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Review essay: Are new wars new?

A common notion in the mass media and the literature in that the world has entered into an era of a new type of war. This trend is said to have begun with the conclusion of the Cold War with an increase in ethnic and regional conflicts at the margins of the world community. But just what is a "new war"? Are these, however defined, becoming more prevalent? What are some of the arguments underlying proposed trends? In respect of this, how should security policy and theory be altered?

W. Phillips Shively argues that the most important challenge to the state, and by extension the state system, is ethnic and regional (separatism) conflict (Shively 35). Rather than diminishing recently, they have often flourished as states become more modern (Shively 36). He suggests three factors for increases in regional conflict (1) economic globalization, (2) cultural homogenization and (3) the end of the Cold War (Shively 37). Globalization has led various regions within particular states to become more transnationally connected to regions of other states than to the union, particularly in economic activity. This encourages more affluent regions to seek to unburden themselves of underperforming economies by secession. In the Yugoslavian case, the relatively more affluent Slovenia and Croatia had economic incentives added to any underlying hostilities for seeking a split. A trend of globalization undercuts the need for economies of scale within state borders: small states can make it on their own, economically. Globalization is a commonly cited catalyst.

Secondly, joined with the increased transnational movement of capital and labor is the movement of ideas. Cultural homogenization is the fear of many conservative elites in non-hegemonic areas. This comes in two forms: (1) a few central cities dominate the domestic hinterland and (2) Anglo-American cultural exports overwhelm indigenous production. Regions that are more on the fringe of things may see their culture being destroyed and fight back with movements for autonomy (Shively 38).

Thirdly, the end of the Cold War is suggested to have contributed to the declared increase in conflict by removing many ideological and coercive assets which had discouraged such dissidents. The universalist ideologies of liberalism and communism, in theory whatever the failings may have been in practice, have been removed as a trans-ethnic, mobilizing, unifying mantra. The United States and USSR have as well drastically

reduced support (IMET, etc.) to the coercive services of their (former) clients, requiring the states to seek out new sources of funding or scale back these very costly operations. In short, the end of the Cold War has made it more difficult to suppress ethnic separatist and devolutionary claims, either by persuasion or coercion.

Another trend Shively identifies is within the domain of ethnic conflict, there has been a shift from ranked to unranked conflict. This he also attributes to changes in the polarity of the state system. Within a ranked system, one groups has political and economic dominance over another group. Examples include the apartheid system of South Africa. However, in an unranked system, although one group may be more economically affluent, no legal basis for domination by that group exists (Shively 39). These unranked systems are much messier. Conflict is inter-group rather than a struggle directed against the system of domination. Each group seeks to capture policies, contracts, symbols, and appointments from the state apparatus, thereby competing with other groups. These conflicts are less organized and more difficult to solve, lacking overwhelming resources.

Finally, Shively claims that the world is experiencing a rise of *ethnic* identity (Shively 39). As he puts it: Perhaps in our increasingly mobile world, where we move frequently from place to place and from relationship to relationship, people feel a lack of identity and seek out something to provide them with a stable core (Shively 39). In other words, ethnic identity is a coping mechanism, using a support group, with which to navigating a globalizing and atomizing world. While providing some potentially plausible explanations centered paradoxically on globalization and the end of the Cold war key triumphs for modernizing liberalism for a rise in regional and ethnic conflict, Shively provides no empirical evidence of the phenomenon but this is the pop-analyst argument. This empirical treatment is left to others which will be considered below.

Defining a new war

Answers have come addressing the issue in three categories (1) Actors (2) Tactics and (3) Decision-Making. Firstly, who is fighting the war? Relevant actors may include states, firms, or other non-state actors, including terrorists . The ethnic war may be intervened in by external forces, contracted by a variety of parties. There may be links between ethnic and regional conflict due to irredentism and interest-serving intervention by states and IGO s. In this way such conflict spills over borders potentially destabilizing other states. Tactics may focus on the use of smaller units than the mass conscript armies of Europe in the 19th and

20th centuries. Along with this for capital-abundant states, certain force structures may be more relevant such as the utility of air power. Decision-making changes come into the differentiation as practitioners define the "new war" as being politically-constrained in the scope of operational aims and tactics. Wars are waged by supra-state actors, specifically institutionalized coalitions of states deciding by consensus with mutual veto.

