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Research Design: Anti-colonial movements and competitive politics after liberation

Introduction

Much of the transitions, and more generally the comparative, literature has focused on the relatively developed states of the North Atlantic community, with Latin America receiving less but noticeable interest. These states are dissimilar from much of the rest of the world, the former having long since resolved their stateness questions, constructed national identities, undergone economic development and experienced long periods of democratic governance. As such, the studies of these advanced states may insufficiently inform inquiries regarding newer states. Over the past decade, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Eastern Europe and Russia with their struggles of transition have become hot topics. Something scholars of Eastern European transitions have been seeking to explain is why arguments rooted in the electoral rules of Western Europe are unable to explain outcomes in the East. In other words, explanations which fit the cases in Western Europe focused upon electoral rules, such as Duverger s famous treatment (1954), are not explaining events as they occur and have provided leaders guidance with unintended consequences.

It appears there may be a distinction to be drawn between regime transitions in new and in mature states for the socialization of elites and the mass public as well as the legitimization of state institutions and their authority. Zielinski suggests that *early* in democracy elites look to the long-term to influence their electoral reforms and/or survive the party attrition to position

themselves for a role in the successive stable system while *later* after the said system had stabilized the paradigmatic electoral rules scheme analysis with their posited short-term oriented rational actors can offer accurate predictions. If this is true, the literature has been studying the wrong set of cases to draw solutions for transitions in Eastern Europe. North America and Western Europe are filled with advanced democracies in which institutions including electoral rules are relatively inflexible, social identities are established and the state legitimacy is accepted. None of these conditions are present in some Eastern European states. Furthermore, even if scholars were to return to the transition epochs for these democracies applicability would be in question. British, French and American democratic transitions (or at least their origins) predate the industrial revolution (and with it, the rise of working-class interests organized into trade unions). Doubtless, no scholar of Eastern Europe would make claims whose bases could not account for the class interests as conceptualized by Marx and substantiated as salient under the USSR-aligned governments. In any case, the parties literature has focused upon the functioning of democracies, post-transition. The present question differs in focus.

There is another set of cases which have been ignored and could help to inform the evolving debate. Beginning in the aftermath of WWII, Euro-American decolonization of large areas of Asia and Africa created dozens of new states, the study of which is more feasible than 17th century England (in terms of record keeping and administrative measures). These postcolonial (or less developed, or Third World, etc.) states in half a century have had the task of constructing institutions of governance including institutional rules, coping with identities having

been permitted to emerge after a period of suppression by an external power which had dominated the political life of the area, and establishing authority over territory contiguous with others facing the same struggle. The states transitioned rapidly in the aftermath of a hegemonic war in which democratic republics were among the victors. Huntington called this period of democratization a Second Wave which included the occupation-enforced democratizations of Japan, West Germany and Italy as well as that of the decolonized periphery. The members of this group of nations are arguably more analogous and thus, when properly studied, more useful for the scholars of Eastern Europe to take into account for their own work. Beyond relevance to cases popular in the scholarly journals, postcolonial democratic transitions need to be studied precisely because they have not been given adequate treatment thus far. This work aspires to suggest an avenue for the study of cases of postcolonial transition, specifically, in respect to the role political organizations including parties of the pre-independence period have on the creation and consolidation of institutions of the successor state.

Key Questions

How do political organizations, which agitate for system change, react when that transformation occurs? The transformation of the anti-system organizations in national liberation movements in decolonizing areas into political parties in the new mass suffrage contexts and their role in setting up the party system of the successor state in which they would potentially compete is the key issue. The twentieth century saw the dismantling of colonial empires with the transfer of statutory authority over the erstwhile colonies to indigenous populations, often

indigenous elites. Whether the transfer of power was initiated by local action or a change of perceived interests in the metropole, authority was to be transferred to someone. The organizations best positioned to be the recipients of government institutions were often those very organizations which had agitated for systemic change. As these variously constituted liberation movements were constructed to seek the departure of the colonial overlord, that objective having been satisfied, what happened to the movement? Below it is argued that the movement transformed itself into a system-supporting political organization within a system it created.

The movements became political parties. These organizations faced a number of challenges: (1) to build and legitimize the institutions of a successor government; (2) to provide a mechanism for determining who would govern, and (3) demobilizing an often-agitated population. Key among these is the determination of what form the new political system will take. The history of the movement, it is argued below, contributes to explanations of what political system is selected and how it functions.

Consider this illustration. The Indian National Congress was founded in 1885 among the indigenous British-educated elite as a deliberative body through which to express grievances to the Raj. Through the first decade of the twentieth century it was an organization which worked within the bounds prescribed by the existing political system. Over the next three decades, the Congress transformed its existing institutions to actively dispute the legitimacy of the Raj and meanwhile to integrate the masses into the political movement. As Lipset and Rokkan suggested, parties are the essential agencies of mobilization for the integration of local communities into a

national whole. What was retained throughout the transformation was the essentially democratic nature of the selection of Congress leaders and decision-making process on policy. In the immediate prelude to independence (1937, under the Government of India Act of 1935), the UK devolved control over local affairs to an indigenous parliament for which Congress successfully stood candidates. From that point forward, including after independence in 1947, Congress was the dominant party at all levels of the Indian government until the 1960's and at the national level until the end of that decade. The primary national liberation movement became one of a number of parties in a successor political system after its liberation objectives were achieved. When Congress lost elections within a political system it largely had constructed, power was transferred orderly and peacefully. This need not be the case.

Some of the relevant lines of inquiry to be pursued are: Does the relative democratic-ness of a movement organization translate to the party organization s decision-making apparatus? Do more democratic organizations in the anti-system movement predict to greater support for a competitive democratic party system after the transition by that movement's elite? Is a mass movement more likely than an elite-only movement to predict to the successor party's ability to incorporate newly-enfranchised masses? How does the party (which has won systemic changes) respond to electoral defeat when and if it arrives? Does the character of the independence struggle suggest the regime-type which will be selected after victory? Does institutional, elite or administrative continuity predict to regime stability? What role does credit-taking for independence play in the post-victory political configurations?

Definitions

For the sake of clarity there are a number of terms which appear frequently in comparative politics literature whose definitions should be stated. *Regime* is taken to be the basic form of government in a state which is practiced by all legitimated system actors. Regime types include democracy and authoritarian (Juan Linz lists several more which are not needed for the present discourse).

Like any other basic concepts, treatments of *democracy* in theory and empirically have consumed vast forests for explications. Claiming neither the exhaustive nor final statement, democracy derives its legitimating authority from those whom are governed. In practical terms democracy shall be deemed as present in cases where elections, participated in by citizens enfranchised under universal adult suffrage select among a number of choices, however determined, determine the context in which governments may be formed and/or the policies selected for implementation.

Authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, may deny political participation or severely and discriminatingly restrict the franchise. Such regimes are not legitimated by the consent of those governed and as such not bound to be responsive to them. There have been a wide variety of authoritarian regimes frequently of the military and administrative dictatorship types. For the purposes of this study the specific character of an authoritarian regime is less important than distinctions from the democratic archetype. As Przeworski et al do, the authoritarian regime is treated as the residual category for non-democracies. Both of these ideal types, derived from regime studies, i.e., the regimes of states, can be applied to other organizations. It is suggested

below that political organizations including liberation movements and parties exhibit varying characteristics in terms of relative democraticness.

