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Research design: framing a national security problem for mass media transmission

In the case of a national security crisis, governing elites will   by definition   have a limited amount of time during which to deliver a persuasive argument to the relevant audience. In all but the most localized systems, the mass media will be essential for the delivery of the desired message. With this in mind, elites structure their statements to maximize institutional benefits. This paper will discuss these issues which lie at the intersection of media studies and problem representation in the context of India s (perceived) security crisis in Kargil (1999) in the hopes of constructing a useful research design. Rather than describing a particular media system in detail or seeking to assess media effects, this endeavor seeks to consider desired-content inputs to information distribution systems, particularly in their connections to policy. Within the foreign policy literature, the problem representation research program is an often-cited enterprise which informs this debate. Before proceeding to the research plan, some background on the Kargil conflict will be offered.

Representing the Problem

General Description of the Historical Events

In Spring of 1999, in the aftermath of NATO s air offensive against Serbia, India launched air strikes against targets in the Kargil region of Kashmir as part of *Operation Vijay*[1]. The escalation to the use of air power was perceived as qualitatively different from the low-intensity artillery and infantry exchanges which have occurred with frequency in the region. It

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[1] Interestingly, India has used this operation name before. In 1961, *Operation Vijay* was launched as the liberation of Goa, a foreign-held territory viewed as part of sovereign India.

was with the beginning of the Indian Air Force s entry into the conflict that regional newspapers gave more prominence to the story and the international press began detailed coverage. The use of air power required a clear decision taken by high-ranking national security officials. Typically land forces are deployed on the Line of Control and participate in low-intensity border clashes. These clashes have been ongoing events for several decades, controlled by field commanders. While air force interceptors (Soviet-designed MiG-21*bis* being the most common) are available in the area in small quantities, they do not generally fly in a Combat Air Support (CAS) role and lack significant strike capabilities. Air Force tactics and composition changed on both these grounds in May 1999. As forces had to be transferred from other military districts, this was not accidental but a deliberate decision made at a high level of the national security apparatus. For this reason, it seems potentially useful to apply the types of approaches toward understanding leadership decision-making that cognitive model and problem representation scholars have used.

The Indian government identified the problem in Kargil as Pakistani infiltration across the Line of Control. As the extent of intrusions into the Kargil sector became clear, the Indian Army responded to this new threat to national security. With the Air Force being launched into conducting air strikes against the intruders positions, all efforts were directed at denying the enemy any further movement across the Line of Control (LC) into Indian territory. The Army consolidated its positions in this sector, while building up with more troops being inducted. Artillery and other equipment was also brought into the sector to provide our own troops with covering fire and neutralize the enemy's guns and positions (Bharatiya Thal Sena). Many of these intruders turned out to be Pakistani troops as New Delhi had claimed not the domestic Kashmiri freedom fighters Islamabad countered with (Hasnain). The infiltrators captured a

number of key hills which Indian political authorities demanded be retaken. Infiltrating units were operating as irregular military forces, armed primarily with Chinese-made infantry weapons. While Indian and Pakistani artillery increased the frequency of exchanges during this time of tensions, political considerations prohibited Islamabad from permitting regular and acknowledged units to be used in support of infantry actions. The Indian military had no such restriction and used heavy infantry, artillery, helicopters and fighter-jets to assist light forces already in theater.

Place in Context of the Longer Conflict

The conflict in Kargil, of course, did not happen in isolation: it was a manifestation of a much longer period of tension. Kargil is one of the districts (equivalent to US counties) which make up the province of Srinagar which together with the province of Jammu form the state which is represented in India s parliament as Jammu and Kashmir, these being the Indian-controlled sectors of Kashmir. The state of Jammu and Kashmir retains a special status within the Union government: the rest of the states follow the Indian constitution, but Jammu and Kashmir has its own constitution (adopted in 1956) that affirms the integrity of the state within the Republic of India.

