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Disarmament Governance

Introduction

In 1998, Iraq discontinued cooperation with UNSCOM arms inspectors, India and Pakistan weaponized and tested their nuclear technology but Burkina Faso ratified the (Anti-Personnel Land) Mine Ban Treaty. The year offered a, at best, mixed record for global governance in disarmament. By itself and when compared to other major areas of global governance attempts (to be explored below), this issue of disarmament is drastically underdeveloped and what steps have been taken often relate to peripheral issues. The decisions to adopt disarmament governance attempts are taken with the same incentives as drive militarization. These can be broken down to three major categories: security-maximization; prestige-seeking and economic interests. Where governance has succeeded, advocates have been able to appeal to at least one of these categories.

Definitions

Before proceeding, it is necessary to define several key terms many of which are under dispute. This broad category of disarmament governance includes the issues of disarmament, arms control and regulation of the practice of war. Disarmament refers to procedures undertaken whereby the effective military capabilities of an actor are reduced, often with an objective as the elimination of such capabilities. Arms control, of the other hand, seeks to manage the growth of weapons stockpiles usually by rivals agreeing to slow an arms race; there is no implicit goal of demilitarization. Both conventional and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are considered; the distinction between these two issue groups and its relevance is discussed below. Regulating

the practice of war sets certain standards for the behavior of military forces toward each other and civilians; the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners is a famous example. The laws of war should also be included in discussing this area of inquiry as such provisions have often appeared in the same documents as the prior categories and as with arms control such measures can impose governance upon capabilities.

Globalization is a process concerned with the harmonization of an integrated world economy, emerging social movements, and developing political structures. Advances in transportation and communication technologies have facilitated these processes. Global Civil Society is a layer of networks of non-state institutions and social movements that operate at the global level with universal goals. Such associational ties transcend borders encouraging a globalized identity. Global Governance is a process that encompasses elements of the traditional concept of governing rule-making and rule-enforcing but includes any array of actors which have the capability to conduct themselves on the global level, incorporating non-state actors engaged in the practice of regulation without legitimate sovereign authority. This is a relatively new phenomenon to be explored systematically by academics. Smouts argues similar dynamics can operate at the regional level (Smouts 86). States continue to play a central, if less encompassing role, as their legitimacy is challenged by the institutionalization of control mechanisms emerging from the fragmented subsystems of a multiplicity of involved actors. States, multinational corporations, transnational social movements, international governmental organizations, international non-governmental organizations, media organizations and prominent individuals are among the significant actors.

The Issue of Disarmament/Arms Control

In light of these key concepts, the issue of disarmament can be placed in context. The direct effects of the process of globalization have been minimal. Security concerns remain a largely state-level affair. Where the industrial capabilities exist, governments have launched concerted efforts to make their states self-sufficient in arms production and technology even if they have not undertaken such measures in the civil economy. For example, India has begun a plan to increase the domestic share of arms procurement from 30% to 70% and open up markets abroad for such products. The minimal impact of globalization has come in two forms increased horizontal proliferation of mostly low-technology weapons and the launching of joint-venture procurement projects, often at the regional level (Jaguar, Tornado, JSF, Horizon, EF2000 Typhoon, ANZAC, Eurocopter Tiger, etc.). MNC s have formed partnership to take advantage of the economies of scale enjoyed with access to multiple defense budgets. One of the most successful export aircraft designs, the Harrier, was developed by British Aerospace. When the US Marine Corps sought to procure the VTOL variant, the product was delivered by a joint venture between British Aerospace and the US MNC McDonnell-Douglas (now part of Boeing). Globalization has also been relevant to NGO actors. Technological advances in communication (faxes, email, internet news services, usenet) have enhanced the ability of NGO s to communicate with their members and to organize activities. In the efforts surrounding the Mine Ban Treaty, involved NGO s contacted grass-roots members and petitioned decision-making authorities utilizing such technologies. E-mail and distribution listservers have dramatically reduced the cost of providing detailed information rapidly disseminated globally.

The influence of global civil society on the disarmament issue has been rather weak. At

this point it is necessary to consider an exception which while often allied to disarmament efforts has an agenda that goes beyond most attempts at governance. The peace movement has many of the characteristics of successful deep politics associated with a vibrant global civil society. The peace movement has been built on a network of activists and institutions which transcend borders. The realization of a universality of human identity (rather than exclusive national or ethno-linguistic identity) forms the basis of seeking global disarmament. For the more typical disarmament effort, those directed at specific weapons systems, the impact of global civil society has not been as great. Claims of sovereignty over security-related matters reduces the access of civil society organs to the relevant decision-making actors.

The extent of global governance over disarmament has been low. States claim nearly exclusive control over the issue area. NGO s are generally locked-out of the decision-making process. Global and regional IGO s can be involved to facilitate multilateral agreements between states. These tend to be global for WMD but regional for systems that have only regional externalities. MNC s are involved as sellers in the arms trade. Global governance has been restrained by the unwillingness of states to provide substantial access to information and decision-making. Only where the state surrenders sovereign rights as final arbiter can governance be achieved in a meaningful way. Governance attempts are usually argued in the same terms as military procurement (security, prestige and jobs).