General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) during the Kosovo war, defines modern war as "limited, carefully constrained in geography, scope, weaponry, and effects" (Clark xxiv). In waging modern war, an organizational problem was the US armed services' effort to cling to Operation Desert Storm as a model while "an ambiguous, tense, highly political coalition environment in which military actions would face tight restraints, constant high-level oversight, and continuing public scrutiny" was more likely (Clark xxxi). Long-range, precision-guided (third generation) weapons have blurred the line between war and peace. using in-flight refueling and GPS all-weather targeting, small numbers of CONUS-based aircraft can inflict disproportionate damage on targets on short notice (no redeployment). The USAF has called this doctrine: "Global Reach - Global Power" (Clark 10). The forces required were small but capital intensive. There were inconsistencies, however, between this doctrine and procurement. The Pentagon's requirements following the Bottom-Up Review were to fight two simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs) against North Korea and Iraq. Both could be built upon previous models and force structures (Clark 46). The then-SACEUR General Joulwan feared a loss of essential resources as Europe was not assigned MRC status (Clark 48). The deployment commitment of 25,000 US troops in the Balkans was not anticipated in the plan (Clark 53). Parochial interests were undermining operational effectiveness in projected conflict deployment scenarios.

After the Dayton accord was signed in Paris, a requirement of the European NATO allies, Milosevic confided to Clark that the Serbs had lost not to Croats and Muslims in Bosnia but NATO air power. Clark was unsure whether this was a signal of weakness or "the Serb penchant for blaming their problems on some superior outside power" (Clark 68). Clark, as operations continued, encountered two divergent American voices: the Department of State and White House who focused on the mission succeeding and the Pentagon which emphasized keeping operations limited and risk-free. Secretary Cohen, never an advocate of involvement, often admonished Clark for strong demands of the Yugoslavian government (Clark 91).

Clark relates a number of incidents from SFOR to illustrate a modern way of war intelligence, maneuver, operations security, surprise, superior communications, Allied teamwork with air and ground forces of different nations, all in close coordination with civil authority. These actions in that they were doing some good had a positive effect on NATO soldier morale (Clark 98). When Clark, informed the Pentagon of the evolving situation in Kosovo, they were more interested in concealing it from Secretary Albright and how it might complicate their legislative agenda than crafting a response (Clark 109). Although some 200,000 Kosovar Albanians had been made homeless in the summer of 1998 by Serb actions, for Clark the problem was not in Kosovo but in Belgrade a lack of democracy there. To remedy this, bombing and positive incentives were put into consideration (Clark 129). By October of 1998, when 350,000 Kosovar Albanians were homeless, Clark asked Washington for a strong ultimatum against Milosevic backed by force (Clark 133). As the credibility of NATO was at stake, Cohen diminished his obstructionism (Clark 134). NATO threatened to expand aerial verification to bombing if Milosevic did not pull back excess units from Kosovo. The Serbs were after 410 KLA terrorists and the process displace one thousand times that number. Some 4000 Serb forces were deployed on the mission. Milosevic, after denying the existence off the identified units, agreed to the pull-back (Clark 147-9). Milosevic was intimidated and began a withdrawal, monitored by NATO aircraft (Clark 153).

Over the next several months, NATO considered the possibility of the Serbs fully reneging. Britain, France, Germany, Italy and America committed forces. As zones were selected, the US chose one on the Macedonian border for easy abandonment. An extraction force was built up in Macedonia. The Serbs used this as a pretext to reenforce Kosovo (Clark 166). By the spring of 1999, NATO struck Serb targets in Kosovo with sea-launched missiles, strategic bombers, and tactical fighters. Initial targets included air defense assets (194). Yet C3 facilities for the ethnic cleansing operations which continued during the NATO campaign were left untouched in Belgrade (Clark 219).

