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The Regime-Change Struggle, Democracy, and Political Parties: Lessons from the Third World

Much of the transitions, and more generally the comparative, literature has focused on the relatively developed states of the North Atlantic community, with Latin America receiving less but noticeable interest. These states are dissimilar from much of the rest of the world, the former having long since resolved their stateness questions, constructed national identities, undergone economic development and experienced long periods of democratic governance. As such, the studies of these advanced states may insufficiently inform inquiries regarding newer states. Over the past decade, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Eastern Europe and Russia with their struggles of transition have become hot topics. Something scholars of Eastern European transitions have been seeking to explain is why arguments rooted in the electoral rules of Western Europe are unable to explain outcomes in the East. In other words, explanations which fit the cases in Western Europe focused upon electoral rules, such as Duverger s famous treatment (1954), are not explaining events as they occur and have provided leaders guidance with unintended consequences.

It appears there may be a distinction to be drawn between regime transitions in new and in mature states for the socialization of elites and the mass public as well as the legitimization of state institutions and their authority. Zielinski suggests that *early* in democracy elites look to the long-term to influence their electoral reforms and/or survive the party attrition to position themselves for a role in the successive stable system while *later* after the said system had

stabilized the paradigmatic electoral rules scheme analysis with their posited short-term oriented rational actors can offer accurate predictions. If this is true, the literature has been studying the wrong set of cases to draw solutions for transitions in Eastern Europe. North America and Western Europe are filled with advanced democracies in which institutions including electoral rules are relatively inflexible, social identities are established and the state legitimacy is accepted. None of these conditions can be taken for granted in some Eastern European states. Furthermore, even if scholars were to return to the transition epochs for these democracies applicability would be in question. British, French and American democratic transitions (or at least their origins) predate the industrial revolution (and with it, the rise of working-class interests organized into trade unions). Doubtless, no scholar of Eastern Europe would make claims whose bases could not account for the class interests as conceptualized by Marx and substantiated as salient under the USSR-aligned governments. In any case, the parties and transitions literatures have focused upon the functioning of democracies, post-transition. The present question differs in focus.

There is another set of cases which have been ignored and could help to inform the evolving debate. Beginning in the aftermath of WWII, the Euro-American decolonization of large areas of Asia and Africa created dozens of new states, the study of which is more feasible than 17th century England (in terms of record keeping and administrative measures). These postcolonial (or less developed, or Third World, etc.) states in half a century have had the task of constructing institutions of governance including institutional rules, coping with identities having been permitted to emerge after a period of suppression by an external power which had dominated the political life of the area, and establishing authority over territory contiguous with

others facing the same struggle. The states transitioned rapidly in the aftermath of a hegemonic

war in which democratic republics were among the victors. Huntington called this period of

democratization a Second Wave which included the occupation-enforced democratizations of

Japan, West Germany and Italy as well as that of the decolonized periphery. The members of this

group of nations are arguably more analogous and thus, when properly studied, more useful for

the scholars of Eastern Europe to take into account for their own work. Beyond relevance to

cases popular in the scholarly journals, postcolonial democratic transitions need to be studied

precisely because they have not been given adequate treatment thus far. This work aspires to

suggest an avenue for the study of cases of postcolonial transition which includes post-

communist areas, specifically, in respect to the role political organizations including parties of

the pre-transition (of sovereignty) period have on the creation and consolidation of institutions of

the successor state.

Key Questions

How do political organizations, which agitate for system change, react when that

transformation occurs? The transformation of the anti-system organizations in national liberation

movements in decolonizing[1] areas into political parties in the new mass suffrage contexts and

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[1] The terms decolonizing and post-colonial are used throughout this paper. They apply as well to areas formerly in the Communist Bloc whose sovereignty over security, foreign, and other affairs had been stripped. The Soviet communist authority is treated as the colonizer. COMINFORM was created in the 1920s to guide communist political development worldwide. Decision-making authority was linked to the Soviet communist party and thus the state. When Tito s Yugoslavia broke from Soviet-alignment it was also ejected from COMINFORM. Beyond ruling-party linkages, these now-post-communist states were politically and militarily allied to the Soviet state. Under Herrmann and Fischerkeller s image typology, the perceived relationship is *colonial*.

their role in setting up the party system of the successor state in which they would potentially compete is the key issue. The twentieth century saw the dismantling of colonial and contiguous empires with the transfer of statutory authority over the erstwhile colonies to indigenous populations, often indigenous elites. Whether the transfer of power was initiated by local action or a change of perceived interests in the metropole, authority was to be transferred to someone. The organizations best positioned to be the recipients of government institutions were often those very organizations which had agitated for systemic change. As these variously constituted liberation movements were constructed to seek the departure of the colonial overlord, that objective having been satisfied, what happened to the movement? Below it is argued that the movement transformed itself into a system-supporting political organization within a system it created.

The movements became political parties. These organizations faced a number of challenges: (1) to build and legitimize the institutions of a successor government; (2) to provide a mechanism for determining who would govern, and (3) demobilizing an often-agitated population. Key among these challenges is the determination of what form the new political system will take. The history of the movement, it is argued below, contributes to explanations of what political system is selected and how it functions.