A *party* is a rule-bound political organization whose activities are centered around placing its members in office by election, or otherwise. Parties can be subdivided into system-supporting and anti-system parties. System-supporting parties accept the basic framework of the current institutions to operate within those broad parameters, concentrating appeals on operational policy issues and minor reforms rather than a critique of the underlying system. As Lipset and Rokkan suggest a competitive party system protects the nation against the discontents of its citizens: grievances and attacks are deflected from the overall system and directed toward the current set of power-holders (Lipset and Rokkan 92). There is an implicit agreement amongst the elites of system-supporting parties to forswear attacks on state and regime institutions. This is typified by the concept of the loyal opposition. Anti-system parties are those which have by no means abandoned institutional critiques and may focus their manifestos on the wholesale reshaping of society and government in a way divergent from the contemporary status quo. Both the communist and fascist parties of post-WWII Italy would fall into this category. Under this schema, a political organization can only be a political party if permitted to participate under relevant institutions, the most common activity being standing members for election.

An *institution* is a set of rules which govern and thus create expectations of behavior. The rules include both state laws and group or social norms.

Parties, as political organizations, share a functional requirement with governments: multiple individual interests must be aggregated to create policy decisions. The parties faced

what Mancur Olsen called the collective action problem in which a set of individuals, each behaving rationally, viz., to advance individual self-interest, produces a socially-suboptimal outcome. This is essentially a problem of coordination. Parties have attempted to solve the problem in the same way as many other organizations including states by establishing institutions, or rules, to govern conduct and create expectations of future behavior. Analogous to the states again, the organizations can adopt rule of a democratic nature in which party members vote to choose their leaders or platform positions. On the other hand, the organization can have a closed top-down decision-making process.

Argument

Variables

This study looks at various national liberation movements and follows them through to the period after the generating or seizure of sovereignty. A number of threads to this process are laid out below.

A key independent variable with respect to the national liberation movement concerns the base of liberation movement: Is it elite mass based? Since the operating paradigm is now for universal adult suffrage, emerging states face the objective of enfranchising and incorporating all of the population. This expansion may or may not have been undertaken prior to independence. If the liberation movement is not mass-based it will be up to the later successor political organizations to embark on the potentially socially disruptive endeavor. An elite-only movement will predict to a less stable, but still competitive, attempt a democracy.

Secondly, the tactics that the liberation movement had adopted, negotiations versus violent rebellion, influence the successor system. Democratic governance requires an elite which is willing to make pragmatic compromises. The national liberation movements can adopt a range of tactics on a scale from negotiated to violent (revolution/coup). While the negotiated manner can modify and build upon existing colonial institutions, a revolution will seek their overthrow. Once the colonial institutions have been abandoned, the successor regime must reconstruct its administrative apparatus. A negotiated process will produce a more stable successor state.

A substantially related factor is the tactics of colonial power. Does the metropole attempt cooptation or a crack down? As with the movement, the metropole has a number of tactical responses available to combat attempts at national liberation. It can adopt a conciliatory posture and work with the would-be revolutionaries, coopting them. This produces a longer, more gradual, but more stable transition which may retain many of the advantages for the metropole from the ex-colonial relationship, such as continued business domination and favorable terms of trade. Conversely, the colonial power can refuse to negotiate resisting with armed force. A shattering of ties and institutions would be the result, regardless of which side wins.

As hinted at during the discussion of definitions, decision-making in the liberation movement can vary on a democratic to authoritarian continuous scale. The national liberation movement itself will have organizational characteristics in terms of the selection of leaders and the adoption of specific policies which can be considered. A more democratic movement will support a successor competitive political system legitimating an opposition. An authoritarian, often militarily-organized, movement creates a one-party state in which opposition is perceived

as anti-system.

Fifthly, institutional continuity is another aspect which varies among the relevant cases. Pre-independent areas have established institutions of the colonial administration. These may have existed in some form for decades or more oppressing and in some cases serving the indigenous population. As with any bureaucracy and any set of rules social groups are differentially affected by the institutions. Consequently, while some imagine improvements with reform or removal of said institutions, others fear the loss of their privileges. There are three key questions here: Do institutions carry over from the colonial period to that of the sovereign successor state? Does the elite who controls the bureaucracy carry over? Do the administrative (civil) service which operates the agency carry over? While it is expected that all institutions will experience changes, the distinction between the modification and scrapping of colonial institutions is immense. Often in the early decolonization process while still under colonial authority indigenous elites and professionals are inducted into various positions in the administrative apparatus. Many of these people could potentially be kept on if only reforms to institutions following independence were pursued diminishing training requirements for the new administration. Alternatively, new elites can opt for the destruction of all vestiges of colonial authority including these institutions to create all rules and administrative agencies anew.

On the dependent variable side of the equation, the post-independence resulting party system may be a competitive, stable democracy, or not. Systems vary in terms of democraticness and stability among other factors. State systems are classified from democracy to authoritarian. For the stability of regime (not government), state systems are coded with the average number of

years between regime change.

Secondly, is the political system competitive? Can new parties contest elections? In terms of opposition, where on Lipset and Rokkan s four thresholds (Lipset and Rokkan 114) does this fall? For this, the focus is on democracies. This variable discriminates between competitive party systems, dominant-party states and one-party states. Furthermore, barriers to entry of new parties into the system are considered. The translation of public party preferences into government and policy selection under Lipset and Rokkan is another approach.

Thirdly, peaceful transitions in the new system are critical for a sustainable democracy. Institutions must be established, deemed legitimate and be supported by all relevant parties especially the party or coalition in government. Do parties in-government accept the victory of opposition parties and when electorally unseated relinquish power to the opposition peacefully? For this, episodes in the up to half century history will be sought in which parties ordered out of government by institutions choose to (attempt to) alter them, i.e., change the game in the midst of play.

Scope Conditions and Case Selection

This study in its eventual form will be applicable to all states decolonized in the period of after World War II which were Euro-American colonies in Africa and Asia. These include those states which were granted independence after peaceful protest or violent insurrection by colonial metropoles or their settler outposts. While this may be applicable to other cases, no such claim is

made at this point.

This paper itself will not exhaustively consider all of the cases which fit the criteria laid out in the preceding paragraph which number several dozen in its detailed qualitative study. Five cases were selected to reflect a diversity of region and colonial history as well as covering the Huntingtonian critique, culture/religion. A comprehensive but less detailed quantitative treatment of the universe of postcolonial cases will supplement the comparative case studies.

Hypotheses

1. A violent national liberation struggle requires a military/paramilitary organizational form to be successful. This form is inherently hierarchical and authoritarian and suspicious of competitors. This produces a paranoid one-party state (the liberators are unwilling to recognize an opposition as legitimate; they cling to power based upon a revolutionary role) or an authoritarian state which includes no pretense of parties. The system is not competitive and leaves no room for the entry of other political parties into the system. There is no recognition of the opposition as legitimate by those governing.

2. Negotiated liberation through normal channels undertakes the gradual integration and socialization of new elite through pre-systemic change institutions predicting to competitive democracy. Independence struggles which are achieved through negotiations are relatively gradual and consist of a series of delegations of power from the metropole to indigenous political actors. Indigenous elites from the liberation movement are brought into the halfway institutions to *participate* in colonial governance. These institutions provide a framework under which the

indigenous populations can acquire administrative skills which can be put to use in successor regimes. Most importantly the elites are conditioned, or socialized, to operate under agreed-to rules and respect them as binding. Furthermore, institutions of governance can select elites from multiple indigenous organizations and if permitted choose to elevate organization members under rules differing from that organization. Depending upon the specific rules, this may provide an opportunity for competition to be practiced. Contrasting with (para)military organizations which are very hierarchical and do not provide opportunities for dissent, this can be a divergence.