The process of choosing targets by committee was a mess with each country wishing to approve the selection. Some countries wanted a slow-down or pause to the bombing; the UK wanted to hit more high-value targets (Clark 224-5). The French doctrine on the use of force was the best way to pressure Milosevic was to ensure that he had more to lose in the future than he had already lost…if he feels like he s already lost everything, he ll have no incentive to stop (Clark 236-7). By April 19, 900,000 had been displaced in Kosovo

(260) and the ground option underwent serious consideration as air power was not winning the war (Clark 264). On April 23 the NATO 50th anniversary the UK was pushing to use all options including ground for the operation to success while Cohen demanded Clark say nothing about ground forces (Clark 268-9). Apparently this new way of war which avoided risking mass ground armies was insufficiently effective. The ground option came to rely not on an opposed invasion or invited intervention but a semi-permissive environment for a mopping-up exercise (Clark 299). This would take 100,000 troops: 50,000 British, 20,000 French, 3,500 Italians and the remainder from America and the smaller countries which would only commit if the US did. The Germans were non-committal (Clark 302). On the general question of using ground forces, the British were for it, others opposed. This divided Alliance opinion signaled to a receptive US not to commit. Yet, Clark suggests a number of other Allies supported action contingent on US involvement (Clark 330). In the end, the Serbs agreed to a joint-NATO/*Russian* force in Kosovo to stabilize the situation.

In modern war, achieving decisive political aims may not require achieving decisive military results. Operation Allied Force was waged this way (Clark 418-9). The lesson is the US should look beyond its interests to values and fully share the burdens and rewards on action (Clark 461). Clark s key points are (1) operations are politically constrained (2) political constraints can come from coalition dynamics (3) objectives may not include the control of territory and (4) capital-intensive strikes from a safe distance may be sufficient to obtain a positive result. Air power can be determinative.

Mary Kaldor also finds there to be a new kind of organized violence, emerging since the 1980's. As Shively above, globalization has been critical to the materialization of such wars. There are three critical dimensions: goals, methods, and financing which vary between the new and old wars. The goals have shifted from geopolitical and ideological to an identity-based policy, methods from soldiers tackling soldiers to using paramilitary units and non-military coercive assets to control populations, financing has truly globalized and liberalized. (Kaldor 76, 91, 101). Identity politics aim for mobilization around ethnic, racial or religious identities for the purpose of claiming power (Kaldor 76). Rather than seeking modernizing ideas these are fragmentive, backward-looking and exclusive (Kaldor 78). The rise of a civilian orientation to the conflict itself as targets as well as fighters is executed through the systematic murder of the out-group, ethnic cleansing, and rendering an area uninhabitable. The war economy, as well, differs in two ways (1) there is incomplete autarkic centralization and (2) funding is transnational. Foreign-sourced funding can come from the

diaspora, bilateral assistance and humanitarian aid (Hislope 29, 8).

Clausewitz defined war as an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will ; the war was waged inter-state for a definable goal (Kaldor 15). This state-centric view has been codified into the very laws of war. Reflecting upon the Bosnian conflict, Kaldor finds a war without a state, with a collapsed state. This turns the paradigmatic approach on its head. The state had collapsed, there was no modernizing, transformative ideology, identity dominated, and resources were extracted transnationally (Kaldor 35). This for her is a conceptually new form of conflict. For Kaldor, the solution is a strategy of capturing the hearts and minds needs to be counterposed to the strategy of sowing fear and hate (Kaldor 114) with cosmopolitan political mobilization. That is, as the problem was moved away from the state and conventional operations, so too must the means of resolution.