Jammu and Kashmir is treated in this way by the Indian central government, different from the other states, due to a different history of incorporation. Some attempts were made in the 19th century to define the boundaries of the territory, but precise definition was in many cases defeated by the nature of the country and by the existence of huge tracts lacking permanent human settlement. In the far north, for example, the maharaja's authority extended to the Karakoram Range, but beyond lay a debatable zone on the borders of the Turkestan and Sinkiang

regions of Central Asia, and the boundary was never demarcated. There were similar doubts about the alignment of the frontier where this northern zone skirted the region known as Aksai Chin (now claimed by China), to the east, and joined the better known and more precisely delineated boundary with Tibet, which had served for centuries as the eastern border of the Ladakh region. The pattern of boundaries in the northwest became clearer in the last decade of the 19th century, when Britain delimited boundaries in the Pamir region in negotiations with Afghanistan and Russia. At this time Gilgit, always understood to be part of Kashmir, for strategic reasons was constituted as a special agency in 1889 under a British agent. As long as the existence of the territory was guaranteed by the United Kingdom, the weaknesses in its structure and along its peripheries were not of great consequence; following the British withdrawal from South Asia in 1947, however, they became apparent. By the terms agreed upon for the partition of the Indian subcontinent between India and Pakistan, the rulers of princely states were given the right to opt for either Pakistan or India or   with certain reservations   to remain independent. The maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, initially believed that by delaying a decision he could maintain the independence of Kashmir, but, caught up in a train of events that included a revolution among his Muslim subjects along the western borders of the state and the intervention of Pashtun tribesmen, he signed an Instrument of Accession to the Indian Union in October 1947. This was the signal for intervention both by Pakistan, which considered that the state was a natural extension of Pakistan, and by India, which intended to confirm the act of accession. Localized warfare continued during 1948 and was terminated through the intercession of the United Nations in a cease-fire, which took effect in January 1949. In July of the same year, India and Pakistan defined a cease-fire line that divided the administration of the territory.

Regarded merely as a temporary expedient, this partition along the cease-fire line still exists, though warfare between the two contestants was briefly resumed in 1965 and again in 1971, despite the many proposals made to end the dispute. Thus, the "Kashmir problem" has remained intractable. Although there was a clear Muslim majority in the state before the 1947 partition and its economic, cultural, and geographic contiguity with the Muslim-majority area of the Punjab could be convincingly demonstrated, the accidents of history have resulted in a division of territory that has no rational basis. Pakistan has been left with territory that, although basically Muslim in character, is thinly populated, relatively inaccessible, and economically underdeveloped. The largest Muslim group, situated in the Vale of Kashmir and estimated to number more than half the population of the entire state, lies in Indian-administered territory, with its former outlets via the Jhelum valley route blocked. India thus acquired the lion's share of both territory and population and with them substantial linguistic, ethnic, and religious problems. There have been a number of movements seeking a merger of Kashmir with Pakistan, independence for Jammu and Kashmir from both India and Pakistan, or the granting of union territory status to Buddhist Ladakh. To contend with these movements, confront Pakistani forces along the cease-fire line, and support the administrative structure of the state, the union government has maintained a strong military presence in the Indian sector, especially since the end of the 1980s.

Competing claims over Kashmir between India and Pakistan have also been the trigger for two (1948, 1965) of the three wars fought between the rivals as well as the nuclearized war almost fought (1990). Kargil district contains strategic heights on the Line of Control in the Indian section. The Kargil problem is then hardly unique to trigger a conflict in the dyadic

relationship. However, actions taken in Kargil did not escalate in the same manner as one may

suspect given the history of Indo-Pakistani relations. One factor which may account for increased

caution was the weaponization of nuclear programs of both countries in 1998 including the

fielding of delivery systems. As other new nuclear powers have done with the acquisition of such

weapons, India placed nuclear forces under civilian-political rather than military command (India

has strict subordination of an apolitical military to civilian authority, a legacy of the British-

officered Indian Army and Indian Marine of the colonial period.) This enhanced the prerogative

of civilian authorities to be involved at a tactical level in war planning and execution against

nuclear-armed powers. This is an argument for caution in militarizing the conflict[2], yet actions

were taken. A model of the Kargil must examine the motivations and decisions of the various key

actors which overrode this systemic constraint.