3. Liberation of mixed violence and negotiation generates both types of factions which compete over systemic issues (regime-type). This produces an unstable system which oscillates between democracy and one-party rule. This is not just a category for movements whose tactics are difficult to define in the above categories but a grouping for movements which employ both tactics in a mix such that neither one dominates, or employ both tactics each against a different colonial opposition. A mix of movement tactics generates both of the institutions and interests to exist in the successive society. In one sense both types of institutions compete but this is not the competition of advanced liberal democracies. Rather, the two factions are mutually deemed illegitimate, subversive and anti-system by the other. When in power supporters of the other regime-type cannot be considered a loyal opposition but an internal enemy to be irradiated. Yet, as the faction has support in society the governing regime is unable to crush it. This allows oscillation amongst regime-types to take place as long as no equilibrium is reached.

4. While the previous three hypotheses have as their starting point movement tactics, institutional continuity is more focused on what successful movements do to the colonial

institutions. There are three aspects to this: continuity of rules, continuity of management and continuity of staff. Institutional continuity will correlate with system stability. Continuity exists in cases where the change of regime makes few changes to or minor reforms of institutions rather than wholesale restructuring of these institutions. Transitions which retain administrative institutions from the previous period with a trained experienced staff will, ceteris paribus, have a more stable experience. The administrative apparatus also forms an important building block of the new state upon which to build instrumental legitimacy for the regime. For the typical citizen most contact with governing institutions comes by interaction with various parts of the administrative apparatus, the bureaucracy. This is also where comparison amongst regimes for the individual occurs. Has independence been worth it? The individual may make that evaluation on the basis of government services. The destruction of the administrative apparatus may well impair successor regime s ability to competently provide government services. This failure provides a basis of opposition to governing elites and undermines support for and identification with the regime. Even if sovereignty is considered by the public opinion to be a good thing, instrumental legitimacy may be determinative. In Russia, citizens may well be asking these questions as government services have collapsed in many areas due to institutional discontinuity. Under this hypothesis one would expect regime system instability.

For decolonizing entities:

[Sub-National Identities]

Strong   Weak

Stateness Remains a Problem   [Colonial Institutions]

Security a Major Concern   Democratic   Authoritarian   Metropole-Only Power

Authoritarian Regime Likely   [Liberation Movement]   Violent Rev

                              Sub-National Identity   National Identity

                                   Civil War   Movt   Org

                                   Auth   Democratic   Authoritarian

                                             Dem Regime   Auth Regime

Operationalization

To contribute to the social science literature, it is necessary to provide clear statements of relationship with explicit definitions which can be replicated by others over the scope of relevant cases.

The first part is the connection between the liberation movement. What tactics are employed by the liberation movements? These are classified as violent conflict or a negotiated-type settlement. Violent conflict includes war, intercommunal genocide, frequent assassination of elites, persistent riots and other similar events. Croatian and Bosnia independence from (Greater) Serbia would be classified as such. The negotiated settlement is obtained with peaceful protest or other means leading to discussions amongst relevant parties yielding compromised agreement. The Slovakian separation from Czech Republic or a potential non-UDI split of Quebec from Canada would typify the latter form.

While the focus is on what the movement does, a connected issue concerns what the movement is, and specifically what is the decision-making process. It has been argued above that a more democratic movement will, having practiced the art of negotiated compromised politics within its ranks, being accustomed to it and having a propensity for such approaches, consider extending such options to interactions with colonial elites. Simply, ceteris paribus,: democratic decision-making in the movement privileges negotiated colonial-indigenous settlements which privileges the establishment of democratic political systems in successor state regimes. Conversely, an authoritarian type of liberation movement the form which can most effectively and efficient wage conflict against similarly constituted authoritarian organizations will not have placed in its options set the tools of negotiation. These organizations are often military or paramilitary (including terrorist) in form. Such organizations are less likely the create a democratic successor to the colonial regime in anything more than name. Democraticness of liberation movement then becomes critical, namely: How are leaders and policies selected?

Perhaps most critical is: What is negotiated? What is a mix? If hypothesis three were removed it may be necessary to code Pakistan, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania all of which ended up with one-party and/or military rule but were there independence struggles negotiated. The notion of a mix introduces itself in two aspects (1) multiple strategies may be alternatively or concurrently employed and (2) multiple strategies may be employed against multiple enemies. The latter notion   more critical it is posited   may require further explanation. There may be cases in which the political elite seeking independence from a colonial power may become divided and some may seek freedom from the successor state. Even if negotiations bear fruit with

the colonial power violent conflictual tactics may be employed in the sub-national struggle. This secondary struggle may concern regional separatists or intervention by opportunistic neighbors. However arrived at this mix will produce elements of the champions of both conflict and peaceful settlement in the successor state each of whom claims credit for winning sovereignty, each whose claim holds some resonance in the public psyche. The successor system will be unstable. Furthermore, it will experience oscillations amongst democratic and not-so-democratic forms of governance.

Alternative Hypotheses, Counter-Examples and Response

An earlier rendition of this research design was distributed to solicit some scholarly feedback. Among the valuable response were some potential alternative explanations and disconfirming cases which will be addressed here. A general comment which must be made is: The hypotheses contained in this study only claim to be determinative when all other factors and characteristics for a given case are equal. Of course, in the real world nothing is ever equal so alternative explanations need to be considered. While some of these may exhibit correlations they are not fully determinative either.

Economic development at the time of transition

Is competitive democracy a luxury good? While further economic development, as modernization theory would tell us, may create a context which assists democratic development it is not necessary. In the cases of postcolonial states, this analysis considers states of relatively equal levels of economic development (1) nascent industrialization (2) basic industry plans (3)

stock and other capital formation markets and (4) participants in international trade. A broader study which examined the universe of cases including wide disparities in development could fully test this alternative.

Economic growth after transition

This is basically a question of government performance. Hypothesis four which argues for a role for institutional continuity can address this issue. Economic growth requires competent fiscal and monetary policy management as well as a global climate which promotes growth. Capital-owners seek stable expectations this is something stability in institutions and administrative services can provide.

Threats to national security

Such threats provide a way to justify restrictions on rights of the public but are not sustainable in the long run. Indira Gandhi s Emergency provides an example. The Indian constitution provides the President with emergency powers which can create a rule-by-decree regime. This only lasted a couple years as opposition was not extinguished even in the case of claimed threats to the state. This notion is controlled for by having states which claim fear of territorial integrity being violated included in the survey.

Threats to internal security (stemming from Dahl s sub-cultural pluralism)

In a similar way to the above this is a justification used by governing elites to market their policies specifically in respect to limitations placed upon the population. Once again this can only be a temporary action when the threat is deemed credible. As emerging postcolonial states have to deal with stateness questions specifically in regards to artificial borders which have

created incongruities between political and cultural demarcations. All postcolonial states have faced this; many have faced civil war. Yet there is still regime variation. Clearly this alternative does not capture the full picture.

Civilization

Huntington argues that certain civilizations, namely Sinic and Islamic, are incompatible with western-derived liberal democracy (Huntington 72). This notion should be rejected as there is regime variation within the civilization boundaries posited. Furthermore the underlying mechanism Huntington uses is flawed owing to his limited temporal scope. To control, an Islamic or Sinic state must be included in the analysis.

