last aspect of security pertains to micro-security issues which encompass a clutch of activities/developments that have a symbiotic linkage with political-economic -societal and environmental factors and have the ability to adversely affect the security/stability of state and/or society. These include what I have qualified as the FUNTERNARSA-DD factor— fundamentalism of any hue, terrorism inspired by such ideology, narcotic networks that undermine state organs and individuals and small arms whose proliferation has become a hydra-

headed monstrosity and finally, demographic drift impelled by individual economic aspirations and free zealotry. Many of these activities can be brought within a grid but may be outside the scope of this paper.

Maritime Relevance and Indian Ocean

The rationale for any navy and what kind of capability it imports to the parent-state needs little elucidation to this audience and I am personally inclined to borrow and build on Cable's inimitable turn of phrase here—a set of tools in the national inventory whose visibility can be calibrated to suit the occasion—a pair of tongs that can be brought to bear to retrieve the awkward 'diplomatic' chestnut from a hotspot—suasive trans-border military capability that can be harnessed in an era of "violent peace."

Maritime strategy and its specific naval interpretation must therefore recognise all the factors we have outlined earlier. These include the changed post-Cold War geo-political context with the emergence of what may be termed geo-economic primacy, the transmutation of security in the post-Cold War and the typology of states in the late 20th century, and the grand national strategy that should, in a normative sense harmonise all these factors even while attempting to outline broader policy initiatives. To that extent maritime strategy is but a means to a larger end and the relevance of individual platforms such as the carrier acquires credibility only when so contextualised. Hence a swift overview of the maritime trends in the post-Cold War world may be noted.

Currently the maritime focus of the world has shifted from the Atlantic-Pacific combine to the Pacific-Indian Ocean in tandem with the shift from the geo-politics of competitive military

security in the Cold War to the frenzied free-trade and global economic inter-dependence-activities which are predicated on matters maritime, namely the nurturing of a low threat, stable environment at sea which would facilitate steady supply of energy/oil and the movement of foreign trade by sea. Thus the north-western Indian Ocean encompassing the oil-rich Persian Gulf has become of crucial significance to the major economies of the world. The US and EU apart, in Asia itself, Japan, Indonesia and India will have to recognise the maritime strands of their energy security and seek the most effective politico-military framework to nurture this national interest. In a period when the growing inter-dependence of the world and the end of bipolarity negates the possibility of the big fleet battles a la Mahan, nations will have to establish their maritime "presence" in areas of strategic interest and the Gulf looms large in the global perspective. This is no less relevant for India.

State, Security, Strategy: Symbiotic Linkage

Whether precious hydrocarbon or the scattered Indian diaspora in West Asia, there are many elements that constitute national interest and many of them can be extrapolated to the maritime domain and are best served by a carrier capability. This tenet has been acknowledged by most maritime nations and contrary to popular perception that the carrier is a relic of the Cold War, current trends are instructive. In the big league, the USA and France are investing in large nuclear -powered carriers ranging from 40,000 to 100,000 tonnes. Medium powers such as the UK continue to retain light carriers (10,000 to 20,000 tonnes) also referred to as sea control or air defence ships. Joining the list are Spain and Thailand. The latter commissioned its first helicopter carrier in mid-1997, thereby setting a precedent for the Association of South-East Asian Nations

(ASEAN). Waiting in the wings are Germany, Japan and China and all of them have an air defence ship in their strategic plans.

While the specific relevances of security at the three tiers outlined earlier can be extrapolated to the maritime dimension and each nation will have to draw up its blueprint of adequacy and affordability, the carrier cannot be seen in isolation for any state. At the macro level, the significance of the nuclear deterrent and its increasing shift to the maritime domain by way of the emphasis on submarine launched ballistic missile as envisaged under the STRAT treaties being negotiated between the usa and Russia cannot be ignored but is beyond the scope of this paper. What states will have to identify is the quality—both political and technological—and quantity of strategic military (trans-border) capability they need to acquire and sustain within the state typology and strategic matrix they symbolise. Naval capability, including the carrier, must be a harmonious part of this overall national capability and to a great extent, the emphasis on the post-Cold War RMA is on moving towards a joint operations doctrine of all the armed forces and related assets of state inventory.