Developments in Disarmament Governance

Disarmament has been on the global agenda as long as war has. Traditionally disarmament has occurred following wars among participants in the conflict. In this form, victors disarmed the defeated. An important advance came in the seventh century B.C.E., when the

Amphictyonic League (Ancient Greece) set laws of war (including provisions against some forms of biological warfare) among members which were enforceable by sanctions, economic and military. Members were obliged to provide troops and funding. The modern institution, the United Nations, enshrined universal disarmament in its mission. Attempts at disarmament governance have had numerous precedents but only limited success.

Historically, attempts to outlaw weapons systems have shadowed developments in arms technology. From the third century B.C.E. to the Middle Ages, arms technology was relatively static and there were few attempts to implement governance. Significant attempts were, however, made by the key interstate institution of the period, the Papacy. The Roman Catholic Church offered The Peace of God in 990 CE to limit the scope of war and protect civilians. In 1139, the Second Lateran Council banned the use of the crossbow against Christians. The development of firearms widened the scope of war, increased the potential for violence, reduced training costs permitting the raising of mass armies and made killing cheaper. These developments resulted in the devastation of Germany in the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). Reflecting on the brutality of the period, three major developments in disarmament were attempted. Firstly, the scope of conflict was limited by professionalizing armed forces, making war a game of kings. Secondly, conventions were adopted on the treatment of prisoners and logistics (to end pillaging). Thirdly, utopian plans were formulated by enlightenment philosopher such as Rousseau and Abbé de Saint Pierre for total abolition of war. This was an action to be repeated: Calls for total disarmament followed as a reaction to catastrophic total wars.

The next major change in the conduct of warfare negated the gains in governance made in the aftermath of the Thirty Years War. A period of limited wars ended with the rise of mass

armies during the Napoleonic Wars (1799-1815) which enlarged the size and devastation of war. Following Napoleon s defeat, France and Spain were forced to disarm and limit their national arsenals. At the Congress of Vienna (1815), the issue of arms reductions for the *victors* was considered. These efforts came to nought when the UK refused to reduce its arsenal unless Prussia did; Prussia tied arms control to Russia. While no progress was made on the Continent, the UK and US agreed to reduce, equalize and eventually eliminate Great Lakes naval forces under the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817.

In the Nineteenth century the manufacturing capabilities created by the Industrial Revolution were applied to the production of war materials by advanced countries. Technological innovation led to the development of rifled artillery, breech-loading rifles, machine guns, and other weapons that revolutionized warfare. The resources of entire nations could now be turned to war, making possible conflicts of unprecedented scale and destructiveness. Although many government elites saw the arms buildup in Europe as potentially dangerous, little was done to reduce armaments until the First Hague Disarmament Conference of 1899. The period was one of relative peace in Europe, with much of the military competition diverted to the periphery. By the end of the century much of the world was already divided with a newly unified Germany rapidly expanding economically but lacking an imperial `place in the sun to absorb its military-industrial production. This capability stayed and accumulated on the Continent.

The First Hague Conference was called on the initiative of Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, who was trying to lessen the costs of competing with the advanced economies of Germany and the UK, for the purpose of bringing together the principal nations of the world to discuss and resolve the problems of maintaining universal peace, reducing armaments, and ameliorating the

conditions of warfare. At the urging of pacifist groups most prominently in Austria and the UK, twenty-six countries accepted the invitation to the conference issue by the minister of foreign affairs of the Netherlands. 101 delegates including jurists, diplomats and military officers attended; Alfred Thayer Mahan was among the US delegation. The delegates to the conference entered into three formal conventions. Firstly, they set up the permanent machinery for the optional arbitration of controversial issues between nations which became known as the Hague Tribunal. The other two conventions dealt with the treatment of civilians and neutrals to limit the scope of war. They also agreed to three declarations which banned poison gas, expanding bullets and aerial bombardment. Though arbitration was not made compulsory due to sovereignty concerns, this conference made a significant advance toward governance by providing a non-militarized method of addressing disputes and eliminating a number of weapons systems.

A second conference was held eight years later at the urging of Russia and the US and was attended by 44 countries. Conventions were adopted establishing principles on the duties of neutrals, naval bombardment, laying of submarine contact mines and the conversion of merchant ships to warships. They also recommended another conference to be held within eight years which the Netherlands began to prepare for. However, this conference was canceled with the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. Overall these conferences seem to have made great progress in multilaterally discussing issue which had rarely been considered in the past. Unlike many efforts which have been driven by a revulsion of a recent militarized catastrophe, these Hague efforts were motivated primarily by economic concerns of the weakest states in the system.

There was a catastrophic event which kicked off the next phase of disarmament

governance attempts. WWI accounted for 9.8 million dead, 5% of which were civilians (the comparable figure in WWII was 48%). Of the accords adopted in the Hague those relating to poison gas, dumdum bullets, aerial bombardment, arming merchantmen, and neutrals were violated. Among hegemonic wars, civilians accounted for less of the dead; this fact may have been more a function of the style of (trench-) warfare than the adoption of norms on the subject. In the early phases of the war there were repeated attempts by religious and associational organizations to open peace talks. These talks were unsuccessful as the body counts rose to a level of investment the governments could not have spent without results to show from it. After the carnage of World War I, the international climate was more receptive to the idea of arms control. The League of Nations took over many of the responsibilities of the Hague, most notably providing a forum for the pacific resolution of disputes. One of the lessons taken from the war was that the accumulation of arms was a contributing cause to the launching of that war. British NGO s began to pressure their government which emerged from the war with the world s largest army, navy, air force, and arms industry to unilaterally disarm. Britain drastically scaled back their active forces and munitions production capabilities.