Representation of ethnic groups in the liberation movement

This is perhaps most critical. Liberation movements must be representative organizations to generate democratic systems but *who* is represented is critical as well. Bias in representation is likely to lead to coalitional difficulties or even civil war for the successor regime. There are however a number of factors which can change the impact of this factor: What is the relative size of the ethnic group in question? Is the ethnic concentrated in a region or dispersed throughout the state? Can institutions be built to address these grievances? Are other ethnic groups opposed due to history of a particular one dominating politics? The ethnic question may well play a role but is so multifaceted it is beyond the scope of the present project.

The "first new nation" (the United States) was created out of violence but resulted in the development of a classic two-party system.

Firstly, the United States could be an anomaly. More informatively the American

independence struggle was a bit more complicated. There was a military conflict which was supported by a minority of the US population (not the mass mobilizations of the twentieth century), there were ongoing talks with colonial representatives and the war was won by the intervention of an opportunistic foreign power. Significantly institutions were changed but not destructively. Americans built upon colonial democratic institutions and retained much of the elite and staff from those local administrative organizations. Rather than a revolution the US had an elite coup in which only the very upper layer of leadership was changed. For the present study, the US is outside the bounds of the scope conditions.

An important criticism has been suggested that the democratic nature of the liberation movement may be determined by the same factor(s) that will determine the democratic nature of the post-independence regime. In abstract terms this cannot be easily explained away. It is more properly an empirical question. In the broad range of cases (in terms of both states and movements/parties), there may be examples in which specific parties diverge from a democratic norm. the test need to be controlled for common predictors of a democratic regime-type: GDP per capita, region/contagion, British colony[1], income inequality, proportion Catholic, ethno-linguistic divisions, etc.

Cases

Five cases are to be explored utilizing the comparative case study technique: India s

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[1] Although even if this predictor is makes the hypothesized factors spurious the hypotheses will provide a clearer process mechanism of how and why the British colonial experience matters than has been advanced before.

Indian National Congress (Congress Party); Pakistan s Pakistan Muslim League; Zimbabwe s

Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front; Vietnam s Communist Party of Vietnam; and

South Africa s African National Congress. Two of these movements were built against a British

colonial occupation force, on French and two more recent cases against minority settler rule

extending from the time of British exit. Of the cases, India and South Africa (thus far, what an

unseated ANC will do remains to be seen) have established stable competitive democracies.

Pakistan has had phases of competitive democracy interrupted by military coups. Zimbabwe and

Vietnam have experienced one-party states.

The case study approach will be supplemented with quantitative approaches. It is not

feasible to undertake a comprehensive survey of the world s states in the degree of detail

mandated by the comparative case study approach. At the risk of collapsing specific details into

more generic categories, a data set will be developed to capture the relevant characteristics of

postcolonial states. As noted in the above definitions, this study takes a procedural approach to

democracy which encompasses contestation and participation. Regime-type here is a

dichotomous categorical variable. Rather than merely reporting frequencies, a more informative

statistical test is performed here using the chi-squared test for contingency, a test of significance.

As this uses dichotomous nominal variables, regression and many other more powerful statistical

tests are not available (most of these need interval variables). The null hypothesis is that the two

sets of characteristics (x and y of the specific hypothesis) are unrelated. One attempts to reject the

null hypothesis by means of the chi-squared test. Before beginning the rejection attempt the

relevant question is: What kind of a table would be expected if the null hypothesis were true? These are the observed frequencies. The next issue is: Assuming that the null hypothesis is true and that the marginal totals in the observed frequency table actually reflect those marginals in the population, what are the expected frequencies? The expected frequencies are calculating from dividing the product of the row and column marginals by the grand total. In a two by two table, as some below, it is necessary to calculate only one expected frequencies as others can be obtained by subtraction from the marginal totals. This characteristic is used in the actual significance test. The number of expected frequencies needed before one can defer to the marginal totals is the test s degrees of freedom which is a calculated figure. The degrees of freedom is the product of the quantity of one less than the number of rows by the quantity of one less than the number of columns. So for a two by two tables, the degrees of freedom is one. In making a decision to reject the null hypothesis or not a table is used that provides the mathematically determined critical values of chi-squared at selected probability levels for a wide range of degrees of freedom. All statistical tests performed in this study are done using SPSS 10 for Windows. Machine outputs are reported along with frequencies and graphs. Compilations of data will be made available to the research community via the Internet.

Regime Formations and Transitions

The literature regarding regimes in terms of their emergence and consolidation has shifter over the last forty years from a focus on the emergence of regimes in the postcolonial world to replace traditional forms and non-indigenous institutions to concern with transitions from modern states with authoritarian regimes to democracies. As many of the regime constructions

under consideration occurred during a discourse which had problematized the origins of modern regime-type, it will be useful to begin with the foundations of this literature as elite decision-makers would have been aware of it.

The creation of a new state broken out from colonial bondage which had been imposed for 75 (interior Africa) to 350 (Bengal) years was a momentous occasion which begged reflection to the streams of western political theory. Note that the indigenous elite of European colonies who would take over the formal institutions of authority with the retreat of the metropole were steeped in European philosophical currents as well as local traditions. Many were educated in the schools of the colonial master. Furthermore, there was something appealing about the West - clearly dominant in all aspects: political, economic, technological, military - which had recently emerged victorious from hegemonic struggle[2]. Such institutions could be emulated in the construction of new constitutions. Elites then considered how the western nation-states were built and legitimated. For this modernity traditional forms were to be broken off from and imports pursued. It is from this perspective that a consideration of the currents of western political theory is to be considered.

When considering the origins of state authority, there are two key perspectives put forward by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Hobbes *Leviathan* is a core work of political

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[2] Certainly, the Soviet Union provided most of the sacrifice and accounted for the preponderance of German units destroyed in the Second World War. However, the unscathed United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand along with the weakened UK accounted for more than two-thirds of economic activity and were the ones setting the rules for the post-war world (Bretton Woods). The USSR would only become a target of emulation when it had recovered a decade later.

theory and philosophy. Hobbes offers some definitions of key concepts and their derivation from

Christian doctrine, though a secularized incarnation of it.

Power, the core issue in politics, is the present means to obtain some future apparent

good (Hobbes 78). The greatest power is found with men united by consent in one person which

is the power of commonwealth; to have servants or friends united is power (Hobbes 78).

Reputation of power is power (Hobbes 78) and the reputation for prudence is power as subjects

submit more willingly (Hobbes 79). To honor is to obey, to acknowledge authority, to love or to

fear as either shows value - the price at which power is surrendered (Hobbes 81). The

construction of political institutions which can centralize authority is thereby advocated for being

most able to effect allegiance and the capability to exercise power so constituted. Issues of

(national) identity and stateness are also moved to the forefront of institution building. The

creation of the institutionalized state from a vacuum of indigenous authority calls upon the

construction of allegiance to new authority. The center of political gravity re-focuses on the state

rather than the more traditional forms of the clan, or tribe or village. Furthermore when new

states are created with borders arbitrarily drawn in London or Paris or Berlin which do not reflect

local disputes state and tribal-based allegiances may come directly into conflict. To build

allegiance to political institutions legitimacy of the state itself may be a precondition.