Crises and Images

Indian authorities defined the situation in Kargil as a crisis. As the FPDM community has

developed a literature on crisis decision-making, it may be useful to evaluate the claim. A crisis

situation requires time constraints and the underlying issue to be of importance. On the second

point Kargil can qualify as both the civilian and military authorities of India place a great value

on the defense of territorial sovereignty, especially from arch-rival Pakistan. Where urgency is

concerned, the picture is less clear. The infiltrators did not just suddenly appear but crossed the

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[2] That both Pakistan and India have nuclear weapons and delivery systems does not mean that a situation of MAD has evolved. Neither side has the capability, or will acquire it in the near future, to deliver unacceptable damage (25% population, 50% industry) against the enemy. Large sections of India are not even within range of Pakistan s most advanced IRBM s.

border over a period of time. The operations conducted by these irregulars did not change in character when India identified the Crisis. Indian border control obviously failed to secure the Line of Control but there was also an intelligence failure in detecting the presence of irregular forces occupying key strategic sites. As such, the situation may be analogous to the Cuban Missile/Caribbean Crisis in which CIA/NSA photo interpreters failed to alert high-level US decision-makers to the presence of Soviet missile infrastructure in Cuba when it first appeared. The other potential explanation answers the question: When will a national security crisis provide the greatest political pay-off? Once again, the JFK/CUBA (Sylvan) precedent being used close to an election may be instructive. The Indian government defined Kargil as a crisis during a period of political instability. India is a parliamentary democracy in which the government coalition must maintain a majority in the *Lok Sabha* to continue in power. In Spring of 1999, the BJP-led government lost a vote of confidence, triggering a government crisis. As the opposition Congress (I) was unable to form a majority, the President dissolved Parliament pending new elections. The BJP remained in control as care-taker until elections were held in October (which, incidentally, they won handily). By taking a strong, nationalistic line in defense of national sovereignty, the BJP solidified its base and raised approval ratings. This also placed a time-constraint on resolving the matter to India s satisfaction before the election. The situation was presented by decision-makers to the electorate as a crisis and fulfils relevant criteria.

A strategic image is a subject s cognitive construction or mental representation of another actor in the political world (Herrman and Fischerkeller 415). An image includes a judgement of the threat or opportunity represented by the subject for both absolute and relative gains, relative power which constrains options, and cultural dimensions such as norms (Herrman and

Fischerkeller 425). The five types of images are: enemy, ally, degenerate, imperialist and colony. The enemy image and spiral model which is associated with it have played a dominant role in psychology-influenced IR treatments. This single image presents the problem of being limited in its domain of applicability to those in which adversaries were roughly comparable in [power] capability, had somewhat comparable cultural sophistication, and in which leaders perceived great threat from the other state (Herrman and Fischerkeller 416) for example a superpower interaction in the Cold War. Ally image refers to a perceived relationship in which the subject s belief in prospects for mutual gain outweighs the importance of perceived capability or cultural judgements (on relative sophistication). The degenerate image is seen as representing a great opportunity to exploit and is similar in capability but suffering from cultural decay. Imperialist image represents the ideal case of a subject seeing intense threat from a state that is much more powerful but not culturally superior. The colony image is just the opposite, viz., a subject believes there is a great opportunity to exploit a target actor which is both weaker and culturally inferior (Herrman and Fischerkeller 426). Using these ideal types, the researcher takes the verbal behavior of leaders and seeks a match. Depending on the strength and divergence of domestic opposition, policies may not conform to projections. Indian leaders image of Pakistan based upon capability and culture is what Herrman and Fischerkeller termed enemy. If Pakistan is the enemy : What is the nature of this enemy? How have leaders come to this conclusion?