The interwar period saw many formal arms control conferences held and treaties drawn up. From 1921 to 1922 the Washington Naval Conference was held to establish stable relationships among the naval forces of the leading powers. The agreements regulated the fortification of Pacific possessions, established capital ship (excluding carriers) tonnage ratios, limited battleship tonnage and armaments, established a moratorium on battleship construction, and recognized spheres of interest in China. The conference was prompted by a war-weary British Empire which sought to avoid a naval arms race with the US. In 1925 a convention in

Geneva banned the use of toxic gas in warfare signed by the major powers except for Japan and the US. The Geneva convention also established a standard for the treatment of prisoners of war. This was observed until Italy violated it in 1936. In 1928 the Kellogg-Briand Pact, initiated by France and the US, was signed by 63 countries. This pact renounced war as an instrument of foreign policy. It made no provisions, however, for enforcing compliance, and many nations only signed it with sweeping qualifications. It had no effect on international relations. This lack of enforcement plagued many of these agreements.

In 1932, after nearly ten years of preliminary discussions, a World Disarmament Conference was held in Geneva under the auspices of the League. The keystone of the conference was the Hoover Plan offered by the US based on the concept of qualitative disarmament: the elimination of offensive weapons. The result was to be an increasingly unfavorable ratio between offensive and defensive power to deter aggression. Qualifications imposed by many of the major powers diluted the Plan until it was only a statement of principles. Another problem with this approach is the distinction between offensive and defensive weapons is a difficult one to make. It is more an issue of doctrine than capabilities specification.

The last major arms control agreement of the interwar period was negotiated in 1936. In London the US and UK reaffirmed the naval limitation treaties with an acceleration clause, which would provide for proportional increase in the US-to-UK ratio, to counteract any German or Japanese violations. The Japanese fearing Anglo-America superiority withdrew from further negotiations.

This progress in governance collapsed with the onset of the Second World War. This war cost 55 million lives (48% civilian) and led to the widespread use of a number of new war

technologies. Massed armor blitzkrieg, strategic area bombing, incendiary bombing, tactical air support, airborne assault, effective submarine blockade (US against Japan in the Pacific), carrier-borne air strikes, massive amphibious assault, fleet supply train, mechanized logistics and, of course, the atomic bomb were among the most significant developments. After WWII ended in 1945, considerable support again developed for arms control and for alternatives to military conflict in international relations. The UN Charter was designed to permit a supranational agency to enforce peace, avoiding many of the weaknesses of the League covenant. Thus, Article 11 of the charter stated that the General Assembly could consider the general principle of disarmament and the regulation of armaments. Article 26 required the Security Council to submit plans for a system of armament regulation. Article 47 established a military staff committee to assist the Security Council in this task.

Although conventional weapons accounted for more than 99.8% of casualties in the war, nuclear disarmament has been most prominent in the aftermath. Nuclear weapons are categorized as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) along with biological and chemical weapons. These categorizations may seem somewhat arbitrary but there are some characteristics of a W-88 thermonuclear warhead which clearly differ from a 9mm round. The distinction is not that massive destruction (e.g., city-busting) can be done with the weapon as commonly claimed but that such destruction can be repeatedly mounted *cheaply*. In the closing phases of WWII, 1000-bomber incendiary attacks were launched on Japanese cities including Tokyo killing as many as the atomic bomb on Hiroshima or Nagasaki. The atomic bomb dropped by a single B-29 took 1,000 incendiary-loaded B-29 bombers to equal it. A B-29 in 1945 cost $2 million but the Nagasaki atomic bomb cost $200 million (including its research and development). In a more

modern example, the W-88 armed Trident D-5 SLBM s costs $6 million apiece while B-52H s each cost $73 million. The point is that with nuclear weapons there is more destructive capacity to mass which reduces the cost of delivery systems. Biological and chemical weapons, while they can be defended against, also provide sufficiently inexpensive destruction to be considered WMD.

The development of the atomic bomb by the US toward the end of WWII brought with it the capability of devastating whole civilizations. While the US still maintained a monopoly on nuclear weapons, it made overtures in the UN for control and elimination of atomic energy for military purposes. In June 1946, American representative Bernard Baruch presented a plan to the UN Atomic Energy Commission, calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons, international control over the processing of nuclear materials, full sharing of all scientific and technological information concerning atomic energy and the safeguards to ensure that atomic energy would be used only for civilian purposes. The government of the USSR vetoed the Baruch Plan in the Security Council objecting to the UN s authority over disarmament and citing the domination of that body by the US and Western Europe, and their spheres of influence. In 1949 the USSR exploded an atomic weapon of its own, ending American monopoly. The possibility of a nuclear war was now present with the Cold War underway. Both the US and the USSR were engaged in a race to develop thermonuclear devices, which have many times the destructive power of atomic bombs. The weapons raised the possibility of ending all life on earth in an all-out war. After 1954, when the USSR exploded its first hydrogen bomb, the primary concern of arms control was to reduce nuclear arsenals and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology.