The terror of some power is needed for laws to be observed as they are contrary to the

natural passions outlined in elsewhere in *Leviathan* (Hobbes 139). This is the institutional

incentive for acquiescence once a covenant has been arrived at. Getting there may be the trickier

part of the process. Hobbes is offering a way to address enforcement of contract but lacks

monitoring. Why submit? Strength comes not from the collection of many as decisions can be divided. Unified authority is necessary for judgement and enforcement of agreed-to codes (Hobbes 140). If such authority is not required there need not be any commonwealth (Hobbes 140). There is thought to be some good for the group (and all included individuals) from coordination of society but no one is will to bear the risks and costs of managing the system without an agreement. The thing all desire most which is missing in anarchy is security. Unity alone can aggregate enough resources for its provision. The only way to aggregate sufficient power to provide security is to confer it upon one man or an assembly which can speak with one voice (Hobbes 142). A covenant delegating power from the individual to the collectively-deemed authority thereby authorizes the latter s actions on behalf of the community (Hobbes 142). The multitude so united is termed commonwealth; peace and defense is owed to the created mortal god, Leviathan (Hobbes 143). This commonwealth aggregates power both by force and by consent viz through mutual covenants (Hobbes 143).

Upon the commonwealth is laid much responsibility and much power. The duly-constituted commonwealth represents all system participants whether they voted for or against it (Hobbes 144). Once instituted the form of government is not subject to change (Hobbes 144). The sovereign-subject relationship cannot be broken by either party - power proceeds from the act of covenant (Hobbes 145). Protesting the sovereign is treason and should be punished (Hobbes 146). Sovereign actions are not to be questioned by the subjects nor are his judgements (Hobbes 147). The sovereign is the supreme judge for himself (Hobbes 147). The sovereign has legislative executive and juridical authority over subjects (Hobbes 148) as well as powers of war,

appointment and punishment (Hobbes 148). The sovereign cannot be subject to civil laws but only to the laws of nature (Hobbes 254). The right of the sovereign cannot be divided or reduced without the elimination of the sovereign power (Hobbes 150). The emphasis is on the centralization of authority of the commonwealth and the governing body s independence from civil law. The sovereign is to be absolute. As such a consociational compromise which divides sovereignty between a state-centered polity and one focused at the ethno-linguistic or tribal level would be untenable. A complete break from traditional forms and their replacement with the modern nation-state is the object of Hobbesian political institutional construction.

There are three kinds of commonwealth monarchy which is the rule by one, democracy rule by an assembly of all and aristocracy rule by part only (Hobbes 152). Hobbes suggests monarchy is preferable in light of contemporary events of the reign of Charles I of England (1625-1649). Charles reign culminated in Civil War and his beheading having lost to Parliamentary forces. Most critical is system stability when it can provide essential goods. Monarchy has the advantages of consistent decision-making, no divided opinion in government and a simple institutional design (Hobbes 155). In this way the issues of coordinating individuals in collective action is mitigated. Monarchy however depends upon the sovereign s judgement and quality of rule. Succession is an issue for any system no less those contemplated here (Hobbes 160). For states emerging from a civil war or social-disruptive independence struggle may identify more closely with the context out of which Hobbesian thought emerged.

The liberty of the subject exists in absence of the law (Hobbes 178). Liberty is the natural state of the absence of constraints. Free choice can exist within a structure - fear of consequences

can condition choices (Hobbes 171) To gain peace artificial bonds to liberty - covenants - are created making expectations and standards for enforcement (Hobbes 172)

As subjects constituted the sovereign, no action by the sovereign may be termed injurious to the subject so absolute power for the sovereign is consistent with the liberty of the subject (Hobbes 173). The liberty of the sovereign to execute his duty is critical (Hobbes 175). The abdication of a sovereign returns the subject to liberty until a new covenant has been rendered (Hobbes 180). Freedom exists in the absence of restriction which the absolute sovereignty has the right to impose in any domain bounded only by natural law.

Covenants form imperfect institutions and are as such subject to dissolution (Hobbes 251). Less than absolute power conferred upon the sovereign may make the provision of peace and security for which the covenant was formed unworkable (Hobbes 252); access to sufficient resources in society are also necessary (Hobbes 259). Where security is the prime concern of the populous - again likely to arise out of a bloody independence struggle - arguments as this may be compelling. Security-maximization requires centralized and sufficiently-provided resources.

All this has often been interpreted as justifying monarchy of authoritarian systems but any institutionalized system which seeks continuation would do well to heed the device. That democratic states retain such authority so absolute is made evident in national security crises and war.

Locke offers derivation of the origins of society and state based upon the micro foundations of human nature. While the form and style is similar to Hobbes the work reads as a critique of *Leviathan*. The state of nature is a state of perfect freedom, all power and jurisdiction

is reciprocal in this state of equality (Locke 8). There is this freedom but it affords no license for a man to destroy himself or harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions (Locke 9). Everyone is bound to preserve himself and if possible the rest of mankind (Locke 9). This is the foundation of social interaction as these objectives may be unattainable autonomously. Self-interest is to have positive externalities for other members of society. Locke s approach has been more popular among would-be democratic elites of emerging states where Hobbes has found a home with those harboring dictatorial tendencies.

Authority is given the non-arbitrary rights of reparation and restraint (Locke 10). A mutually assented compact puts an end to the state of nature (Locke 13). That which creates the state also limits it. The domain of state authority may only expand as authorized by compact. Further, it is legal to kill he who would without consent take away freedom (Locke 15). The state of nature is not a state of war as it is living according to reason (Locke 15). Natural reason includes the right to preservation (Locke 18). Freedom then does not itself create conflict so an anarchic inter-state system may have random episodes of peace. Individual self-interests may align to subdue violence. The function to provide is structuring the state of nature reduce the uncertainty tax through institutions. It is freedom which occupies Locke s mind: striking the balance between market-stabilizing order and market-promoting freedom. For him the solution lies in government but one of a limited variety.

Locke expands the traditional definition of property rights to accord such rights to labor (Locke 19). The value of property increases - productivity gains - with inputs (Locke 23). Bounded property became fixed by law (Locke 24); property is created by labor and capital

investment but settled by compact (Locke 27). The freedom of acting upon one s own will presupposes reason (Locke 35). Those lacking reason lack this freedom and are to be governed by others (Locke 35). While born free and rational, man only exercises each with age thus should defer to paternal power while a minor (Locke 34). With the power of guardianship comes obligation (Locke 39). This backtracks on the compact-based argument to offer a loophole: some are not ready for self-government. This is the favorite claim of colonial overlords and dictators.

The first society was/is the family so from it conclusions of the larger society can be derived (Locke 42). Legal protection against fellow man is not worth much if for it is traded a predatory state - the absolute monarch (Locke 50). No one in society should be exempted from its laws *including the government* - against Hobbes - so Locke advocate for a juridically limited government (Locke 51). Hobbes story of the voluntary submission of man to one of their number for safety lack historical precedent, he suggests (Locke 53). Every man is naturally free even if he is born under government; thus he can require consent to be governed (Locke 63).

A commonwealth is a community (Locke 69). The first fundamental law for the preservation of society is to establish legislative power (Locke 69). Property cannot be taken from citizens without their consent (Locke 73). Legislative power is delegated from the people and is as such not transferable to another authority (Locke 75) to be legitimate; authority is not the property of the government - it operates with restricted license. Executive power is subordinate to the legislative (Locke 79). Constant and frequent legislative sessions are necessary to constrain absolutist power (Locke 81). Following the Long Parliament and Cromwell the opinion is not surprising.