Operation Vijay can be distilled into two components: isolating pockets of infiltrators and destroying their strongholds. The first requires local infantry to take actions supplied by adequate intelligence. The second has greater logistical requirements in support of a multi-divisional frontal assault on treacherous mountain peaks coupled with CAS operations. The former was

relatively automatic upon discovery of infiltration and has been authorized by local commanders, though on a smaller scale, in this theater on a number of occasions. The counter-offensive is where important decision-making at the tactical and strategic levels was undertaken by both political and military authorities. Specific decisions included: reinforcement of Kashmir, air strikes authorized, placing armed forces nationwide on alert, and deploying armor for a counter-offensive across the Thar Desert at Pakistan proper. Key institutional decision-makers in the Indian central government were Prime Minister (Atal Bihari Vajpayee), Minister of External Affairs (Jaswant Singh), Defence Minister (George Fernandes), Chief of Army Staff (Gen Shankar Roychowdhury), Chief of Air Staff (ACM S K Sareen), Chief of Naval Staff (Adm Vishnu Bhagwat). The first three are political portfolios and the service chiefs are military officers; roles and motivations vary between these two groups. The primary task of the military is to defend the territorial integrity [of India] from external aggression and threats (Avsm). This is a very typical role for institutionalized democratic states. Issues of sovereignty resonate strongly with this mission. The secondary use for the military is to provide aid to civil authorities whenever required due to internal problems or natural calamities (Avsm). This task is different from what Americans may expect, in fact the Pentagon is prohibited from taking action domestically, but is common in both developing and advanced countries. The most common operations in this role are rescue missions following monsoons. For its other component, most police duties are conducted by civilian forces except in regions deemed high-risk by the government. Kargil is one such region in which BTS army and paramilitary forces are deployed for internal security. This mission can be viewed as counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency. Of the three service branches, only the land forces devote any significant effort to the

secondary mission. The Sea and Air Force commanders would view the enemy as military forces of a foreign power making cross-border incursions or seizing territory. Their favored response will be described in terms of defense of territorial integrity, or sovereignty. Incursions in Kargil by an enemy will be seen as less threatening by sea forces as their response options are limited, at best, being able to blockade and strike (with missiles and aircraft) Pakistani ports but unable to directly stop such incursions. The air force will be more able to address the threat, though less than intercepting enemy strike-fighters, by strafing enemy fielded forces and supply logistics as well as striking value sites in enemy territory. Land forces will be most motivated to act as they have two missions being activated: defense of territory and counter-terrorism. Land incursions describe in the Kargil affair also signify a previous failure in defense on their part. The response of land forces will be more counter-force: engaging enemy units and recapturing land with secondary operations capturing the support network for deployed irregular forces. All the service chiefs will describe the infiltrators as enemy (being military) in terms of sovereignty; the army will also associate terrorism with them.

The civilian authorities are politicians. As India is a parliamentary democracy these ministers are MP s who must periodically stand for election (within at most five years). These individuals are all members of the BJP party coalitions which is now the dominant force in Indian politics at the federal level. In their institutional roles, these civilian leaders will share the same territorial security and internal stability motivations as their military counterparts. As many are Hindu nationalists and politicians looking to the next election, they will appeal to Indian patriotism or nationalism with references to heroes and martyrs in the campaign like the funeral oration recounted by Thucydides. There are then three motivations: territorial integrity, anti-

terrorism and political advantage, the last not being shared with the military. These BJP leaders will view the infiltrators as the enemy but not see them in a strictly military or paramilitary fashion; they may also include members of a restless minority religious group of civilians (Muslims). Incidently, Kashmir is the only Indian state with a Muslim majority and the BJP runs weakly there.