Consider this illustration. The Indian National Congress was founded in 1885 among the indigenous British-educated elite as a deliberative body through which to express grievances to the Raj. Through the first decade of the twentieth century it was an organization which worked within the bounds prescribed by the existing political system. Over the next three decades, the Congress transformed its existing institutions to actively dispute the legitimacy of the Raj and

meanwhile to integrate the masses into the political movement. As Lipset and Rokkan suggested, parties are the essential agencies of mobilization for the integration of local communities into a national whole. What was retained throughout the transformation was the essentially democratic nature of the selection of Congress leaders and decision-making process on policy. In the immediate prelude to independence (1937, under the Government of India Act of 1935), the UK devolved control over local affairs to an indigenous parliament for which Congress successfully stood candidates. From that point forward, including after independence in 1947, Congress was the dominant party at all levels of the Indian government until the 1960's and at the national level until the end of that decade. The primary national liberation movement became one of a number of parties in a successor political system after its liberation objectives were achieved. When Congress lost elections within a political system it largely had constructed, power was transferred orderly and peacefully. This need not be the case.

Some of the relevant lines of inquiry to be pursued are: Does the relative democratic-ness of a movement organization translate to the party organization s decision-making apparatus? Do more democratic organizations in the anti-system movement predict greater support for a competitive democratic party system after the transition by that movement's elite? Is a mass movement more likely than an elite-only movement to predict the successor party's ability to incorporate newly-enfranchised masses? How does the party (which has won systemic changes) respond to electoral defeat when and if it arrives? Does the character of the independence struggle suggest the regime-type which will be selected after victory? Does institutional, elite or administrative continuity predict to regime stability? What role does credit-taking for independence play in the post-victory political configurations?

Definitions

For the sake of clarity there are a number of terms which appear frequently in comparative politics literature whose definitions should be stated. *Regime* is taken to be the basic form of government in a state which is practiced by all legitimated system actors. Regime types include democracy and authoritarian (Juan Linz lists several more which are not needed for the present discourse).

Like any other basic concepts, treatments of *democracy* in theory and empirically have consumed vast forests for explications. Claiming neither the exhaustive nor final statement, democracy derives its legitimating authority from those whom are governed. In practical terms democracy shall be deemed as present in cases where elections, participated in by citizens enfranchised under universal adult suffrage select among a number of choices, however determined, determine the context in which governments may be formed and/or the policies selected for implementation.

Authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, may deny political participation or severely and discriminatingly restrict the franchise. Such regimes are not legitimated by the consent of those governed and as such not bound to be responsive to them. There have been a wide variety of authoritarian regimes frequently of the military and administrative dictatorship types. For the purposes of this study the specific character of an authoritarian regime is less important than distinctions from the democratic archetype. As Przeworski et al do, the authoritarian regime is treated as the residual category for non-democracies. Both of these ideal types, derived from regime studies, i.e., the regimes of states, can be applied to other organizations. It is suggested below that political organizations including liberation movements and parties exhibit varying

characteristics in terms of relative democraticness.

A *party* is a rule-bound political organization whose activities are centered around placing its members in office by election, or otherwise. Parties can be subdivided into system-supporting and anti-system parties. System-supporting parties accept the basic framework of the current institutions to operate within those broad parameters, concentrating appeals on operational policy issues and minor reforms rather than a critique of the underlying system. As Lipset and Rokkan suggest a competitive party system protects the nation against the discontents of its citizens: grievances and attacks are deflected from the overall system and directed toward the current set of power-holders (Lipset and Rokkan 92). There is an implicit agreement amongst the elites of system-supporting parties to forswear attacks on state and regime institutions. This is typified by the concept of the loyal opposition. Anti-system parties are those which have by no means abandoned institutional critiques and may focus their manifestos on the wholesale reshaping of society and government in a way divergent from the contemporary status quo. Both the communist and fascist parties of post-WWII Italy would fall into this category. Under this schema, a political organization can only be a political party if permitted to participate under relevant institutions, the most common activity being standing members for election.

An *institution* is a set of rules which govern and thus create expectations of behavior. The rules include both state laws and group or social norms.

Parties, as political organizations, share a functional requirement with governments: multiple individual interests must be aggregated to create policy decisions. The parties faced what Mancur Olsen called the collective action problem in which a set of individuals, each behaving rationally, viz., to advance individual self-interest, produces a socially-suboptimal

outcome. This is essentially a problem of coordination. Parties have attempted to solve the problem in the same way as many other organizations including states by establishing institutions, or rules, to govern conduct and create expectations of future behavior. Analogous to the states again, the organizations can adopt rule of a democratic nature in which party members vote to choose their leaders or platform positions. On the other hand, the organization can have a closed top-down decision-making process.

Argument

Variables

This study looks at various national liberation movements and follows them through to the period after the generating or seizure of sovereignty. A number of threads to this process are laid out below.

A key independent variable[2] with respect to the national liberation movement concerns the base of liberation movement: Is it elite mass based? Since the operating paradigm is now for universal adult suffrage, emerging states face the objective of enfranchising and incorporating all of the population. This expansion may or may not have been undertaken prior to independence. If the liberation movement is not mass-based it will be up to the later successor political organizations to embark on the potentially socially disruptive endeavor. An elite-only movement

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[2] It should be noted that while these variables   elite versus mass basis of the movement, tactics employed, and decision-making procedures   need not have particular values correlate, it is likely that democratic decision-making organizations will employ nonviolent tactics. Below it is argued more strongly that military tactics are best served by hierarchical decision-making structures. No assumption is made of a connection with the movement basis. The full case studies will make mention of any such uncovered trends.

will predict a less stable, but still competitive, attempt a democracy.