In 1957 the International Atomic Energy Agency was established to oversee the

development and spread of nuclear technology and materials. Two years later a treaty was negotiated to demilitarized the Antarctic and to prohibit the detonation or storage of nuclear weapons there. In 1961 the UN General Assembly passed the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations. It was followed in 1963 by a treaty that bound the US, UK and USSR not to test nuclear weapons in space, in the atmosphere or underwater. In 1967 another treaty between the same nations limited the military use of outer space to reconnaissance only. They deployment of nuclear weapons in orbit was expressly prohibited. A second treaty in that same year banned nuclear weapons from Latin America. One of the most significant agreements on arms control in the post-war period was the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. Signatories pledged to restrict the development, deployment and testing of nuclear weapons to ensure that weapons materials or technology would not be transferred outside the five declared nuclear powers (US, USSR, UK, France, PRC). In 1993, North Korea threatened to withdrawn from the treaty after refusing to let inspectors examine its sites of suspected nuclear-weapons production. In 1995 over 170 countries agreed to permanently extend the treaty. India which tested in first nuclear device in 1974 and weaponized this capability in 1998 has refused to sign calling the NPT nuclear apartheid as it codifies two classes of states: the haves and have-nots, reinforcing the status quo. Pakistan, losing an arms race with India, has refused to sign unless India does.

There were also a number of bilateral accords reached under the bipolar system. In the late 1960's the US and USSR initiated negotiations to regulate strategic weapons stockpiles. These negotiations became known as the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I) which produced two important agreements in 1972. The agreements limited to growth of offensive

weapons, restricted the number of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) sites and barred ocean floor testing. SALT II (1979) limited the number of US and Soviet launchers. This treaty was not ratified by the US Senate until after the fall of the USSR.

During the early 1980's controversy surrounded the placement by the US of ballistic missiles on the territory of European NATO. Opposition in W Germany played a role in unseating Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1982. In 1983 US antinuclear groups rallied to support a bilateral arms freeze and US Roman Catholic bishops approved a pastoral letter with a similar aim. Controversy also surrounded the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) introduced by Reagan in 1983. This research program for developing a defense against ballistic missiles challenged the assumptions of nuclear strategy since the beginning of arms race. This was a major break from 30 years of deterrence which provided stability. Critics of SDI believed that efforts to construct a defense against nuclear weapons would destroy that balance and remove the conditions upon which peace relied. Despite these concerns US-Soviet arms negotiations resumed in 1985. In 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev signed a treaty banning intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) including many of those the US had placed in Europe. The treaty called for the destruction of all missiles with ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometers and established a 13-year verification program. The treaty was ratified in 1988.

Nuclear weapons were not the only site of attempts at disarmament governance in the post-war period. In 1972 the US USSR and most states signed a convention prohibiting development production and stockpiling of biological and chemical weapons. In the late 1980's Iraq s use of chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers and civilians during the Iran-Iraq War and in subsequent attacks on its own Kurdish population prompted renewed international efforts

to ban the use of such weapons. In 1993 representatives from 160 states approved the Chemical Weapons Convention. This agreement banned production use sale and storage of all chemical weapons. It also mandated destruction of existing stocks by 2005. The US ratified the agreement in 1997 but Libya Syria Iraq and North Korea are not signatories.

Conventional weapons such as booby traps and landmines have also been targets for disarmament governance. Global sentiment against land mines led 125 countries to sign a treaty banning the use production transfer and stockpiling of the weapons. The effectiveness of the ban is threatened by the refusal of the leading producers not signing the agreement. One of the most recent successful governance attempts has been regarding anti-personnel (AP) land mines which provides a model for how efforts come together. This effort has been largely driven by the activities of NGO s. The issue entered international discourse in 1991 following the publication of The Coward s War: Landmines in Cambodia a pamphlet issued by Asia Watch of Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the medical nonprofit Physicians for Human Rights (PHR). The two organizations were joined that same year by Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) calling for a ban on AP mines. VVAF noted that AP mines were the largest killer of American personnel in the war and that most North Vietnamese mines were US-made. The next step was the organization of national campaigns by NGO s to educate the public on the issue and lobby decision-making bodies. By the end of 1992, the EU parliament passed a resolution on mines. In 1993, the first NGO International Conference on Landmines was held to coordinate strategy among 40 NGO s operating world-wide; UNICEF opted to give priority attention to the issue of landmines. In December of that year, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a moratorium on the export of AP mines. Sweden s Bofors corporation, a leading weapons

manufacturer, announced for moral reasons it would terminate manufacture and export of AP mines and components. In 1994, a second international conference was held with then 75 NGO s represented. The Vatican Council for Justice and Peace called for a mine ban in June, 1994. At the end of the year, the Dutch MOD announced that they will destroy their AP mine stockpile. In February 1995, the Africa, Caribbean, Pacific-European Union Joint Assembly passed a resolution calling for a global ban on the use production and export of mines. By mid-year, the Pope John Paul II called for a definitive end to the production and use of AP mines at the Pax Christi meeting. In conjunction with HRW, the Faculty of University Eduardo Mondlane (Maputo, Mozambique) sponsored a seminar on mines. In September the Australian campaign presented 219,000 signatures for total ban to Parliament. By year s end Canada, Switzerland and the Philippines banned mines and began stockpile destruction. The Islamic Conference also called for an immediate ban on AP mines. In April of 1996, Congo Honduras Jamaica and Germany joined the growing list forswear AP mines. A month later, Clinton announced his new landmine policy (1) an end to the use of dumb mines by 1999 except in Korea (2) use of smart mines indefinitely until an agreement is reached and (3) qualifications on any treaty. The OAS adopted a resolution providing for a mine-free hemisphere. The six Central American states created the first mine-free zone in September of 1996 to be joined by the second Caricom two months later. In the next year (1997) the pace of progress picked up even more with the OAU adding its support, Germany exploring verification and compliance and the list of nations growing. That year s Nobel Peace Prize went to ICBL and its coordinator Jody Williams. In December 122 countries signed the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa. After this, efforts shifted to concentrate on those states including many major military powers which had not signed.