As Kaldor argued, combat is transitioning from a state-soldier versus soldier paradigm. One of the forms this can take is through the privatization of coercive apparatuses. David Shearer offers a treatment of such military firms[1]. The trend towards the decreasing popularity and frequency of use of mercenaries began in the late 18th century as they were replaced by national forces and conscripts (Shearer 14). Yet, this trend is reversing itself as these private firms have found work with both governmental and non-governmental actors. Why their resurgence? Shearer asserts several reasons linked to the end of the Cold War. firstly, the decline in great power force sizes from Cold War levels has idled millions of trained soldiers. This also happened after the end of the Hundred Years War which dumped thousands onto the private sector (Shearer 13). Secondly, the major powers have become less interested in intervening in conflicts, especially in Africa with the disappearance of the zero-sum game. Where public goods are under-provided and demand remains, private actors have stepped in. Thirdly, leading states have become constrained by the fear of casualties in peripheral matters (Shearer 27-34). This leaves a power vacuum. Most of these conflicts are intra-state. In fact, of major armed conflicts in 1996 only one was inter-state (Shearer 32). UN peacekeeping forces fell by three-quarters following the Somali debacle.

The activities in which the military firms participate varies (Shearer 25-6). Some firms do everything including combat operations. Many limit their activities to training and logistics. The American and British

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[1] Shearer uses the term companies. Firms are used here to avoid confusion with the 100-150 person operational unit, company, used in the American Order of Battle (OOB).

firms which dominate the market, while operating commercially act in the interest of their home governments, often to secure trade prerogatives (Shearer 34). These often are linked as contractors to national defense ministries. Conflicts with government policies could trigger unfortunate scrutiny. Foreign ministries promote approved vendors to foreign funders when public forces will not be provided. Clients include governments, multi-national corporations, exilees and others. Most state they will only work for recognized governments but leave the term undefined. The firms are paid in financial instruments as well as access to natural resources. The IMF and western governments have also funded the (limited) activities of some of these organizations. There is little incentive for western governments — in fact only Germany has signed a protocol against it — to clamp down on convenient private alternatives to political risk (Shearer 37).

Robert Hislope as well sees ethnic war on the rise but for somewhat[2] different reasons. System-wide corruption makes for weak states which are vulnerable to external aggression and "the availability of weapons is the single most important determinant of ethnic war" (Hislope 2). Corruption remains a major problem for post-communist states of the region which have moved swiftly to procedural democracy. What is missing are liberal norms of police professionality, minority rights, judicial independence, transparency, accountability, and state autonomy from anti-democratic social elements. The last is a focus here. Literature on ethnic war, Hislope argues, has failed account for the role of organized crime particularly in weapons procurement, as he states the obvious — "wars cannot be fought unless access to weapons is secured" (Hislope 4). Crime and corruption are central causes for the Macedonian state "virtual state of war" (Hislope 3). Albanian paramilitary, including NLA, forces are organized and maintained by criminal networks. Macedonia has a corrupt set of institutions which have impeded democratic development, alienated citizens and delegitimized an ethnically-neutral state (Hislope 3) providing an opening for such conflict.

In the 1990's a powerful Albanian mafia emerged which would play an indispensable role in funding and thereby equipping hitherto ragtag paramilitaries in the southern Balkans (including the NLA and KLA). In providing the means to wage this war in Macedonia, the interests of the national liberation movement and a narco-mafia coalesced (Hislope 5). These Albanian areas lie on the "Balkan Road" by way of which $400 billion dollars of illicit commerce (drugs, tobacco, prostitution, illegal immigrants, etc.) enter the EU market

[2] In a way this is also linked to globalization. Diaspora populations transfer capital through the globalizing financial institutions, largely beyond state control.

(Hislope 6). The influx of NGO s and peacekeepers have recently created a larger domestic market for the consumption of such goods and services. Criminal activity is pervasive with 83.1% of respondents to a June 2000 poll having property stolen worth up to $5,000. Most of these have a drug connection (Hislope 8). Few report burglary to the police. Participation in the gray economy is common. Economic conditions do not instill confidence in the system: 45% unemployment and 25% below the poverty line (Hislope 9). With a lack of legitimate business opportunity, the underworld takes on necessity.

Crime is only salient when linked to the ethnic dimension. Macedonians perceive Albanians to be responsible for the bulk of criminal activity which is born out by official statistics: Albanians who comprise between 1/4 to 1/3 of the population account for over 50% of serious crime and 80% of incarceration (Hislope 10). This has fed a stereotype of Albanian-as-criminal. To the displeasure of law-abiding Albanians who must live with this image, the Albanian mafia has risen to prominence amongst continental organized crime pushing the Turks aside in heroin and creating a niche for itself in Italy among the traditional crime families (Hislope 11).