Secondly, the tactics that the liberation movement had adopted, negotiations versus violent rebellion, influence the successor system. Democratic governance requires an elite which is willing to make pragmatic compromises. The national liberation movements can adopt a range of tactics on a scale from negotiated to violent (revolution/coup). While the negotiated manner can modify and build upon existing colonial institutions, a revolution will seek their overthrow. Once the colonial institutions have been abandoned, the successor regime must reconstruct its administrative apparatus. A negotiated process will produce a more stable successor state.

A substantially related factor is the tactics of colonial power. Does the metropole attempt cooptation or a crack down? As with the movement, the metropole has a number of tactical responses available to combat attempts at national liberation. It can adopt a conciliatory posture and work with the would-be revolutionaries, coopting them. This produces a longer, more gradual, but more stable transition which may retain many of the advantages for the metropole from the ex-colonial relationship, such as continued business domination and favorable terms of trade. Conversely, the colonial power can refuse to negotiate resisting with armed force. A shattering of ties and institutions would be the result, regardless of which side wins.

As hinted at during the discussion of definitions, decision-making in the liberation movement can vary on a democratic to authoritarian continuous scale. The national liberation movement itself will have organizational characteristics in terms of the selection of leaders and the adoption of specific policies which can be considered. A more democratic movement will support a successor competitive political system legitimating an opposition. An authoritarian, often militarily-organized, movement creates a one-party state in which opposition is perceived

as anti-system.

Fifthly, institutional continuity is another aspect which varies among the relevant cases. Pre-independent areas have established institutions of the colonial administration. These may have existed in some form for decades or more oppressing and in some cases serving the indigenous population. As with any bureaucracy and any set of rules social groups are differentially affected by the institutions. Consequently, while some imagine improvements with reform or removal of said institutions, others fear the loss of their privileges. There are three key questions here: Do institutions carry over from the colonial period to that of the sovereign successor state? Does the elite who controls the bureaucracy carry over? Do the administrative (civil) service which operates the agency carry over? While it is expected that all institutions will experience changes, the distinction between the modification and scrapping of colonial institutions is immense. Often in the early decolonization process while still under colonial authority indigenous elites and professionals are inducted into various positions in the administrative apparatus. Many of these people could potentially be kept on if only reforms to institutions following independence were pursued diminishing training requirements for the new administration. Alternatively, new elites can opt for the destruction of all vestiges of colonial authority including these institutions to create all rules and administrative agencies anew.

On the dependent variable side of the equation, the post-independence resulting party system may be a competitive, stable democracy, or not. Systems vary in terms of democraticness and stability among other factors. State systems are classified from democracy to authoritarian. For the stability of regime (not government), state systems are coded with the average number of years between regime change.

Secondly, is the political system competitive? Can new parties contest elections? In terms of opposition, where on Lipset and Rokkan s four thresholds (Lipset and Rokkan 114) does this fall? For this, the focus is on democracies. This variable discriminates between competitive party systems, dominant-party states and one-party states. Furthermore, barriers to entry of new parties into the system are considered. The translation of public party preferences into government and policy selection under Lipset and Rokkan is another approach.

Thirdly, peaceful transitions in the new system are critical for a sustainable democracy. Institutions must be established, deemed legitimate and be supported by all relevant parties especially the party or coalition in government. Do parties in-government accept the victory of opposition parties and when electorally unseated relinquish power to the opposition peacefully? For this, episodes in the up to half century history will be sought in which parties ordered out of government by institutions choose to (attempt to) alter them, i.e., change the game in the midst of play.

<u>Scope Conditions and Case Selection</u>

This study in its eventual form will be applicable to all states decolonized in the period of after World War II which were Euro-American colonies in Africa and Asia and non-Russian post-communist entities other than China, Cuba, and North Korea[3]. These include those states which were granted independence after peaceful protest or violent insurrection by colonial

[3] Where communist authority is of domestic genesis, the case must be treated differently than postcolonial entities.

metropoles or their settler outposts, as well as transitions from Soviet-aligned communism. While this may be applicable to other cases, no such claim is made at this point.

This paper itself will not exhaustively consider all of the cases which fit the criteria laid out in the preceding paragraph which number several dozen in its detailed qualitative study. Several cases will be selected to reflect a diversity of region and colonial history as well as covering the Huntingtonian critique, culture/religion. A comprehensive but less detailed quantitative treatment of the universe of postcolonial cases will supplement the comparative case studies.

Hypotheses

1. A violent national liberation struggle requires a military/paramilitary organizational form to be successful. This form is inherently hierarchical and authoritarian and suspicious of competitors. This produces a paranoid one-party state (the liberators are unwilling to recognize an opposition as legitimate; they cling to power based upon a revolutionary role) if formally democratic or an authoritarian state which includes no pretense of parties[4]. The system is not competitive and leaves no room for the entry of other political parties into the system. There is no recognition of the opposition as legitimate by those governing.