Ratifications were sufficient for the treaty to enter into force. The WHO joined the effort considering the public health consequence of AP mines (1) one in 230 Cambodians has lost a limb to mines (2) 200 million mines are deployed, mostly in unmarked areas and (3) arable land denied by the risk of mines contributes to starvation in affected countries such as Angola. (ICBL 1999). While NGO s were the driving agenda-setting force the final adoption and implementation lay with the states. Regional IGO s were heavily involved in creating mine-free zones where past mine use has had regional negative externalities. States and MNC s took unilateral actions under public and NGO pressures as the movement reached critical mass.

In the aftermath of the Cold War the US and USSR signed the START I to reduce nuclear arsenals 25%. The US unilaterally withdrew its tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. After the break-up of the USSR successor states agreed to abide by the terms of the agreements signed. Russia, Kazakhstan, the Ukraine and Belarus were left with nuclear warheads on their territories; the latter three unilaterally disarmed for financial incentives. After abandoning apartheid, South Africa destroyed its nuclear stockpiles and production facilities. In 1993 Russia and America signed START II reducing nuclear warheads and multiple-warhead missiles by two-thirds. While the Senate has ratified this agreement, the Russian Duma has yet to do so.

In 1996, the five declared nuclear powers signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which banned most types of nuclear weapons testing. This is considered to be the other half of nuclear governance along with the NPT. While a number of states with research programs continuing signed, India Pakistan and Israel refused. The treaty would effectively halt weaponization development for states lacking necessary high-powered computer facilities to simulate tests.

A number of important results have been achieved through these efforts at governance. Institutions have been created through which disarmament issues may be considered and adopted; these will be discussed in the next section. Agreements have been made on critical weapons systems limiting or eliminating their use and production. Nonstate actors have made known their interest and ability to be involved in arms control efforts. The role of the state in such security concerns has diminished from absolute but remains the primary arbiter. Past experience with phases of disarmament governance lead to the following general conclusions (1) disarmament is driven by technological innovation, economic need and revulsion to catastrophe (2) in hegemonic total war, militaries will disregard agreements signed if to do so is tactically advantageous and such actions are not militarily deterred (3) following hegemonic struggle, the state is blamed for the suffering and deeper governance attempts are made. There is no reason to expect recent agreements to be followed in the next major war but over the long-term there is a deepening of governance with each postwar peace going beyond what existed in the prewar period. This governance will be regional to address regional externalities and global for global effects.

Institutions

Security continues to be considered a matter of sovereignty where even status information can remain classified from public access. While NGO s can place an issue in general terms on the agenda and lobby for adoption, critical action of codification takes place in state-to-state interaction. Important institutions in such circumstances are IGO s at the regional and global levels which provide a site for negotiations. In the postwar period the UN and its affiliated agencies have performed the global role the League had previously. The UN has had the

advantage of increased transparency in individual states to technical means and on-site inspections. The First Committee is charged by the General Assembly with (1) reduction of military budgets (2) transparency in military expenditures (3) creation of nuclear-weapons free zones (4) general and complete disarmament and (5) practical disarmament measures (UNGA 1998 A/C.1/53/1). Much of the negotiations on WMD issues and transparency have been facilitated by UN institutions.

Regional IGO s have been the location of key agreements on conventional systems and, more generally, of early stages of what would become global governance efforts. They play such a role as the effects of governance (or consequences of not entering into governance) are most acutely felt on the regional level. These should still be considered systemic arrangements as participation tends to be universal among *affected* members of the global system. Regional IGO s have been set up in most of the regions of the world: EU, CSCE/OSCE, OAS, OAU, ASEAN, Arab League, etc. these tend to be IGO s where states are represented. The European Union is an important exception to this generalization as its various institutions represent different domestic elements: state governments in the commission, citizens in the Parliament, and regions. The EU is much more encompassing than other IGO s. The Conventional Forces in Europe which reduced armor and air power deployed to the European continent was negotiated under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to which both NATO and Warsaw Pact members belonged. OSCE has also facilitated monitoring of the implementation of CFE and UN-brokered agreements in the Balkans (before NATO intervention). Another regional IGO which is neglected in the literature is the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). While SAARC s primary activities have dealt

with the task of development and health policy, it has played a pivotal role in the Sinhalese-Tamil LTTE conflict in Sri Lanka and Indo-Pakistani tensions in Kashmir offering a continuing forum in circumstances where embassies cannot be used, i.e., if diplomatic relations have been broken. Under SAARC India and Pakistan slowed their arms race.

Regional and global IGO s have been the sites where governance attempts have taken place among states at the prompting of NGO s and other actors. However, there have been bilateral and multilateral negotiations held through Foreign Ministries and ad hoc organizations. The removal of IGO s would not prevent effective governance but require actors to take the extra step of performing its function as the site of codification discussions. That is the most important function IGO s have done but a new one is emerging. IGO s, as states increase transparency, have joined relevant NGO s and state institutions in verification of agreements.