Back to India

For India, the carrier experience as epitomized by the Vikrant saga and the extrapolation to the 21st century is symptomatic of this challenge of harmonising individual naval capabilities with the larger national grid. The need to replace the Vikrant has been examined by policy makers for some years and the persuasiveness of the argument is not in doubt. India will have to evolve a long-term strategic defence doctrine that weaves all the factors and strands noted earlier in defining the kind of strategic military capability it deems appropriate and affordable within the

context of prevailing global trends. The core question is not the desirability of a carrier in the Indian inventory in the next century which is not in doubt, but affordability. The Indian Navy is a Cinderella service and the contrast within the Indian armed forces is one of the most striking by global norms. In terms of personnel strength the Navy: Air Force: Army ratio is 1:2:22, while in budgetary allocation it is about 2:3:11. These force levels and budgetary allocations reflect the strategic orientation of the Indian security establishment as it grapples with various challenges and certain ground realities have to be acknowledged.

However the staff work for the replacement to the Vikrant has been going on for some years and the case for an indigenously designed and built ADS—air defence ship—is currently receiving the active consideration of the government. The proposed ship will be built at the state owned ship building yard in Cochin in the southern state of Kerala which has the necessary infrastructure. The naval staff is optimistic that necessary approval from the government will be accorded soon and that the vessel can be met from existing naval budgetary allocations. The successful commissioning of the indigenously designed and built missile destroyer, the INS Delhi in November 1997 is hopeful augury and the first decade of the next century may yet see an Indian designed and built medium carrier steaming in the Indian Ocean as part of a collective global co-operative effort—the Holy Grail the world hopes to steer towards.

Nuclear and Missile Proliferation

Sagan: Security, Domestic Politics, Norms Models

Security—increase national security against foreign threats. Because of the enourmous destructive power of nuclear weapons any state that seeks to maintain its national security must *balance* against any rival state that develops nuclear weapons by gaining access to a nuclear deterrent itself. Balancing can take two forms internal and external. A strong state will internally balance by drawing upon and mobilizing domestic resources to deploy a nuclear capability. States unable or unwilling to do this will externally balance by joining in alliance with an existing nuclear power. Examples: US, USSR, UK, PRC, India, Pakistan. Each responded to the fear of an existing rivals nuclear potential

Domestic—political tool to advance bureaucratic interests. Three key actors nuclear energy establishment (scientists), military constituencies (strategic missiles, nuclear propulsion for the navy), politicians in pro-nuke publics. Examples: India, South Africa. The 1964 PRC test did not trigger an immediate crash programme by India despite the advanced state of civilian nuclear energy. No concerted effort was made to ally with USSR or USA or others; conflicted with nonalignment. There was however an elite in the military and atomic energy commission who favored development. Senior foreign affairs and domestic officials were not involved in the initial decision to have a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE); they were simply informed of it. As there was no immediate follow-up Sagan suggests the decision was taken in haste. The PNE was done at a time of unpopularity for Indira Gandhi. In June 1974 91% surveyed said they were personally proud of the achievement and Gandhi's public support increased by one-third in 30 days.

Norms—symbols of state's modernity and identity. Symbols of national power; the trappings of a great power. Example: France.

For Sagan security explains the most cases.

Singh: Weaponization as Consistent with Global Disarmament

Singh, an Indian MP and member of the BJP which campaigned on open nuclear testing, attempts to explain why India conducted nuclear tests in 1998. He argues that India, which is not party to NPT or CTBT, has continued its long-standing policy in light of a nuclear world selecting between the choices of global disarmament or the Aexercise of the principle of equal and legitimate security for all@ (42), that is, become a nuclear weapons state. He characterizes past Indian nuclear policy as moralistic with little benefit, while the BJP policy is security-driven. It is also realistic: ANuclear weapons remain a key indicator of state power@ (44) He catalogs the past diplomatic efforts India has made on the non-use and elimination of the weapons which have been rebuffed by the nuclear-haves (44). Singh emphasizes in weaponizing overtly India broke no treaty obligations but Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation violated the NPT, making it a dead letter in South Asia, leaving it no choice (44). National interest supported by a consensus made the decision (46). Between two nuclear weapons states, in a world in which nuclear deterrence covers all but Africa and southern Asia, India filled a vacuum to defend its own security.