2. Negotiated liberation through normal channels undertakes the gradual integration and socialization of new elite through pre-systemic change institutions predicting to competitive democracy. Independence struggles which are achieved through negotiations are relatively

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[4] The United States, of course did not end up with this regime-type. As a settler colony, granted sovereignty in a different time period, it lies outside the scope of this model. At the same time, this paper does not claim that there is no role for elite agency.

gradual and consist of a series of delegations of power from the metropole to indigenous political actors. Indigenous elites from the liberation movement are brought into the halfway institutions to *participate* in colonial governance. These institutions provide a framework under which the indigenous populations can acquire administrative skills which can be put to use in successor regimes. Most importantly the elites are conditioned, or socialized, to operate under agreed-to rules and respect them as binding. As these elites in the movement had gained their position and prestige within such institutions, it may serve their interest to model the successor state on them. Democrats must be willing to lose, viz., to submit to institutionally-selected elites for a given period of time until subsequent iteration of the game. This same game could occur within an organization as without and be typified by a lack of splinters and institutional violations. Lack of elite change, however, need not indicate anti-democratic tendencies. A closer look at specific cases is necessitated. Furthermore, institutions of governance can select elites from multiple indigenous organizations and if permitted choose to elevate organization members under rules differing from that organization. Depending upon the specific rules, this may provide an opportunity for competition to be practiced. Contrasting with (para)military organizations which are very hierarchical and do not provide opportunities for dissent, this can be a divergence.

3. Liberation of mixed violence and negotiation generates both types of factions which compete over systemic issues (regime-type). This produces an unstable system which oscillates between democracy and one-party rule. This is not just a category for movements whose tactics are difficult to define in the above categories but a grouping for movements which employ both tactics in a mix such that neither one dominates, or employ both tactics each against a different colonial opposition. A mix of movement tactics generates both of the institutions and interests to

exist in the successive society. In one sense both types of institutions compete but this is not the competition of advanced liberal democracies. Rather, the two factions are mutually deemed illegitimate, subversive and anti-system by the other. When in power supporters of the other regime-type cannot be considered a loyal opposition but an internal enemy to be irradiated. Yet, as the faction has support in society the governing regime is unable to crush it. This allows oscillation amongst regime-types to take place as long as no equilibrium is reached.

4. While the previous three hypotheses have as their starting point movement tactics, institutional continuity is more focused on what successful movements do to the colonial institutions. There are three aspects to this: continuity of rules, continuity of management and continuity of staff. Institutional continuity will correlate with system stability. For most citizens, interact with the state apparatus comes in two forms: (1) revenue extraction and (2) the provision of public goods and services. The continuance of these relies on the civil (often called administrative) service. Quite simply, these are the acts citizens expect of their governments and the basis for long-term tacit support for a regime. During a popular transition, failures in the provision of public services may be overlooked if there are other issues of extraordinary importance. In the end little economic growth, corruption, and the failure to maintain law and order   all of which require a functioning civil service   will endanger the stability of a regime by raising the costs for attaining compliance.

Continuity exists in cases where the change of regime makes few changes to or minor reforms of institutions rather than wholesale restructuring of these institutions. Transitions which retain administrative institutions from the previous period with a trained experienced staff will, ceteris paribus, have a more stable experience. The administrative apparatus also forms an

important building block of the new state upon which to build instrumental legitimacy for the regime. For the typical citizen most contact with governing institutions comes by interaction with various parts of the administrative apparatus, the bureaucracy. This is also where comparison amongst regimes for the individual occurs. Has independence been worth it? The individual may make that evaluation on the basis of government services. The destruction of the administrative apparatus may well impair successor regime s ability to competently provide government services. This failure provides a basis of opposition to governing elites and undermines support for and identification with the regime. Even if sovereignty is considered by the public opinion to be a good thing, instrumental legitimacy may be determinative. In Russia, citizens may well be asking these questions as government services have collapsed in many areas due to institutional discontinuity. Under this hypothesis one would expect regime system instability.

Model

For decolonizing/separating entities:

[Sub-National Identities]

[Strong]   [Weak]

[Stateness Remains a Problem]   [Colonial Institutions]

[Security a Major Concern]   [Democratic] [Authoritarian][Metropole-Only Power]

[Identity   [Civil War]   [Liberation Movement]   [Violent Revolt]

Imposed]   [Movt   Org]   [Independence] [Lose]

   [V]   [II] [Partition]   [Democratic] [Authoritarian]

[Authoritarian Regime Likely]   [Dem Regime]   [Auth Regime]

1. If sub-national identities are strong, stateness remains a problem prompting internal security to be a major concern. Authoritarian successor regimes are likely.

2. With weak sub-national identities, one must look at the colonial institutions. For these three values are proposed: democratic, authoritarian, and metropole-only power. The last is a subset of authoritarian which excludes local elites from decision making.

3. When the colonial institutions are for metropolitan power only, a violent revolt is the only route to sovereignty. This will end, if successful in an authoritarian regime.

4. If indigenous elites are involved in decision making, consider the mobilization of liberation movements. Is organizational decision-making democratic or authoritarian? How do domestic elites champion their cause? How are they met be existing authorities? The above hypotheses begin from this point.