These two philosophical current form the key bases of the theories regarding the origins of the state. Where this relevantly come into play in the current discussion is the revival of concern on such issues during the post-war decolonization efforts. How should one create a state? What institutions should be adopted? And, in the Cold War context, how and why do democratic regimes arise? Normatively favoring democratic system the modernization theorists attempted to address the issue with policy-relevance for American State Department decision-makers. Deutsch in 1961 argued the key to be social mobilization, viz., the transition from traditional to modern[3] society. There is a set of changes which go together in certain historical situations which are identifiable and recurrent, cross-nationally transitive and relevant to politics. These changes are the uprooting from old settings and the induction of the mobilized populous into new relationship patters. Key indicators of modernization for Deutsch were a mass media audience, residential mobility, urbanization, a labor force employed in non-agricultural pursuits, literacy, high GDP per capita and exposure to any aspect(s) of modern life. Lipset argued in 1959 in the classic defining work of the modernization literature that economic development would lead to democracy. Economic development is defined in terms of wealth and industrialization. The former is operationalized as GDP per capita, people per automobile, per capita doctors, radios, telephones and the newspaper readership rate in the population; the latter, percentage of males employed in agriculture and per capita energy consumption. With wealth and industrialization comes urbanization (percentage in large towns, small cities, and metropolitan areas) and education (literacy, school matriculation). Education itself is not sufficient but may be

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[3] Modern is code for western, or more specifically American, in this literature.

a necessary conditions for democracy. Democracy for Lipset focuses on contestation (effective opposition) and the rule of law (loyal opposition, that elections matter for effective authority). Democracy was to be the one true end to development.

Out of this tradition came a critique of the single-minded pursuit of democracy. The industrial expansion of the Stalinist Soviet Union was an unescapable empirical fact. Could this level of basic industries, arms production and socio-economic organization not be economically developed? The ideological blinders of US foreign policy were to be questioned.

Barrington Moore was one of the practitioners of a class-based variant of, or more accurately response to, the modernization theory which was prominent during early decolonization transitions but broke with Lerner and others by positing a multipath approach. Moore s work falls into the field of Comparative Historical Sociology and more specifically development, utilizing theory-testing case studies. Theda Skocpol and James Scott are among his most prominent successors, though no comparativist in development could claim to have not been influenced. This classic of Marxian class analysis - an inherently structural account - considers three cases, UK, France and USA plus illustrative examples from Japan, India, China, Germany and USSR.

Modernization theory as articulated here suggests that economic systems (social class) creates the conditions necessary for the establishment of a given political system (regime), more quotably, No bourgeoisie, no democracy (Moore 418).The goal of the study is to explain outcomes, not the process. Moore critiques the linear path liberals posit leads to modernity

which is itself defined as liberal states. The history of development is more complex than that. Breaking the dogmatic conformity to US foreign policy annunciations plaguing the modernization literature, Moore argues that interclass power relationship determine the path out upon which a society will set towards multiple potential end points. There are three paths to modernity (1) capitalism/liberalism (2) fascism and (3) communism, and three key classes (1) bourgeoisie (2) aristocracy and (3) peasantry. Interclass power relationships determine which path will be selected. These classes are, in classic Marxian tradition, defined in terms of their means of production, viz., the bourgeoisie are owners of capital (merchants), aristocrats own land, and the proletariat owns labor. He goes about his study by comparing patterns of class conflict.

Dominant Classes	Modernization Path
Arist. + Peasants	Fascist
Bourg. + Peasants	Liberal
Peasants alone	Communist

Moore s epilogue addresses his critics who claim his class-analysis is economically deterministic - and it is - which misses substantial variation. Moore counters that culture is in fact created by class conflict; culture is dynamic, a product of social forces. For Marxians the fundamental incompatibility between culture and class is explained away by Gramscian false consciousness. Peasants can *choose* an ideology which explains their situation (Moore 495), such as Marxism or Catonism conservative populist nationalism. This is an element of agency.

Therefore, there can be a left-wing or and right-wing peasantry. This gives an independent role for ideas, i.e., ideology is a tool. Yet, a conservative peasantry is not just false consciousness (Moore 505).

Every modern society has been created through not evolution but revolution, as traits of the previous persist. There are three routes to modernity (Moore 413) 1 - bourgeois revolution combined capitalism and parliamentary democracy after revolution e.g. the Puritan Revolution, French Revolution and Amer Civil War; 2 - conservative revolution from above: capitalism without strong revolutionary surge producing reactionary political forms as seen in Fascist Germany and Japan; 3 - peasant revolution yielding communism as in USSR and PRC; and a possible 4 - no revolution of India. Later modernizers learned from previous experiences of others of the costs (Germany/Japan of UK; USSR of capitalism and fascism; India of all three) (Moore 414). Democracy has three goals (1) check arbitrary rulers (2) rationalize arbitrary rules (3) obtain a share in rule-making. Feudalism of Western Europe had several aspects which are conducive to democracy (1) free contract (2) corporate immunity (3) right to resist unjust authority these produced the key : independent nobility (Moore 415), democracy requires a rough balance between crown and nobility where crown predominates but the nobility remains independent but the aristocracy does not break free of crown control in the absence of town dwellers bourgeois (as it did in Russia and Prussia incr land and serf holdings) (Moore 417)

Moore identifies five conditions for the development of democracy (Moore 430-1) 1 - balance between crown and landed aristocracy with neither able to act fully unilaterally; 2 -turn towards the *appropriate form* of commercial agriculture; 3 - weakening of landed aristocracy; 4 -

no alliance forged between aristocracy-bourgeois against the workers (class v urban/rural

schisms); and 5 - revolutionary break with the past.

These new states emerging from a recent colonial past has a number of options for their

economic development. In fact there were different paths they could take to modernity yielding

different political regime-types. If Moore is correct these choices were determined by social class

power relationships.

If modernization theory with its followers and detractors offers a picture of the grand

interplay amongst economic and social forces in molding institutional structures, a closer look at

the dynamics of the transition remains to be explored. Unlike the Euro-American states which

have dominated the discussion of modernizationists, relatively clear records are available for

many of the transitions from a broad array of post-colonial states. Michael Bratton and Nicolas

van de Walle expand the democratic transitions discourse to consider a set of cases often

neglected in Africa by both political scientists and the US State Department. A number of

African countries underwent (or attempted to undergo) democratic transition soon after the

sweep of transitions spread across Eastern Europe. The authors quantitatively consider 40 states

of Sub-Saharan Africa from their respective dates of independence through 1989 (Bratton and

van de Walle 70) and arrive at some pessimistic findings which contradict Fukuyama s

triumphalism.

Key political events occurred sequentially: first political protest then liberalization then

competitive elections and only then democracy with a year between the apex of each phase

(Bratton and van de Walle 3). African regime transitions were rapid - compared to Latin America and Eastern Europe - going from protest to election in at most four years (Bratton and van de Walle 4). As will be shown the initial liberation struggles of postcolonial states - many in Africa - were more gradual affairs, especially if following the negotiated model proposed. Further, the trends were not linear but often contained receding waves (Bratton and van de Walle 5) as Huntington would suggest. Leadership turnover (the deaths of old patrimonial personal dictators who gained power soon after independence) created an opening with succession crises (Bratton and van de Walle 7).