Albanians, however, could not do this alone. The entry point into Macedonia (from Bulgaria) is 100% Macedonian. Even Macedonia s Interior Ministry admits to rampant corruption in the customs services, police and tax administration. Corruption was rated the second most important problem after economic concerns. Parties are coalitions of convenience which come together to dole out patronage and material benefits of privatization efforts rather than based upon ideological congruence (Hislope 17). Privatizing did not require competitive bidding nor have open rules. The government could arbitrarily set or alter the value of an asset. Political elites, their associates and their families accumulated resources during this process. The justice system is corrupt and abusive especially targeting Albanians (Hislope 19). Few indigenous citizen groups are present to monitor and lobby government policy and implementation. The presence of IGO s and foreign NGO s inhibit the development of civil society groups by absorbing those potential employees. Media outlets are government or party affiliated, running unbalanced stories; those (such as *Dnevik*) which are more independent have been terrorized with violence (Hislope 21). There is a lack of trust in state institutions: 62.2% did not trust parliament; 58.1%, the government; 61%, attorney general; 59.6%, the courts; 62.3%, banks; 51.3%, the police (Hislope 22).

The link between freedom fighters and the drug trade is part of a worldwide trend. Paramilitaries need

to raise hard currency for weapons purchases and have a comparatively more skills in the provision of private security. Yet, most Albanians in the NLA are motivated by politics not crime (Hislope 24). Continuing conflict has made authority even more ambiguous adding KFOR to an ineffective state and organized crime. KFOR has been unable to close the borders to smuggling.

The KLA was organized when Kosovo went underground supported by $163 million in diaspora donations and $250 million from the Albanian heroin mafia. The Albanian mafia sold heroin in Europe to buy Kalashnikovs and Uzis which were sent back to Kosovo (Hislope 29). The Albanian diaspora includes 900,000 in wealthy, developed countries (500,000 in EU, 400,000 in USA; compare to a Kosovo population of 2 million, 400,000 in FYROM, and 3.5 million in Albania). Much of the money raised was to go for humanitarian purposes and non-lethal military supplies through western financial institutions but the mafia used these very same mechanisms for laundering $1.5 billion. Hislope doubts most donors knew of the mafia links. The NLA was built on KLA experience and stockpiles, and in action benefitted from KLA military support. Kosovo remains an economic basket case (60% unemployment) and quite militarized which could support action in Macedonia.

While not attempting to attribute the entirety of ethnic warfare to this explanation, for Hislope the role of uncontrolled arms trafficking by criminal syndicates is of importance: Without access to war materiel, ethnic groups have no choice but to rely on more conventional manifestations of political competition such as electoral contestation and social protests (Hislope 38). The Hungarian diaspora did not have weapons caches available to be tapped in conflict so were limited to diplomatic and non-violent pursuits of redress. Hislope s main contribution is his discussion regarding the raising of resources for the conflict. They no longer come solely by extracting from a captive population, by taxation or other means. The drug trade, however, is somewhat problematic. Illicit drugs have played a role in prior conflict, most significantly the inter-state war, the Opium War, which sought to guarantee market access. Diaspora funding, while not exclusively post-Cold War, is a relatively new phenomenon requiring the reduction of barriers to the movement of labor (to disperse the in-group) and capital (to remit) assets. Dominion support for the UK in both world wars and the support by the American and British Jewish communities of Israel in the 1948 war fit this model.

Is this new?