This model requires only going back a quarter-century   less than Kitschelt demanded to the mobilization of Solidarity and the ascension of Dudayev for the post-communist space, where reliable data is relatively more attainable. No question is asked as to why certain organization forms rise in a given context; this answer may well lie in historical legacies. The focus is on understanding transition, consolidation, and the practice of governance.

Operationalization

To contribute to the social science literature, it is necessary to provide clear statements of relationship with explicit definitions which can be replicated by others over the scope of relevant cases.

The first part is the connection between the liberation movement. What tactics are

employed by the liberation movements? These are classified as violent conflict or a negotiated-type settlement. While there is likely to be a mix of tactics employed over time, the preponderant tactic type is coded. Violent conflict includes war, intercommunal genocide, frequent assassination of elites, persistent riots and other similar events. Croatian and Bosnia independence from (Greater) Serbia would be classified as such. The negotiated settlement is obtained with peaceful protest or other means leading to discussions amongst relevant parties yielding compromised agreement. The Slovakian separation from Czech Republic or a potential non-UDI split of Quebec from Canada would typify the latter form.

While the focus is on what the movement does (tactics), a connected issue concerns what the movement is, and specifically what is the decision-making process. It has been argued above that a more democratic movement will, having practiced the art of negotiated compromised politics within its ranks, being accustomed to it and having a propensity for such approaches, consider extending such options to interactions with colonial elites. Simply, *ceteris paribus*,: democratic decision-making in the movement privileges negotiated colonial-indigenous settlements which privileges the establishment of democratic political systems in successor state regimes. Conversely, an authoritarian type of liberation movement the form which can most effectively and efficient wage conflict against similarly constituted authoritarian organizations will not have placed in its options set the tools of negotiation. These organizations are often military or paramilitary (including terrorist) in form. Such organizations are less likely the create a democratic successor to the colonial regime in anything more than name. Democraticness of liberation movement then becomes critical, namely: How are leaders and policies selected?

Perhaps most critical is: What is negotiated? What is a mix? If hypothesis three were removed it may be necessary to code Pakistan, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania all of which ended up with one-party and/or military rule but were there independence struggles negotiated. The notion of a mix introduces itself in two aspects (1) multiple strategies may be alternatively or concurrently employed and (2) multiple strategies may be employed against multiple enemies. The latter notion   more critical it is posited   may require further explanation. There may be cases in which the political elite seeking independence from a colonial power may become divided and some may seek freedom from the successor state. Even if negotiations bear fruit with the colonial power violent conflictual tactics may be employed in the sub-national struggle. This secondary struggle may concern regional separatists or intervention by opportunistic neighbors. However arrived at this mix will produce elements of the champions of both conflict and peaceful settlement in the successor state each of whom claims credit for winning sovereignty, each whose claim holds some resonance in the public psyche. The successor system will be unstable. Furthermore, it will experience oscillations amongst democratic and not-so-democratic forms of governance.

Alternative Hypotheses, Counter-Examples and Response

An earlier rendition of this research design was distributed to solicit some scholarly feedback. Among the valuable response were some potential alternative explanations and disconfirming cases which will be addressed here. A general comment which must be made is: The hypotheses contained in this study only claim to be determinative when all other factors and characteristics for a given case are equal. Of course, in the real world nothing is ever equal so

alternative explanations need to be considered. While some of these may exhibit correlations they are not fully determinative either.

Economic development at the time of transition

Is competitive democracy a luxury good? While further economic development, as modernization theory would tell us, may create a context which assists democratic development it is not necessary. In the cases of postcolonial states, this analysis considers states of relatively equal levels of economic development (1) nascent industrialization (2) basic industry plans (3) limited stock and other capital formation markets and (4) small participants in international trade. For the post-communist cases, the economic development of each is relatively more advanced apart from trade. A broader study which examined the universe of cases including wide disparities in development could fully test this alternative.

Economic growth after transition

This is basically a question of government performance. Hypothesis four which argues for a role for institutional continuity can address this issue. Economic growth requires competent fiscal and monetary policy management as well as a global climate which promotes growth. Capital-owners seek stable expectations this is something stability in institutions and administrative services can provide.

Threats to national security

Such threats provide a way to justify restrictions on rights of the public but are not sustainable in the long run. Indira Gandhi s Emergency provides an example. The Indian constitution provides the President with emergency powers which can create a rule-by-decree regime. This only lasted a couple years as opposition was not extinguished even in the case of

claimed threats to the state. Yeltsin as well took advantage of troubles in Chechnya and Dagestan to exercise super-presidential powers. This notion is controlled for by having states which claim fear of territorial integrity being violated included in the survey.

Threats to internal security (stemming from Dahl s sub-cultural pluralism)

In a similar way to the above this is a justification used by governing elites to market their policies specifically in respect to limitations placed upon the population. Once again this can only be a temporary action when the threat is deemed credible. As emerging postcolonial states have to deal with stateness questions specifically in regards to artificial borders which have created incongruities between political and cultural demarcations. All postcolonial states have faced this; many have faced civil war. Yet there is still regime variation. Clearly this alternative does not capture the full picture.