Treaty	**Verification Means**
Geneva Protocol (1925)	None
NPT (1968)	IAEA Safeguards
Biological Weapons (1972)	None
ABM (1972)	NTM
SALT II (1979)	NTM
Conventional Forces in Europe (1990)	NTM, MTM, OSI, Aerial Overflights
Open Skies (1992)	Aerial Overflights
Chemical Weapons Convention (1993)	OSI
Anti-Personnel Land Mines	NTM, OSI, Open Skies
CTBT (1996)	NTM, OSI, Aerial Seismic & Radiation

NTM=National Technical Means; MTM=Multinational Technical Means; OSI=On-Site Inspections. (Special NGO Committee 1995: 41-42)

States remain the final arbiters of disarmament decisions. Security is seen as the primary (and by some only) legitimate concern of the state. As arms control and disarmament governance alter the correlation of forces in struggles of relative power, states have been loathe to surrender their sovereignty on this issue. There are circumstances in which states see their security-maximizing interest served by agreements if they feel unable to compete with rivals or see more advantage in compensation offered. State government elites are convinced to disarm by the same arguments as to arm for security, prestige and economic concerns. Relative security can be enhanced with the elimination of certain weapons or reduction in size of stockpiles if rivals participate in the governance scheme. Verification agreements which accompany the arms control governance also give an opportunity to evaluate rival forces more accurately. Secondly, prestige can be gained as a leader of bringing world peace. Canada and the Nordic countries have attained a certain status in the world community as moral leaders on this issue which is more than what their capabilities would predict. Thirdly, weapons systems cost money but can create jobs. Economic incentives are often offered to encourage states to disarm (e.g., Ukraine denuclearizing) and the destruction of weapons stockpiles require a labor force to implement (e.g., de-mining). The state is an essential actor in disarmament governance in codification and implementation. Verification is often performed using national technical means (intelligence agencies, spy satellites, reconnaissance, listening posts, etc.) The absence of the state would mean no state system which would require reconceptualization of the entire issue area. In this respect, the state *may* be an obstacle to global governance in its sovereignty claims.

NGO s are the key agenda-setters and are increasingly involved in implementation. NGO s provide the background research on specific issues and lobby decision-makers directly or

through public opinion (often, via media). Human rights and peace groups are often those promoting the issue. Access to information and discussions is often limited but if NGO s are not present and visible at plenaries governments assume there is little public interest in the issue (Special NGO Committee 1995: 9). NGO s are often most important acting at the national level (which can coordinated transnationally) lobbying their government officials. The UN NGO Committee s primary function is to inform the public through NGO s; it is not a true two-way means of communication. Position papers are submitted by NGO s to institutions such as the UN s Conference on Disarmament for educational and lobbying purposes (Special NGO Committee 1995: 10). Without NGO s, the world could expect less rapid action on disarmament efforts. Leaders of these organizations are often the ones provided to media programs and think-tank seminars as experts. Typically the argument to convince a state to give up arms has these characteristics (1) usually a specific weapons system/type (e.g., AP mines) (2) it is militarily obsolete, i.e., modern adversaries can counteract this weapon regardless of number (3) an agreement would increase security as the adversary also gives up the weapon (4) protecting the technology/stockpile is cost prohibitive and (5) economic incentives or an alliance will be offered as a compensation. NGO s have also been increasingly involved in implementation through non-technical monitoring. They are seen by implicatable states as more objective observers than foreign intelligence agencies.

MNC s have been little involved in disarmament governance other than as weapons producers and exporters. Munitions companies have a clear economic interest in the continued proliferation of weapons. The externalities of use of these weapons tends to be in an area which would not effect MNC decision-makers. Companies which have other interest which can be

targeted by selective purchasing of divestment are more likely to discover moral reasons for ceasing production of specific weapons in question. The absence of MNC s from this debate would not be significant as traditionally state-owned enterprises (e.g., Royal Dockyards) have been the primary munitions producers especially for more expensive systems. The change-over in the US came at the time of WWII when the private sector was fully mobilized. In the aftermath of that war, MNC s (Boeing, Lockheed, Newport News, Raytheon, etc.) became primary producers. Weapons producers can (through state contacts) resist disarmament attempts but have little independent effect. New companies specializing in weapons dismantling have financial incentive to see disarmament proceed; this is a small sector but can be expected to expand as the Mine Ban Treaty and others are implemented. (AP mines are significantly more expensive to dismantle than to produce).

Comparison of Issues

Disarmament is, of course, only one of the issues for which efforts have been made at governance. Some of the other broad topics have been the environment, human rights and development. To analyze these issues a framework for comparison is necessary. Specificity of Governance Attempts refers to whether modal governance attempts seek to address the broad category of issues or specific subsets of them. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights broadly addresses the topic, while the CFC ban is rather specific. Human Rights tends to go for universal norms, environment and disarmament attempts have looked at specific phenomena/weapons systems (e.g., rainforests, AP mines), development has lately considered sustainable development with the IMF s one-size-fits-all formulas. The Cleavage of Issue Conceptualization attempts to identify what ascriptive characteristic divide how actors think