Stathis Kalyvas questions the assumption that the new civil wars are qualitatively different than the old ones. New civil wars are mischaracterized because information about recent or ongoing wars is typically incomplete; old civil wars are misinterpreted because historical information, although more comprehensive, tends to be disregarded (Kalyvas 1). Kaplan and Enzensberger have created a false dichotomy on motivation, public support, and conduct of combat (Kalyvas 3). The journalistic accounts contend identity bases for conflict have made these devoid of ideology. Kalyvas counters that the use of religious idioms and local cultural practices does not make them non-ideological (Kalyvas 4). Furthermore, the ideological content of old civil was... appears to have been greatly overstated, much like the dearth of ideology in new civil wars (Kalyvas 5). Secondly, old civil wars are seen through the eyes of the victors who created the state and stability by securing the extraction of resources. Census-based popular support was no more present in past wars than it is present currently (Kalyvas 9). Finally, brutality has played a role in both conflict types. Kalyvas argues the attempt at distinction is flawed and not useful (Kalyvas 12).

New war, defined as a subset in which (1) operations are politically constrained (2) political constraints can come from coalition dynamics (3) objectives may not include the control of territory and (4) capital-intensive strikes from a safe distance may be sufficient to obtain a positive result (5) identity is the key orientation (6) civilian targets are legitimate (7) planning is decentralized, and (8) resource sourcing is globalized, is not new. Political constraints have been present as Karl von Clausewitz argued war is merely a continuation of politics by other means (Der Krieg ist nichts als eine Fortseztung der politishen Verkehrs mit Einmishung andere Mittel). The principle of military subjugation to civilian authority is predicated on the principles. General Clark should have learned this at West Point. Even in military dictatorships, military operations are constrained by political considerations. The early state was built to fund a security apparatus for which funds had to be raised, eventually by the consent of relevant populations. So while the Balkans may have been Clark s first encounter with political constraints these are not unique to the new war. Secondly, coalitions have a historical lineage for those states which sought to balance externally. British Continental policy is replete with examples of coalition-building and its effects on operational policy. Thirdly, territorial control has often been a means to an end. In the four Anglo-Dutch Wars of the 17th - 18th centuries, the UK/England captured Dutch territories in Africa and the East Indies which were returned in negotiations after the war for other concessions. The typical Anglo-French war was fought in the outlying territories for

objectives often unconnected to operational goals. Fourthly, advanced technology has changed the look of war and tactics but not grand strategy. The air power doctrine espoused by armor general Clark is one of the improperly drawn lessons from Kosovo for two reasons (1) it is not without precedent and (2) it did not win the war. British policy on the Continent for four centuries has been blockade, bomb, raid and subsidize insurgencies. NATO used different weapons but followed the same strategy. Yugoslavia was placed under economic sanctions, allied air forces bombed sites, and the KLA was assisted. With NATO providing the heavy artillery from the air, the KLA took territory on the ground. Fifthly, identity is argued to trump ideology. Above, Kalyvas has refuted the claim. Furthermore, are these motivations or justifications? Sixthly, the civilian orientation has been suggested. When compared to WWI this appears to be significant, where 90% of casualties were military. In WWII, the casualties were evenly divided. The historical example here is the Thirty Years War (1618-48) in what is now Germany. Britain, France, Sweden, Austria and the German statelets sent relatively small professional forces but the casualties accounted for 1/3 of the German population (with consequences beyond the present scope). Underfunded and undertrained units turned to thee easier and more profitable banditry of the civilian population. This common feature of war was only solved with the rise of industrial revolution logistics such that deployed forces would not have to live off the land. Where supply lines are not dependable and discipline dubious predatory practices have reappeared. Seventhly, decentralized planning is the rule rather than the exception. It is only recently that states have become strong enough to have dominating ministries of supply to direct the economy and society. The more typical situation has been one which relied on an ad hoc coalition of interests to support conflict, a public-private partnership. Finally, funding from abroad has become more utilized with decreasing transactional costs and dispersal of ethnic groups. However, even this is not post-Cold War but has precedents of at least one century.

The mass conscript army, invading enemy territory to unconditional surrender in autarkic total war is an exceedingly rare event in the broad sweep of military history. The exception is just a few wars spanning one and a half centuries from the Napoleonic Wars until WWII. The new war is not new.

Trends

Even if not conceptually new in a larger historical scope, what trends can be seen in recent years?