Civilization

Huntington argues that certain civilizations, namely Sinic and Islamic, are incompatible with western-derived liberal democracy (Huntington 72). This notion should be rejected as there is regime variation within the civilization boundaries posited. Furthermore the underlying mechanism Huntington uses is flawed owing to his limited temporal scope. To control, an Islamic or Sinic state must be included in the analysis.

Representation of ethnic groups in the liberation movement

This is perhaps most critical. Liberation movements must be representative organizations to generate democratic systems but *who* is represented is critical as well. Bias in representation is likely to lead to coalitional difficulties or even civil war for the successor regime. There are however a number of factors which can change the impact of this factor: What is the relative size

of the ethnic group in question? Is the ethnic concentrated in a region or dispersed throughout the state? Can institutions be built to address these grievances? Are other ethnic groups opposed due to history of a particular one dominating politics? The ethnic question may well play a role but is so multifaceted it is beyond the scope of the present project. Bearing this in mind, whether a given state has an ethnically-divided society, or as Dahl has termed it subcultural nationalism, has been integrated into the model.

The "first new nation" (the United States) was created out of violence but resulted in the development of a classic two-party system.

Firstly, the United States could be an anomaly. More informatively the American independence struggle was a bit more complicated. There was a military conflict which was supported by a minority of the US population (not the mass mobilizations of the twentieth century), there were ongoing talks with colonial representatives and the war was won by the intervention of an opportunistic foreign power. Significantly institutions were changed but not destructively. Americans built upon colonial democratic institutions and retained much of the elite and staff from those local administrative organizations. Rather than a revolution the US had an elite coup in which only the very upper layer of leadership was changed. For the present study, the US is outside the bounds of the scope conditions.

An important criticism has been suggested that the democratic nature of the liberation movement may be determined by the same factor(s) that will determine the democratic nature of the post-independence regime. In abstract terms this cannot be easily explained away. It is more properly an empirical question. In the broad range of cases (in terms of both states and movements/parties), there may be examples in which specific parties diverge from a democratic

norm. the test need to be controlled for common predictors of a democratic regime-type: GDP per capita, region/contagion, British colony[5], income inequality, proportion Catholic, ethno-linguistic divisions, etc.

Cases

Five postcolonial cases are to be explored utilizing the comparative case study technique: India s Indian National Congress (Congress Party); Pakistan s Pakistan Muslim League; Zimbabwe s Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front; Vietnam s Communist Party of Vietnam; and South Africa s African National Congress. Two of these movements were built against a British colonial occupation force, on French and two more recent cases against minority settler rule extending from the time of British exit. Of the cases, India and South Africa (thus far, what an unseated ANC will do remains to be seen) have established stable competitive democracies. Pakistan has had phases of competitive democracy interrupted by military coups. Zimbabwe and Vietnam have experienced one-party states. In addition, Kazakhstan and Chechnya in the post-communist area will be explored.

The case study approach will be supplemented with quantitative approaches[6]. It is not feasible to undertake a comprehensive survey of the world s states in the degree of detail mandated by the comparative case study approach. At the risk of collapsing specific details into

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[5] Although even if this predictor is makes the hypothesized factors spurious the hypotheses will provide a clearer process mechanism of how and why the British colonial experience matters than has been advanced before.

[6] Eventually; the quantitative has not been completed at this point.

more generic categories, a data set will be developed to capture the relevant characteristics of postcolonial states. As noted in the above definitions, this study takes a procedural approach to democracy which encompasses contestation and participation. Regime-type here is a dichotomous categorical variable. Rather than merely reporting frequencies, a more informative statistical test is performed here using the chi-squared test for contingency, a test of significance. As this uses dichotomous nominal variables, regression and many other more powerful statistical tests are not available (most of these need interval variables). The null hypothesis is that the two sets of characteristics (x and y of the specific hypothesis) are unrelated. One attempts to reject the null hypothesis by means of the chi-squared test. Before beginning the rejection attempt the relevant question is: What kind of a table would be expected if the null hypothesis were true? These are the observed frequencies. The next issue is: Assuming that the null hypothesis is true and that the marginal totals in the observed frequency table actually reflect those marginals in the population, what are the expected frequencies? The expected frequencies are calculating from dividing the product of the row and column marginals by the grand total. In a two by two table, as some below, it is necessary to calculate only one expected frequencies as others can be obtained by subtraction from the marginal totals. This characteristic is used in the actual significance test. The number of expected frequencies needed before one can defer to the marginal totals is the test s degrees of freedom which is a calculated figure. The degrees of freedom is the product of the quantity of one less than the number of rows by the quantity of one less than the number of columns. So for a two by two tables, the degrees of freedom is one. In making a decision to reject the null hypothesis or not a table is used that provides the mathematically determined critical values of chi-squared at selected probability levels for a wide

range of degrees of freedom. All statistical tests performed in this study are done using SPSS 10 for Windows. Machine outputs are reported along with frequencies and graphs. Compilations of data will be made available to the research community via the Internet.

Preliminary Findings

When this project is completed, relatively detailed case studies will be presented for each state considered. At this point, case-specific material is of an illustrative and superficial nature only.