Even with *de jure* multipartyism queries remained as to the ability of secondary associations to provide a sufficiently forceful check on the state (Bratton and van de Walle 9). Democracy is defined by the authors as a limited set of *procedures* focused upon contestation: free, fair, competitive elections whose outcome matters (Bratton and van de Walle 13). *Transition* to democracy is coded from the inauguration of the elected government; no claims regarding the durability or consolidation are made (Bratton and van de Walle 13).

A common characteristic of postcolonial African regimes is neopatrimonialism in which characteristics of Weberian partimonialism - authority is personalized, loyalty to rulers is rewarded, and rule is arbitrary - coexists with rational-legal institutions (Bratton and van de Walle 62). The state administration is used to cultivate and enrich the patron-client practices (Bratton and van de Walle 62). Presidentialism concentrated power in the hands of an individual - the big man - a president-for-life superceding other institutions (Bratton and van de Walle 65).. State resources were used for political legitimation linked to clientilism by the redistribution

of assets for political purposes (Bratton and van de Walle 67). Some single-party regimes institutionalized limited competition within the ruling party[4] (Bratton and van de Walle 71). Participation levels widely varied across the African countries (Bratton and van de Walle 73). Bratton and van de Walle posit five ideal types for African regimes:

Ideal Type Name	Characteristics (78-82)
Plebiscitary One-Party	neopatrimonialism with low contestation, high participation
Military Oligarchy	exclusionary neopatrimonialism
Competitive One-Party	some but restricted choice, limited pluralism
Settler Oligarchy	democracy for whites
Multiparty	democracy for all

They also argue there are phases of regime transition (1) a crisis of political legitimacy where there is a loss of confidence in the government s ability to execute socio-economic development (2) economic protests by key stakeholders (3) the government responds with selective incentives (a cooptation attempt) or repression of political demands (4) deepening economic troubles politicizes protests and triggers a call for a political opposition institution (5) civil liberties reform with indirect representation (6) the government initiates a crackdown which collapses the remaining legitimacy and (7) the constitutional reforms of regime transition (Bratton and van de Walle 98-115). Three questions are asked of the founding election: was it free and fair, the incumbent ousted and did the loser accept the electoral results (Bratton and van de Walle 197). Voters are however not the only decision-makers in regime transitions - the

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[4] Democratic India s Congress Party experienced this internal contestation until its schism in 1967.

military often intervened when its institutional interests were perceived to be threatened[5] (Bratton and van de Walle 210).

The heritage of neopatrimonial regimes has shaped the transitions to democracy in African states in a way which diverges from transitions lacking that history outside of the region (Bratton and van de Walle 269). Conflicts begin among governing elites over the division of extracted spoils (Bratton and van de Walle 269). They conclude pessimistically: the prospects for consolidation are quite limited (Bratton and van de Walle 278).

Parties

The mechanisms through which political forces interact in democratic and some other regime-type is the political party. In fact above hypotheses suggest mobilization for national liberation movements often will spawn political parties. Therefore some discussion of what parties are and what they do will be useful. The parties literature focuses upon developed systems but does not significantly consider how they got there. The transition from movement to party as well appears to have been deferred to the social movement scholars. There are however some useful insights.

The present analysis concurs that organization is critical. Party Organization   constitutes the general setting for the activity of members...machinery for the selection of leaders, and decides their powers   (Duverger 4). Duverger identifies three type, perhaps generations, of

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[5] This is an overly simplistic treatment of military coups. There are five key ingredients to a military coup (1) economic stagnation, (2) a perceived threat to the military s corporate interests, (3) a officer cadre disproportionately drawn from a subgroup within the society, (4) politicization of the junior officer cadres and (5) history of political involvement by the military.

parties: Middle-class parties, European Socialist parties and Communist & Fascist parties. In postcolonial states when independent party systems were created the world had experience with all three generations. In fact, some party systems included communist parties as system-supporting. The latter two categories are associated with two revolutions in party structure (Duverger 4-5) (1) 1890-1900: socialist party branches replaced the restricted causes of their middle-class antecedents and (2) 1925-1930:communist parties with small worksite cells and democratic centralism entered the system. Fascists also at the same time joined with private militias as praetorian guards. Not all western states experienced these revolutions: US had neither; UK only the former. Again the revolutions did not occur in postcolonial states but their outcomes were imported: when party systems began in these states they included socialist and communist forces without the need for their respective revolutionary developments..

Duverger further contrasts between direct and indirect structure of a party. In the former people are themselves members as in the French socialists. The latter finds people as members of component groups such as the affiliated trade unions of UK Labour.(Duverger 5) Direct parties are more common (Duverger 13). In countries such as France universal suffrage led to a direct mass party. Universal suffrage was granted at a time when obstacles still remained for unions so parties could not be based upon affiliated unions. When trade unions were permitted they faced strongly-institutionalized working class parties (Duverger 16).

A party is a collection of communities linked by coordinating institutions (Duverger 17). The basic elements are the caucus, branch, cell and militia (Duverger 19-27). The caucus of middle-class parties have few members, do not intensively recruit across their large geographical

areas which correspond to political-administrative divisions. Socialist branches, unified by class identity, are less decentralized and relatively more numerous in members than the caucus. They gain strength from increasing their membership. The cell, common in Russian communism and its followers, has an occupational base at the workplace. Though the membership is smaller that the socialist branch it is perfectly suited for clandestine action with a built-in meeting place. Militias were used by fascist parties.

Party control over the nomination of candidates varies across systems. In a few only official party candidates are allowed to contest elections. In others (most) barriers are erected against independent candidates such as petition thresholds (Duverger 354). In a few parties have no legal monopoly. Beyond legal monopoly, there is what Duverger terms a practical monopoly of the parties: Even if allowed, can a non-party candidate win election? (Duverger 355). In the UK there is no legal monopoly   anyone can stand for Parliament election (Duverger 355)   but successful independent candidacies are rare. As the size of constituencies increase so does the influence of the party over the candidate (Duverger 357); a shift the a system of proportional representation will also increase candidate dependence on the party (Duverger 358).

Any modification in the electoral system exerts an indirect influence over the expression of opinion   (Duverger 381). These changes structure how parties can operate, which will successfully operate and what opinions can readily find expression. The rules, if they do not determine the winner, determine who can play, viz., be a potential winner. Such institutions become critical to future outcomes of electoral contestation. As Arrow would soon argue the rules determine what the opportunity set is by eliminating alternatives. It is then an exercise of

power. For postcolonial states advanced mass communication technology had two major competing effects on party centrality of the candidate and ability to monitor disloyalty of members. These would play a role in the structure. Also, what the parties literature has laid out for parties can be shifted to analyze the liberation movements.

In the present argument movement mobilization plays a critical role. In pre-independence institutions set up by the metropole and in some post-liberation systems, mobilization duties are assumed by parties. Parties are essential agencies of mobilization which integrate the local communities with the state system (Lipset and Rokkan 91). This is critical to the discussion of cleavages below: parties provide a mechanism to negotiate to first cleavage type arising from national revolution. A competitive party system protects the nation against the discontents of its citizens: grievances and attacks are deflected from the overall system and towards the current set of power-holders (Lipset and Rokkan 92). Parties structure the expression of interests. When a movement becomes a party it at least in party has been co-opted by the system.