Under this new definition of conflicts, which center upon ethnic insurgencies, some have claimed the end of the Cold War has brought about an increasing amount of conflict. Others dispute the claim. James

Fearon and David Laitin have found that ethnic nationalism is *not* at the core of the majority of post-Cold War conflicts. The trend of increases in this type of conflict predates the end of the Cold War (Fearon and Laitin 1; Acharya 174). Rather than the change in polarity of the interstate system, key variables which contribute to insurgency are poverty, rural unrest, topographic features (defensibility) and a weak state. Insurgent civil wars tend to take place in rural areas as police often have poorer intelligence in such regions. This gives guerilla fighters a substantial advantage while they are rather weaker than government forces especially early in the conflict (Fearon and Laitin 7). Weaknesses particularly in logistical capabilities for the insurgents constrain the operations which can be undertaken. Many have to turn to looting commodities for revenue. The level of insurgent resources dictate the scale of the government response. However, there is a law of diminishing returns in effect for counterinsurgency operations (Fearon and Laitin 14).

Fearon and Laitin have undertaken a quantitative, empirical treatment of the issue, drawing upon a number of data sets. They found that there was no long-term increase in the prevalence of civil wars in the post-Cold War era. Rather, the surge experience immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union was subsequently dissipated (Fearon and Laitin 3). Furthermore, the ethnic explanation is spurious. They find the results of their regression analysis to be inconsistent with the ethnic nationalist explanation of civil war. when the level of economic development is controlled for, no relationship between the presence of an ethnic minority and insurgency exists (Fearon and Laitin 18). A number of other factors are found to intervene including population, ruggedness of terrain, and whether the subject state is a former French African colony. They conclude that so-called ethnic insurgencies are, in fact, driven by non-ethnic factors (Fearon and Laitin 33).

Amitav Acharya, likewise, rejects prevailing neo-realist pessimism about conflictuality of the post-Cold War period for the Third World. The opposite results are found. The solution to conflict lies not in bipolarity but regional institutions.

In International Relations theory, the linkage between polarity and stability has been decided: bipolarity is more conducive to stability than is multipolarity (Acharya 160). Third World instability also legitimizes great power interventionism of the past and present. For analysts, the focus for the causes of conflict becomes clearly systemic rather than domestic (Acharya 160). Acharya seeks to evaluate whether the Third World will be more conflictual after the Cold War as the pessimists claim.

Kenneth Waltz, John Lewis Gaddis and Morton Kaplan, among others, argue bipolarity increases stability because (1) with less key actors, uncertainty is reduced (2) it extends the sphere of stability eliminating peripheries and (3) the zero-sum game increases incentives to respond to all conflicts (Acharya 161). Gaddis adds the self-control within blocs of dispute-resolving procedures (Acharya 161). Robert Gilpin dismisses Waltz s uncertainty argument, suggesting that it is the certainty of gain which causes states to war and bipolarity rather than preventing conflict escalates minor local affairs to global events through superpower intervention (Acharya 162). Karl Deutsch and David Singer go further arguing multipolarity engenders cooperation thereby reducing conflict and arms races (Acharya 162). The resolution of the debate is unclear. Yet, it fails to capture specific attributes which vary between the North and the South, Acharya argue (Acharya 162). Stability (of the system) is conflated with peace. While stability may mean (1) the system endures (2) many members continue to survive and (3) hegemonic war is not undertaken, this does not equate to peace. small-scale and intrastate wars may still occur (Acharya 163). Waltz et al failed to consider evidence beyond the great powers or to analyze the North-South relationship. All of these limit the relevance of claims. Eurocentrism must be dispensed with. Acharya finds multipolarity to be more conducive to peace and stability (Acharya 164).

During the Cold War there were many conflicts interstate, intrastate, and regional in the Third World. The two superpowers shared an aim of preventing these from escalating into direct hegemonic confrontation. Waltz et al would claim this. Acharya identifies five other characteristics of the period overlooked by the literature (1) unlike Europe, militarized Third World conflicts were permissible and served as a safety valve (2) bipolarity, while not triggering, contributed to the severity of Third World conflicts (3) the Cold War order undermined the effectiveness of multilateral institutions to resolve Third World conflicts (4) the Cold War was a major factor in North-South polarization, and (5) no East-West understanding developed to contain Third World conflicts (Acharya 165-7). Many Third World clients (governments and anti-system forces) sought patronage to advantage themselves over domestic opponents and were not interested in a code of conduct which could produce adverse consequences (Acharya 168).