Case and Model

There is a paucity of published studies on the Kargil problem. This is not surprising as events of May 1999 are very recent in the academic publishing cycle. More generally, relative to other regional foci there has been little problem representation or computational modeling work performed on Indo-Pakistani conflict in American political science journals of recent years. Work done on other regions, however, may travel. A region with a fifty year conflict, following the removal of British authority, between two sides each predominantly of a different religion, only one of which is a stable democracy and which fought a militarized engagement in each the 1940's, 1960's and 1970's is, of course, Palestine. This is not to say the domains are identical but empirical testing may be worthwhile.

The assertions, in the above section, should be tested against open-source texts as Sylvan has done in the Israel-Palestine context. Using the CIA s FBIS translations from February 1994 to July 1997, Sylvan coded speeches and interviews of seven political leaders. To capture the leaders problem representation, he coded for Complexity, Primary Cause of Problem, Domestic Splits, Degree of Conditionality, Number of Actors to be Involved, Centrality of a Given Image, Audience, and Text Type. Sylvan claims the Leader s Problem Representation drives *actions*, as reported by Reuters, of conflict or cooperation. He found two results: (1) Complexity and

Centrality were the strongest factors and (2) there is the claimed relationship with a slight lag.

Modeling Problem Representation for Decision-Making in the Kargil Crisis

The objective of this study is to look for connections between the problem representation used and propensity for conflict or cooperation. This study is expected to confirm Sylvan s work and demonstrate its portability: problem representation drives and is reflected by policy decisions as embodied in diplomatic and security actions. To do this, a research design similar to Sylvan s will be employed. Admittedly, a comprehensive study of the Kargil crisis would consider internal documents and private conversations held among key decision-makers; due to security concerns the Indian government has classified these as not available to foreign researchers. Given these data limitations, one is left with open sources. These are the mass media both print and electronic. Do decision-makers represent problems the same way in public and in private? One cannot accept this assumption before seeing conclusive cross-cultural cross-system studies. By relying on open sources, the focus of the study changes to modeling the *marketing* of problem representations, i.e., how a decision-maker presents, or to use Iyengar s term, frames, a problem to the public. It cannot be assumed this matches perfectly the decision-maker s own problem representation. Even with this caveat, a relationship between this marketing and action can be posited[3]. The textual basis for the study uses press releases, speeches, and interviews/press conferences as available from Indian official government web sites (parliament, external affairs, defence, army, navy, air force, prime minister), FBIS, major Indian (*Times of India*, Rediff, *The Hindu*, PTI, *Indian Express*, *Economic Times*) and western news sources (*Times*, Reuters, AP, *NY Times*, UPI, BBC). For a passage of text to be considered in the dataset, the word Kargil

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[3] Such marketing is arguably an action in itself. For this study, however, the narrower definition of action is used.

must appear in it. In its final form the study will produce a *comprehensive* data set for the period of the Kargil Crisis. Each passage is coded as interview or speech (responses to questions in parliament, even if in the form of a speech are less prepared and thus coded interview); the audience is also coded [domestic mass/Pakistani government or military/regional press or public/extra-regional press or public/Indian parliament/Indian military]. Complexity is coded as complex or simple in terms of aspects to the problem. Image is any of the options listed above with the form which this object takes noted. The centrality of the image is strong if it dominates all references to Pakistan, medium if some references rely on a different image and weak if it accounts for less than a majority of image-references. The next factor is the admission of splits domestically. In resolution of the problem a varied number of states could be involved which is coded [unilateral/+dyadic/+regional/+great powers/+multilateral IGO/neutral arbitration/NGO]. Finally the key source and motivation of the problem being discussed is coded.

When the tests have been run there will be two groups of findings: What is the relationship between image aspect and problem source (if any)? Does problem representation predict to action? To test the latter, it is necessary to construct a time line placing the decision-makers expressed thoughts in a chronological sequence with actions taken, whether under that decision-makers direct control or not, as reported by Indian media sources listed above. (Indian sources are used to reduce the lag often evident in the US press.)