Immediately after the nuclear tests in 1998, the Indian government made this same case---the security environment, especially a perceived American tilt toward the PRC, necessitated weaponization---and received enthusiastic support from its citizenry in the form of rallies and op-eds. In his discussion of the global nuclear situation, Singh mentions that much of the world is covered by nuclear guarantees and that India is not but does not mention any diplomatic attempts to enter into an extended deterrence agreement.

The stated deterrent target of weaponization was the PRC, yet India has not developed a way to deliver warheads to vital targets (on East and South China Seas); weaponziation is not a credible threat to the PRC until adequate delivery systems are fielded but may be directed as a deterrent to Pakistan. There is, however, another way of looking at it: tactical use. What has been produced are relatively low-yield warheads, with such weapons the costs of nuclear warfare are *contestable*. Nuking an armored column with MiG-29s may be contemplated. Weaponization has a dual purpose: tactical use against a Chinese invasion and deterring Pakistani first-use.

It is a case of nuclearization but not MAD.

Do you find weaponization consistent with calls for global disarmament? What does Singh mean by nuclear apartheid?

Command & Control

Implications on Confidence-Building Measures: Applicability of

Cold War models

David Karl critiques several of the assertions of proliferation pessimists relating to preventive war, doctrine and crisis stability. He uses the South Asian proliferation case to test these fears. Karl finds an Aabsence of preventive-war thinking@ (100) and that conventional Indo-Pakistani conflicts have been relatively Alimited@ in nature (99). The intensity and perceived vital-ness of the conflict, Karl argues, make this a critical case for the proliferation pessimists (102). The 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict (PRC nuclearized in 1964 but had no credible strategic delivery system) offered an opportunity for a preventive strike which was not taken, possibly deterred by the USA (103). In terms of crisis stability, Karl notes that new proliferators do not maintain a hair-trigger launch-on-warning bunker mentality in peacetime that Nuclear Club members do and lack the AEW and radar network for such alerts (111). (India is building a satellite force.) They may have to as threats/targets are regional (yielding short flight time), increasing the possibility of an accidental launch. Lacking hardened silos and SSBNs (both technologically and financially difficult), small nuclear powers have relied on simple survivability techniques (109) which often leave warheads non-weaponized or apart from launch vehicles (113). These states have also not developed rigid doctrines for us of the weapons (116). Karl conludes that he sees no reason inherent in nuclear weapons to expect new proliferants to adopt the same policies which existed in the bipolar Cold War (117). The fears of pessimists seem to be largely unfounded in Karl=s look at the behavior of proliferators. There are two major classes of proliferators: those with sufficient conventional forces to defeat likely threats (on their own territory) and those lack who such conventional forces. Despite the arrival of nukes, the Indo-Pak rivalry remains in its overwhelming character, conventional with nukes seen as another weapon

(as it was seen at the end of WWII). These two countries maintain large conventional forces with assymetries in the dyad greatly favoring India. When viewed regionally, the relationship is balanced as PLA deployments in Tibet prevent India from throwing everything at Pakistan. Furthermore, conventional forces can do substantial damage; nuclearized conflict is not really a new threshold. It should be noted while India did not attack Pakistan=s nuke sites to preventive deployment of the capability, Israel did Iraq in the analogous case. Indian air strikes would have been seen as a prelude to an armored column rolling across the border while Israel striking Iraq could credibly be considered limited. Doctrines will be made to reflect security necessities.

Clearly this is a much different case than the Cold War. CBM.

Conclusions.