about the issue. In the Environmental issue, Northerners approach the topic at the macro-level concentrating on global commons effects while Southerners worry about micro-level consequences. All of the issues appear to have a North/South divide. Human Rights also is divided on civilizational grounds with Anglo-American individualism coming into conflict with the Asian values of conformity (as Mahathir would say). There are a number of different types of actors which are prominent in different aspects of the governance process across these issues: agenda-setting, codification and monitoring. Different types of actors can be among the most prominent at a particular phase in the governance process. NGO s tend to be some of the agenda-setters. States are the final arbiters of governance except in cases where they have ceded such authority. States have retained this prerogative generally in the area of disarmament bu in the environmental area some sovereignty concerns have been surrendered. The Area of Governance Attempt is the site at which agenda-setters present the problem for resolution, this is often tied to where the externalities are felt. Openness of Final Decision-Making process is an indication the access the public has to seeing these decisions made. Issue Transparency (Ease of Collecting Data) is the ability of actors to collect information for background research. These two questions are linked to how much sovereignty the state has surrendered. Disarmament is considered high politics and rarely provides significant access due to official secrets. The environment being low politics handled by technical ministries has provided access to experts. Measurements taken by the scientific community can be applied the background for public education. In human rights there are some restrictions placed by internal security agencies to cover up atrocities which make it more difficult to determine just what events have taken place. The Type of Good Governance Would Be On identifies between public and private goods on the basis of excludibility and

rivalness. Only the environment as it deals with the global commons can be considered a public good as the others can be limited to signatories. Enforcement Plan: Area is the location and scope where implementation (monitoring) takes place. Enforcement Plan: Tactics are the mechanisms used to encourage compliance with agreements. Agreements are meaningless unless pressure to abide by them can be brought. Enforcement mechanisms can be included in the treaties or added on a case-by-case basis in practice. Three major tactics are diplomatic (moral suasion) economic (sanctions) and military action. Typically military action would only be used for that which addresses national interests, i.e., arms control. Operation Desert Fox (US/UK vs. Iraq) was launched to force compliance with arms inspectors. However, the recent NATO war against Yugoslavia over Kosova may legitimate the use of military power to enforce human rights norms as well. The next strongest effort is sanctions which have been used in all categories. Sanctions have been imposed on Iraq until it complies with UN WMD resolutions and PRC is being kept out of WTO on human rights grounds. Moral suasion is used in all areas where will is lacking to invest in more potentially costly measures. Externalities are felt at different levels which are identified. The Impact of Globalization assesses the degree to which the processes encompassed in globalization (defined above) have influenced governance. If the Issue Has Changed Over Time (the last century) it is indicated. All of these issues have changed in the last century with the rise of the universal IGO, weakening of state sovereignty, increasing democratization and rapid communication. If Governance Has Had Success defined as meeting at least some of the broad attempt s original objectives, it is indicated. Answers to these questions are in the following table:

Question	Disarmament	Environment	Human Rights	Development
Specificity of Governance Attempts	specific issue	specific issue	general topic	general topic
Cleavage of Issue Conceptualization	state/nonstate, north/south	north/south	north/south, civilizational	north/south, urban/rural
Agenda-Setting Actors	NGO, IGO	NGO, MNC	NGO	NGO, IGO, MNC
Codification Actors	IGO, State	IGO, State, MNC	IGO, State	IGO, State
Monitoring Actors	State, IGO, NGO	State, IGO, NGO	State, IGO, NGO	State, IGO, NGO, MNC
Area of Governance Attempt	regional (except WMD which are global)	global	regional	global
Openness of Final Decision-Making	low	high	medium	medium
Issue Transparency (Ease of Collecting Data)	weak	strong	medium	medium
Type of Good governance would be on	private	public	private	private
Enforcement Plan: Area	state	global	state	region
Enforcement Plan: Tactics	sanctions, military, moral suasion	moral, sanctions	moral, sanctions, military?	sanctions
Externalities are felt at...	Regional	global	state, minorities	state, substate
impact of globalization	minimal	significant	moderate	significant
Issue Changed over time?	Yes in form	yes	yes	yes
Governance Success	Limited norms	Yes	Norms Established	yes, enforced by market

In terms of governance, disarmament has had the least success when viewed as a broad area. As mentioned above while progress has been made in peace time agreements, there is no reason to

believe these norms would not be violated in the next war, implementation is haphazard on many issues and the most frequently used weapons (small arms) have not been governed. In human rights, norms have been established to address the broad issue in universalistic manner. However, different areas of the world have their own universalisms. Implementation is relatively voluntary. Development can be said to be transnationally governed. The norms in this case are liberal capitalism which is governed by the market. The invisible hand punishes violations. The environment has gone the furthest in governance. Agreements have been signed with built in implementation mechanisms (against violating states and companies).

All of the governance issues are interconnected. Disarmament is linked to the environment because security is. Security that is derived from military force has led to environmental destruction (1) as a tool of warfare to deny adversaries access to resources (2) by pushing refugees to marginal areas (3) exploitation of resources for war (4) pollution such as sinking tankers (5) defoliation of forests (6) bombing contaminates water supplies, the list goes on... (Special NGO Committee 1995: 51). The *Rio Declaration* stated that warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development (Special NGO Committee 1995: 52). The US has 30,000 tonnes and Russia 40,000 of chemical agents. In disarming the US was forced to halt chemical neutralization due to the generation of dangerous waste which would go in the landfill (Special NGO Committee 1995: 52). US nuclear programs have contaminated 11,000 sites.