Key differences for the situation in Europe were (1) the lack of superpower commitment (NATO versus CENTO) and (2) there were a number of states with independent geopolitical ambitions (China, India) (Acharya 168). Yet, the end of the Cold War can fuel Third World instability as (1) superpower withdrawal

alters regional power balances and locally dominant actors may step into the vacuum (2) cuts in military assistance may lead to internal balancing fueling new arms races (3) greater regime instability for dependent clients (4) the loss of unifying ideology leading to a rise of ethnic conflict and (5) the legitimacy of secession was demonstrated in the USSR (Acharya 169-71). This linkage in the literature to the end of the Cold War is exaggerated. Many of these conflicts began before the polarity change. These were caused by local factors scarcity, overpopulation, weak state institutions, and legitimacy shortfalls. The causes remain the same (Acharya 172-3). The explosion of ethno-political conflict is a continuing trend which began in the 1960's according to Ted Gurr (Acharya 174). Even the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation is unconnected to the end of the Cold War as these states developed their programs during the Cold War with superpower implicit or explicit help (Acharya 177).

Although the end of the Cold War has led to greater East-West collaboration, the same cannot necessarily be said of bridging the North-South chasm. The North s current obsession with interventionism and human rights is a likely source of tension. The key will lie in *regional* organizations which would decentralize global collective security and heed the call to democratize the United Nations (Acharya 188). For the Third World, multipolarity is likely to be less conflict-prone than the bipolar Cold War period (Acharya 189). While bipolarity might have been an era of structural stability, it was also a period of heightened regional instability in the Third World (Acharya 189).

Yahya Sadowsky rejects Huntington s clash of civilization notion on several major points. The global chaos theories suggested that globalization limited government cohesiveness leading the cultural schism-based civil wars. Yet, the world is note becoming more rife with conflicts. These conflicts are extensions of prior ones. The cultural wars of the 1990's are not more savage and irrational than others. Globalization does not trigger cultural wars (Sadowsky). The ideas of Kaplan and Huntington have however been adopted by a receptive audience of policy-makers, ancient hatreds prompting civilization-versus-civilization conflicts. Sadowsky argues most civil wars were between familiar groups. Another version was civilization versus chaos which divides the world into peaceful and violent regions. However, isolating the variable is difficult. There is no strong evidence linking globalization to conflict. In fact, Sadowsky suggests globalization would lead to material progress deterring violence. The Cold War s conclusion did not trigger conflicts but allowed western media to focus attention on such conflicts already underway. Sadowsky concludes rather than being

globalization , ethnic conflict was sparked by state collapse and economic problems age-old issues (Sadowsky).

These scholars concur that there is not a post-Cold War trend of increasing new wars. A number of these conflicts can be traced to several decades before the bipolar period ended. Fearon and Laitin importantly argued that the conflicts do not have their basis in ethnic nationalism. There is no post-Cold War tend of increased ethnic conflict as journalistic accounts, believed by policy-makers, contend.

To some degree this is happy new but presents a challenge to western leaders. Bloody conflicts in the modern world can no longer be dismissed as yet another round of intractable ancient ethnic hatreds. Alternatively, these are conflicts which can be addressed as others have been in the past. Analysts however in looking for successful implementations must consider a broader sweep of military history to find parallels to this returning type of war. The resolution lies is some of the underlying conditions Sadowsky has identified and with the regional IGO s[3] for which Acharya calls. There may be a shift to a prior form of conflict, one from a time of a relatively weaker state system, for which current tools need to be re-evaluated.

[3] My MA Thesis, *The Democratic Peace in the Indo-Pakistani Dyad* (2001), came to the same conclusion and offers empirical support.

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