India is the prototypical case of a negotiated peaceful transition to independence. This is not to say that there were not violent episode but the overall character of the struggle was peaceful. The Indian National Congress was the key organization which interacted with the British colonial government but there were others including the Indian National Army (INA). The INA led by Subhas Chandra Bose favored alliances with the Axis powers during WWII to assist the violent overthrow of British surzeinity. Congress was dominant. Though initially an elite organization from the 1920's forward, Congress increased its mass appeal. It had a relatively open decision-making process based upon the votes of members; it was democratic. Congress had candidates stand for election to colonial institutions. India has also had a relative stable *regime* if not government. From independence in 1947 to the present (2001) India has experienced only two regime changes, from democracy to authoritarian powers during The Emergency and back to democracy afterwards. The transition from colony to sovereign state retained much of the administrative apparatus including the Indian Civil Service and India Army. While top-level officials who were British were replaced much of the middle-management and

work force under the British Raj was indigenous. The continuity of these institutions facilitated the legitimacy building of the new regime, of democracy and stability. After independence India became a sovereign competitive democracy with a dominant party until the late 1960's . This should not be mistaken for one-party rule as the Congress *system* included a number of centers of power which themselves competed. Congress remains an important player today and has abided by institutions when it has lost elections.

Zimbabwe fought a war of independence against rather than the colonial metropole its extension the white settler community (as the enemy was in South Africa as well). From independence Rhodesia was minority-ruled by the economically dominant whites and policies were put in place to disadvantage the majority black population. Independence from this minority tyranny was achieved through violent military conflict. The key organization in the struggle was an army led by now President Mugabe. Armies are inherently hierarchical with authoritarian-style decision-making, this one was no different. What became the African National Union-Patriotic Front assumed power following victory over the whites and have retains a paramilitary character calling upon the war veterans to intimidate enemies of the party. While officially a competitive democracy, substantial barriers to entry of alternative parties remain and the translation of their votes to power is limited. The ANU-PF behaves extra-institutionally terrorizing and intimidating opposition supporters; there is no socialized recognition of a loyal opposition. It is unlikely if in a free and fair election Mugabe s party was defeated the institution would be peacefully obeyed. An organization grown out of military conflict for independence has produced an authoritarian though stable for now system. There has been no regime change since independence.

Pakistan is an interesting case, of which Richard Sisson suggests the definitive work has not yet been written. The national liberation movement led by the Muslim League had two enemies the colonial metropole Britain which they fought peacefully in coalition with the Indian National Congress, and India. The split from India was one of violent communal conflict beyond the authority of the Muslim League. The communal strife generated interests which have persisted in Pakistani society at places in military and government as well as the political organization of *jamiat al islam*. This has rendered multiple centers of power with very different visions for the country and how it should be run, essentially competing regimes. Pakistan has had an unstable history since partition, spending equal amounts of time under military and democratic regimes. Pakistan is unstable due to the mixed forms of independence struggles and also the lack of previous colonial institutions. India and Pakistan were ruled together by the colonizer Britain with most of the administrative apparatus placed in the larger population areas of India. After independence and partition, most of the Civil Service and Army went to India including the management elements. These institutions had to be recreated in Pakistan and there were difficulties in providing services which has also contributed to instability.

mixed periods, unstable

Vietnam is an implementation communist state and thus authoritarian which has been relatively stable since the war ended. Vietnam fought three successive wars of independence against external powers for a thirty year period against Japan France and the United States. The Communist Party led by Ho Chi Minh was the dominant political organization for national liberation but much of the struggle was waged by military and paramilitary elements led by Giap. The Communists had produced a solid claim of responsibility for gaining independence and

established a one-party state following it with no room for the induction of legitimate opposition parties into the system. As suggested by hypotheses a military led independence struggle produces an authoritarian regime as state institutions concerning decision-making are modeled after the organization which sets the rules. There has been no regime change since independence.

South Africa like Zimbabwe fought its liberation struggle against the settler extension of the former colonial power. For the most part, the dominant liberation organization the African National Congress led by Nelson Mandela was a peaceful movement explicitly modeling on the Indian case and pursued freedom through negotiations. The country is a competitive democracy which stable for now but it remains to be seen how the ANC would react to their unseating. Hypotheses predict continued stability. Some institutions have been reformed others scrapped (Apartheid) with most in the former category. The successor government has largely been able to modify and build upon the colonial administrative apparatus which has aided system stability. There has been no regime change since independence.

Kazakhstan declared independence in December 1991 with the bulk of the ex-USSR successor states. This was not resisted by central authorities. Sovereignty was largely created by imperial withdrawal. Nursultan Nazarbayev became the state s president upon independence. Nazarbayev had previously served in the Soviet regime as Chairman of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet (1989-90), a member of the Soviet politburo (1990), and president of the Kazakh SSR (1990-91). Procedural democratic institutions with a strong presidency were constructed under a referendum-approved constitution. Yet elections (1994, 1995, 1999) have not been without difficulty. Party development is also weak, the system dominated by the personality of Nazarbayev who has demonstrated authoritarian impulses. Nazarbayev has a party, the People s

Unity Party (PUP), but was backed even more so by independents. In both elections his erstwhile

allies won majorities but rejected some measures after being seated. Courts overturned the 1994

elections. Nazarbayev extended his term and drafted a new constitution, acts not unlike the

Russian experience under Yeltsin. Subsequent elections and referenda have been criticized by

the opposition. Democracy, while still recognized (BEEA), is troubled in this state. A further

type may be needed for states subject to sovereignty by abandonment.