The connection between disarmament and development was made clearly by Eisenhower: Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies, in a final sense, a *theft* from those who hunger and are not fed, from those who are cold and are not clothed (Baker 3). Arms spending drains resources from development projects. Skilled labor is diverted to

weapons design and the officer corps (Baker 5). Disarmament would release funding and industrial capacity for civilian purposes. The amount of funding the military absorbs dwarf social expenditures in most (especially developing) countries (Baker 4). For these reasons, Baker argues that disarmament and development are not two issues but one (Baker 5). A 10% reduction in defense spending could give clean water to two billion ,feed 900 million undernourished people and provide community health care to one billion (Special NGO Committee 1995: 44).

Disarmament is also linked to human rights. A militarized nation is a prime victim for the abridgement of human rights in terms of conscription (a form of slavery for the state) and sedition acts (abridging political rights). Even in the democratic UK, elections were suspended in wartime. Groups of people have political rights suspended or eliminated (e.g., USA reconstruction period). Disarmament and the accompanying demilitarization would limit these effects. Furthermore, when militaries (especially land forces) are constructed for security they can be turned to internal repression (Argentina, Burma/Myanmar, etc) to sustain a regime.

The Literature

The literature on the issue of disarmament makes no attempt to assess the issue as a whole. While there are case studies looking into specific governance attempts (e.g. nuclear freeze) an analytical framework for comparison is missing. This is truly inadequate. Works tend to be studies of specific weapons, are not a comprehensive look at governance, have an overemphasis on nuclear arms and overemphasize the Cold War bilateral context. In more historical studies insufficient work has been done on non-European systems. Characteristics of the European state system may have facilitated a certain approach to arms control which was then disseminated with their empires. The regional IGO the EU is developed to a degree not seen in

other IGO s in penetration of national societies and creating of a sense of European society. Both these circumstances can act as confidence building measures which facilitate disarmament.

The scholarly community has several directions along which to advance the discipline. Firstly, a comparison should be performed between regional and global governance in respect to the type of actors involved for agenda setting, what motivates these actors and variation in state support. As mentioned externalities seem to determine whether approaches will be for regional or global governance initially, this needs to be empirically tested. Do northern NGO s prefer regional to global governance, or vice versa? Southern NGO s? Can regional and global institutions cooperate in governance or will they be competing? Secondly, a comparison of time lines on governance attempts could lead to some conclusions as to model coalition-building processes? Finally, an investigation of disarmament governance in non-state systems from history may provide needed insight into what could evolve with continued erosion of state sovereignty?

2024: Speculation on Developments in Governance on Disarmament

There is no reason to expect dramatic progress in disarmament governance in the near future. Historically, attempts at disarmament governance have been driven by technological innovation and catastrophic events. Technological innovation works in three ways (1) the invention makes a certain weapon militarily obsolete which then can be removed from arsenals or scaled back without reducing security (2) great verification capabilities (more power satellites, etc) make monitoring possible for potential agreements (3) intelligence assets reduce uncertainty by enabling concerned governments to know the capabilities of potential rivals which make reduction calculations possible. A catastrophic event is a hegemonic war which undermines

public confidence in the unregulated security-maximizing state system. The US/NATO lead in aggregate forces and technology and continuing rivalries among potential challengers (Russia, India, PRC) which prevent a countervailing alliance make a hegemonic war in this time frame unlikely. A major war involving nuclear weapons exchange between India and Pakistan (PRC involvement possible) or Israel and Iraq could generate sufficient revulsion to drastically reduce nuclear stockpiles, deploy SDI or add international safeguards. Progress driven by technological innovation is more likely but the results would be less encompassing.

In the year 2024, the following can be expected. There will be six great powers (1) US/Canada (NORAD and NAFTA links) (2) Europe (WEU/EU enlarged to include much of Eastern Europe and Turkey) (3) Russia (with some near abroad states reincorporated) (4) PRC (5) India (6) Japan allied with ASEAN states and Australia. In this scenario NATO has collapsed and the UN will have to be restructured or abandoned. Given the make-up of the Security Council it is unlikely changes would be made there to recognize a new power configuration however other component of the UN system could survive the collapse of UNSC. Generally, there will be a shift to regional blocs for governance and trade with integrated cores and peripheries. What does this mean for disarmament governance? New institutions will have to be created or old ones modified to reflect the distribution of capabilities. The only issue which may see governance attention is small arms, addressed in the human rights sense AP mines were. This is something major powers would seek to avoid but their essential security would not be imperiled if an agreement was reached. This issue is most critical on the African continent where 50 million AK-47's have allowed constant interstate and civil wars. Nuclear-capable great powers with modern armor, aircraft and guided-missile ships may come to accept a global register and

export restrictions. No agreements are likely to address the basic issue of defense overspending and the legitimacy of war as state policy.

If the UK is any example, the circumstances which permit greater NGO involvement in governance will improve. The Blair government has put forward a Freedom of Information Act allowing greater public scrutiny of policy and actions (Florini 53). Information is what NGO s thrive on. In the next quarter-century with increase transparency in government and rapid communication NGO s will be able to play a more effective role in agenda-setting and monitoring. States will still make the final decisions but subject to pressures exerted through democratic institutions. Political leaders take deliberate steps to assess public opinion on matter of even security. The Kosova war has been a watershed as the first major war conducted by focus groups and opinion polls. If military tactical decisions can be made with such openness, this may be an opening for the disarmament agenda. In summary, democratization is the source of cautious optimism in an area which has made relatively little progress.

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