Sample Results from Empirical Tests of the Model

The table offers some data to address the first question. The second question can only be useful answered when more data (at least 20 time-points) have been plotted. Even for the image-PR link, no definitive claim can be made with such a low *n*.

Individual: Vajpayee (PM)

Source of Text: http://www.meadev.gov.in/speeches/pm-jun.htm (Reprinted in Appendix)

Variable	Code
Date	June 07, 1999
Type of Text	speech
Audience	domestic mass
Complexity	simple
Image	enemy (military/paramilitary)
Centrality of Image	medium
Domestic Splits?	None admitted
State Actors to Be Involved	+dyadic
Problem/Key Motive	violation of sovereignty; appeal to national identity

This text selection (Vajpayee 1999) is a speech given by the PM, a civilian leader, to the Indian public while discharging official duties of his care-taker government but during an election cycle. The language and thoroughness of explanations are simple, perhaps dictated by the low-literacy of the audience. The objects involved in causing the problem are enemy military and paramilitary units called regulars and intruders. Vajpayee claims it a sacred duty (Vajpayee 1999) to expel all of these objects. He links these enemy objects to Pakistan but also talk about progress towards peace made with Pakistan and appeals to Pakistan to recall these intruders. In this way, Pakistan is not a monolithic enemy but can be dealt with on a number of levels. As not all, but most, references to Pakistan are of the primary image aspect selected the centrality of said image aspect is coded medium. This is a very nationalistic speech appealing to patriotism and as such does not

hint at divisions within the Indian body politic. On the other hand it could be questioning

Congress (I) patriotism as there contemporary speeches have a different flavor. This issue may be

resolved in a larger sample. Sticking strictly to the PM s words, no domestic split is admitted.

Vajpayee hints at how the problem can be resolved noting unilateral actions (military expulsion)

and diplomatic interaction such that Pakistan withdraws the intruders. This is coded +dyadic

which is consistent with India s long-term Kashmir policy of no-third-parties but bilateral

negotiations in which it can leverage a strategic advantage in all aspects of power. The source of

the problem is violation of sovereignty about which Vajpayee spends substantial time; late in the

speech he appeals to patriotism making heroic martyrs of those serving. The final phrase is Jai

Hind which was the subversive pro-independence battle-cry of the late colonial period.

Conclusion

Clearly more analysis need to be done, but this is the general framework in which they

will be. From this text sample, the predictions made earlier were wrong. It was expected

Vajpayee would include attributes of terrorism and domestic subversion as well as the military

incursion he states. He represented (or marketed?) the problem though open source mass media

much as it was expected military leaders would. Only comparison among texts will shed light on

this. Even with this fault, it was predicted that a military enemy would be linked with sovereignty

arguments, as it was. The action predicted (but not yet empirically tested) would be a military

response, namely counter-force offensive. Such operations were launched but a thorough time

line has not been constructed to permit consideration of plausible links.

As more tests are performed the following questions can be addressed: do military and

civilian leaders differ in their problem representations? Can problem representation be linked to

action? How did audience effect marketing? Are images consistent across the leaders and time?

Appendix

"Address to the Nation"

by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee

June 7, 1999

My dear countrymen,

You are well aware of the situation which has developed in Kargil :

It is a serious situation;

It is a situation fraught with danger;

It is a situation that has arisen from one simple fact: the decision of Pakistan to cross the Line of Control, to send its men and materials to occupy our territory.

No government can tolerate such an incursion our Government certainly will not.

Countries the world over have recognised that we have the full right to evict these intruders from our soil. But for me, and for my Government this is not just a matter of our having a right. It is our duty to rid our sacred Motherland of every single intruder.

For this reason, as you have seen, our armed forces have launched a major operation to drive them back. No one should entertain the slightest doubt: they shall not stop till they have completely attained their objective. No one shall stop them till they have done so.