Chechnya s struggle for sovereignty has, of course, involved violent tactics and military

organizations on both sides, i.e., Chechen independence-seekers and Russian Federation soldiers.

According to the model if Chechnya wins independence by such means democratic prospects are

doubtful. Since the reinitiation of conflict by Putin much of Chechnya including Grozny (2000)

has become subjugated to Russian authority. These comments are based upon a prior source.

The war between Russian and Chechen forces, from December 1994 to August 1996, marked

 the end of Russia as a great military and imperial power (Lieven 1). This prompted a growth in

the self-confidence of Russia s neighbors. At an identity level: The Russians, whose national

identity has long been subsumed in a series of bureaucratic states, faced the Chechens, who have

barely had any state at all in their history, and whose formidable martial attributes stem not from

state organization but from specific ethnic traditions. this parallels the Italian loss to Ethiopia at

Adowa or Spain to Morocco at Anual. Chechnya did this by fielding 3000 (of their force of 6000)

against Russian deployments fifteen times the size (Lieven 4). As Chechnya is small   6000

square miles   logistical difficulties for indigenous elements were somewhat reduced.

Grozny, the Chechen capital, by 1917, nearly a century after its founding as a Russian

fortress from which to subjugate the Chechens, was the second biggest domestic oil producer

after Baku. Russians and Westerners flooded in to develop the reserves. Grozny was not a

Chechen city until the 1970's; the first mosque came in 1988 (Lieven 24). In 1991   the time of

national revolution   almost half of Grozny s population was Russian. Over the next three

years, two-thirds fled. Those who remained were more connected to Chechen society than

Russia s (Lieven 45). Unlike the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Chechens formed the

only determined successionist movement in the Russian Federation. Chechnya was at the bottom

of the socio-economic statistics among Russian autonomous regions. By the 1980's, Chechen oil

formed only 3% of Russia s output (Lieven 57). Initially, the call was for full republic status in

the USSR and CIS, outside of Russia (Lieven 58). A major oil pipeline from Baku runs across

Chechnya and Grozny had the largest oil refinery in Russia. Between 1991 and 1994, twenty

million tonnes of petroleum were exported abroad netting $1 billion in off-budget profits. Much

of this went to arms purchases by the Chechens. The siphoning of Azeri oil and looting of

Russian trains also crossing Chechen soil contributed handsomely to the war effort (Lieven 75).

Further oil discoveries in the Caspian area (Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan)   some 3.5 billion

barrels   were also to head west on the Baku-Novorossiisk pipeline (Lieven 85). Regardless of

the underlying geostrategic circumstances, Lieven suggests the catalyst for Russian intervention

was a series of four bus hijackings on Russian soil by Chechen criminals in 1994 (Lieven 86).

Initially, this meant arming the provisional government and ineffective, small-scale air strikes.

The GRU estimated Dudayev s forces at 20,000 (Lieven 189). The eventual Russian assault was

a disaster. Russian units were not trained for urban warfare in even the limited degree some

Western units are despite a history of Stalingrad, Berlin and Sebastopol. Only the troops

surrounding West Berlin and the marine infantry were. The regular Army lacked tactics,

equipment and practical training for street fighting. Red Army strengths   large-bore artillery and massed armored assault   are useless in this context. Fighting occurs at 15-20 feet in an uncoordinated manner. Training (in small units, typically squads) and morale maintenance is paramount (Lieven 114-5). Russia had the task to destroy Chechnya s forces. Chechnya had only to destroy Russia s forces *will* (Lieven 126). Regarding atrocities, Chechen forces were more disciplined and restrained than their Russian counterparts, rarely shooting prisoners (Lieven 134).

The Serbian option   using the ethnic diaspora as irregulars behind enemy lines   failed due to a lack of national identity. The Russian state never subsidized ethnic nationalism (Lieven 260). Russian expansionism undermined national construction. Bureaucratic imperialism integrated peoples from many nationalities in contiguous lands into the state of Russia. After the collapse of that state, that empire, the organizational basis for identity has evaporated, lacking nationalist ideological support. National consciousness is weak (Lieven 377). The response of both sides has been military and paramilitary engagement. Forces arrayed for this operate on hierarchical decision-making forms which are not immediately amenable to democratic competition and government operation. Stable democracy is not predicted.

Concluding Remarks and Future Research

The emphasis here has been on creating a workable research design which can be applied to a number of different cases by the author or others who wish to afford themselves this opportunity. Due to certain constraints even the cases mentioned fall into the category of an illustration. They could well use a second more in-depth look. The first priority here was to see if there was and if so demonstrate the feasibility of the approach. Later, a more rigorous empirical

inquiry can be mounted. As well each of the alternative hypotheses stated should be tested.

Future research can proceed in two directions (1) an exhaustive quantitative presentation of all cases which fit the aforementioned scope conditions, or (2) detailed case study series on several liberation movements in their moments of transitions to focus in on tracing the process which has been abstractly posited here. In a more lengthy treatment ideally both extensions will be utilized to paint a full picture of what is suggested and whether in holds for reality.

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