There is a hierarchy of cleavage bases which privileges moral or ideological divisions over interest-specific schisms in terms of divisiveness to the total system (Lipset and Rokkan 94-5). A middle ground is more difficult to negotiate and construct on issues which test ideological authenticity than mundane matters of governance. Different cleavages have appeared in different countries (98). Lipset and Rokkan suggest there are four critical cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 101) 1. Subject vs dominant culture (regionalism/subcultural pluralism), spawned in response to efforts at national revolution viz, construction of an identity by the main nation-building culture which threatens less dominant subject cultures, 2. Church vs government which fight over

clericalism dominated nineteenth century France s democratic experience as also described by Duverger, 3. Primary vs secondary economy a conflict intensified by the industrial revolution, and 4. Workers vs employer/owner (owners of labor vs owners of capital). The industrial revolution led to a deepening urban rural political split (Lipset and Rokkan 105). Rogowski put an interesting twist on this suggesting urban/rural or class schisms in society a prompted by the relative abundance of capital, labor and land in a given society. Parties build new state-oriented ties which subsume traditional linkages and translate alternative cleavages to political salience.

The acceptance of the validity of the concept of a loyal opposition by governing elites is a key hurdle which would-be democracies must surmount. There are for Lipset and Rokkan four thresholds of opposition integration (Lipset and Rokkan 113) 1. Legitimation - the right to protest, for an opposition to exist and not be labeled sedition, 2. Incorporation - right of the opposition members to vote and participate politically, 3. Representation - right of the opposition members to stand for office and become elected, and 4. Majority Power - right that if the opposition gains a numerical majority in relevant elected offices it translates into policy control and executive action without structural impediments remaining (e.g. house of lords, supreme court, bureaucracies) to block initiative.

The cleavage structure changes in a given society over time (134). In these western societies studied , party organizations are older than the citizenry - have existed all of their lives (134). These party systems survived two world wars, and the revolutions of fascist and communist alternatives (Lipset and Rokkan 135). Parties are in this way pragmatic and adaptable to changing societal circumstances.

This social cleavage approach while it may well explain some tested cases cannot measure the relative importance, or saliency, of the many competing identities. For the purposes of the present study critical is the saliency of national identity: Can it submerge particularistic small-group-interests which under Lipset and Rokkan would create the parties? Or will parties divide on other matters which collectively reenforce state territorial integrity?

Findings

India is the prototypical case of a negotiated peaceful transition to independence. This is not to say that there were not violent episode but the overall character of the struggle was peaceful. The Indian National Congress was the key organization which interacted with the British colonial government but there were others including the Indian National Army (INA). The INA led by Subhas Chandra Bose favored alliances with the Axis powers during WWII to assist the violent overthrow of British surzeinity. Congress was dominant. Though initially an elite organization from the 1920's forward, Congress increased its mass appeal. It had a relatively open decision-making process based upon the votes of members; it was democratic. Congress had candidates stand for election to colonial institutions. India has also had a relative stable *regime* if not government. From independence in 1947 to the present (2001) India has experienced only two regime changes, from democracy to authoritarian powers during The Emergency and back to democracy afterwards. The transition from colony to sovereign state retained much of the administrative apparatus including the Indian Civil Service and India Army. While top-level officials who were British were replaced much of the middle-management and

work force under the British Raj was indigenous. The continuity of these institutions facilitated the legitimacy building of the new regime, of democracy and stability. After independence India became a sovereign competitive democracy with a dominant party until the late 1960's . This should not be mistaken for one-party rule as the Congress *system* included a number of centers of power which themselves competed. Congress remains an important player today and has abided by institutions when it has lost elections.

Zimbabwe fought a war of independence against rather than the colonial metropole its extension the white settler community (as the enemy was in South Africa as well). From independence Rhodesia was minority-ruled by the economically dominant whites and policies were put in place to disadvantage the majority black population. Independence from this minority tyranny was achieved through violent military conflict. The key organization in the struggle was an army led by now President Mugabe. Armies are inherently hierarchical with authoritarian-style decision-making, this one was no different. What became the African National Union-Patriotic Front assumed power following victory over the whites and have retains a paramilitary character calling up on the war veterans to intimidate enemies of the party. While officially a competitive democracy, substantial barriers to entry of alternative parties remain and the translation of their votes to power is limited. The ANU-PF behaves extra-institutionally terrorizing and intimidating opposition supporters; there is no socialized recognition of a loyal opposition. It is unlikely if in a free and fair election Mugabe s party was defeated the institution would be peacefully obeyed. An organization grown out of military conflict for independence has produced an authoritarian though stable for now system. There has been no regime change since

independence.

Pakistan is an interesting case, of which Richard Sisson suggests the definitive work has not yet been written. The national liberation movement led by the Muslim League had two enemies the colonial metropole Britain which they fought peacefully in coalition with the Indian National Congress, and India. The split from India was one of violent communal conflict beyond the authority of the Muslim League. The communal strife generated interests which have persisted in Pakistani society at places in military and government as well as the political organization of *jamiat al islam*. This has rendered multiple centers of power with very different visions for the country and how it should be run, essentially competing regimes. Pakistan has had an unstable history since partition, spending equal amounts of time under military and democratic regimes. Pakistan is unstable due to the mixed forms of independence struggles and also the lack of previous colonial institutions. India and Pakistan were ruled together by the colonizer Britain with most of the administrative apparatus placed in the larger population areas of India. After independence and partition, most of the Civil Service and Army went to India including the management elements. These institutions had to be recreated in Pakistan and there were difficulties in providing services which has also contributed to instability.

mixed periods, unstable

Vietnam is an implementation communist state and thus authoritarian which has been relatively stable since the war ended. Vietnam fought three successive wars of independence against external powers for a thirty year period against Japan France and the United States. The Communist Party led by Ho Chi Mihn was the dominant political organization for national

liberation but much of the struggle was waged by military and paramilitary elements led by Giap. The Communists had produced a solid claim of responsibility for gaining independence and established a one-party state following it with no room for the induction of legitimate opposition parties into the system. As suggested by hypotheses a military led independence struggle produces an authoritarian regime as state institutions concerning decision-making are modeled after the organization which sets the rules. There has been no regime change since independence.

South Africa like Zimbabwe fought its liberation struggle against the settler extension of the former colonial power. For the most part, the dominant liberation organization the African National Congress led by Nelson Mandela was a peaceful movement explicitly modeling on the Indian case and pursued freedom through negotiations. The country is a competitive democracy which stable for now but it remains to be seen how the ANC would react to their unseating. Hypotheses predict continued stability. Some institutions have been reformed others scrapped (Apartheid) with most in the former category. The successor government has largely been able to modify and build upon the colonial administrative apparatus which has aided system stability. There has been no regime change since independence.

Concluding Remarks and Future Research

The emphasis here has been on creating a workable research design which can be applied to a number of different cases by the author or others who wish to afford themselves this opportunity. Due to certain constraints even the cases mentioned fall into the category of somewhere between illustration and test. They could well use a second more in-depth look. The

first priority here was to see if there was and if so demonstrate the feasibility of the approach. Later, a more rigorous empirical inquiry can be mounted. As well each of the alternative hypotheses stated should be tested.

Future research can proceed in two directions (1) an exhaustive quantitative presentation of all cases which fit the aforementioned scope conditions, or (2) detailed case study series on several liberation movements in their moments of transitions to focus in on tracing the process which has been abstractly posited here. In a more lengthy treatment ideally both extensions will be utilized to paint a full picture of what is suggested and whether in holds for reality.

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