You know well that our relations with Pakistan, as with all our neighbours, were improving rapidly:

The Prime Ministers and other ministers of the two countries were in regular contact;

Dialogue among officials of the two countries was proceeding constructively, and satisfactorily;

Areas of cooperation had been identified, and, at various levels, plans were afoot to work together on each of them;

Most important, people-to-people contacts and exchanges had opened up as never before in fifty years there had been an outpouring of goodwill on both sides.

In the midst of all this, regulars of the Pakistan Army and infiltrators have been sent across. Fomenting insurgency here was heinous enough. But this time Army regulars have been sent. They have been sent to occupy our territory. And, having occupied it, to choke off our links with other parts of our country in particular with Siachin and Ladakh.

This step has been taken after a great deal of preparation. It was a preplanned operation.

It is a repudiation of the letter and spirit of the Lahore Declaration. It is a violation not just of one article of the Simla Agreement, but an eightfold violation of that solemn Agreement.

The Simla Agreement binds each side to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of the other. The Clauses repeatedly enjoin that neither side shall use the threat of force or force to affect the territorial integrity of the other.

The Agreement deals specifically with the Line of Control. It lays down that the Line of Control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides. Furthermore, that "Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally". The Agreement goes a step ahead and

specifies, "Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this Line."

And yet that is exactly what Pakistan has done: it has used force in an attempt to unilaterally alter the Line of Control.

This having been done, it has now been said that the Line of Control is vague. This is nothing but an ex post artifice to justify aggression. After Agreement in Simla in 1972, the military authorities of the two sides went over the Line of Control section by microscopic section. The salients, the locations, the coordinates were marked out on detailed maps. The exercise was done thoroughly: five months were expended on delineating the maps so that no ambiguity may remain.

Not just that, at no time in the last 27 years has the Line of Control been called in question not once, not on a single occasion.

The new assertion, therefore, is just a contrivance to explain away the aggression. It will fool no one. And I do want to make it plain: if the stratagem now is that, the intrusion should be used to alter the Line of Control through talks, the proposed talks will end before they have begun.

India is always open to talks. But the talks must have a definite, specific purpose. In the present instance, the subject is one, and one alone: the intrusion, and how Pakistan proposes to undo it. To discuss this, our doors are always open, and all dates are convenient to us.

India wants peace. We are at peace with all other neighbours of ours. We were taking major steps with Pakistan also towards undoing the fifty-year history of bitterness. Our people desire it. Our Government is committed to it. We have travelled quite some distance for it.

I remain confident that the people of Pakistan too yearn for peace and harmony. They know the possible costs of hostilities of how these will push economic gains even further beyond the horizon. They know that in today s world whosoever launches aggression of any kind will get isolated in the international community.

Moreover, both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers. Our responsibilities in this regard are all the greater.

Therefore, I once again urge the Government of Pakistan: undo the armed intrusion.

We must hope, my countrymen, that even now reason will prevail, that those within Pakistan who see the folly of aggression will have their way. But till that happens, we have a job on our hands.

Our first thought, and our last thought must be for our jawans, for our airmen and our officers who are fighting back the intruders. I want each one of them to know: the entire country stands with you, every Indian is grateful to you. The whole operation has been thrust upon us. To ensure victory, you would not be wanting in your requirements.

Our jawans and officers are laying down their lives. Should we be continuing our petty squabbles at such a time? We should stand by them and avoid unnecessary debates.

Let us use this occasion to learn from our defence forces: let us translate into our own conduct some of the discipline for which they are renowned.

The whole world is watching how our brave armed forces are defending the Motherland in inhospitable hilly terrain and at grave risks to their lives. In this hour of crisis, we must maintain an equanimity and act with confidence.

We should not be disheartened by some momentary mishap. We must realise the gravity of the situation and emulate the fortitude with which our fighting men take such events in their stride;

Have confidence in the ability of our armed forces.

The armed forces shall accomplish this task and ensure that no one dares to indulge in this kind of misadventure in future.

Jai Hind.

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