THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE IN THE INDO-PAKISTANI DYAD

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ABSTRACT

Scholars have offered a number of explanations for the outbreak of war. A focus of the literature in recent years has been on a subset of those explanations referred to as the Democratic Peace which posits that democratic states do not war with other democratic states. This research program has focused on cases in Europe during the Cold War where support was found for the thesis: peace between France and Germany, the UK and France, etc. Yet there are some doubts as to the portability of the democratic peace the Cold War being a specific situation which might not be repeated. Pursuant to this, a series of hypothesis tests has been performed using the Indo-Pakistani dyad during their post-independence experience. Six hypotheses derived from several works in the democratic peace have been operationalized and quantitatively tested using publicly-available, state-level, global data which include the dyad.

The tested hypotheses derived from the literature are: (1) countries with democratic institutions are less likely to engage in war with other countries with such institutions; (2) free countries are less likely to engage in war with other free countries; (3) democracies do not fight democracies in their home region; (4) as states become more

democratic, they intervene militarily in the affairs of others less often; (5) increasing dyadic trade reduces the likelihood of militarized conflict and war; and (6), when states share alliance membership they are less likely to war with each other. Additional tests are performed with the first hypothesis during the abbreviated time period 1972-1999 and the hypothesis that when states share non-military regional IGO membership they are less likely to war with each other.

Rather than finding support for all of the hypotheses, only freedom and non-military IGO s have a statistically significant relationship with war at either the 95% or 90% levels. While freedom had a significant relationship with conflict, outcomes were not as the hypothesis expected. Only IGO s were both significant and found outcomes matching expectations. Policy makers can conclude that the membership of countries in a regional non-military IGO such as SAARC reduces the likelihood of war.

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Introduction

India and Pakistan have been independent from British rule for more than half a century. During this time four wars have been fought between these states[1], three of which occurred in the first half of this period of independence. In fact, 28 years elapsed between the wars over Bangladesh and Kargil. Yet, despite this substantial span of time, militarized conflict in the dyad has not ceased. In late Spring of 1999, a militarized conflict was fought on the mountainous heights of Kargil (Jammu and Kashmir, India). This engagement began to be covered extensively in the western press when Indian Air Force jets were introduced to the conflict in May. Looking not only at Kargil but all four wars

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[1]COW identifies the following Indo-Pakistani conflicts as Inter-State Wars (http://www.umich.edu/~cowproj/iswars.pdf)

COW#	COW Name	Conflict Begins	Conflict Ends
427	First Kashmir	1947	1949
166	Second Kashmir	1965	1965
178	Bangladesh	1971	1971

Table 1: Conflicts (COW)
COW covers 1816-1992; MIDS, COW s successor, will extend this with publication of data on South Asia planned for 2002. Kargil (1999) will certainly be included in future COW/MIDS, the deaths of 524 for India (*Free Press Journal* 17 Jan 2000, according to Indian sources) and 500 for Pakistan (*The Hindu* 20 June 2000 quoting Begum Koolsum Nawaz   Nawaz Sharif s wife, a high-ranking Pakistani) being sufficient. As these numbers are self-reporting it is expected that both of these are low estimates. Even with these most conservative estimates Kargil passes COW s threshold to qualify.

identified here in the dyad, this essay will test a popular theory in the international

relations literature, the democratic peace, for its explanatory power of these conflicts.

What follows is a brief review of some of the interesting contributions to the

democratic peace research program. From these treatments, are derived six hypothesized

relationships to explain interstate conflict. Revisiting the hypotheses, testable

operationalizations are presented. These are tested using existing, publicly available data

sets whose sources are noted. Findings from these data are offered. Then, a number of

statistical tests are performed upon the operationalized hypotheses, including tests of

significance. Finally, remarks are made concerning possible conclusions from the study and

suggestions for future research. A simplified summary of the arguments and findings is

provided in Appendix D.

The Democratic Peace

Attempts have been made to explain the Indo-Pakistani wars generally and that of

Kargil particularly under a variety of approaches. A major explanatory device is the

democratic peace idea which stretches back to Immanuel Kant and later Woodrow Wilson

but which became particularly influential in the literature following consideration of

Western Europe in the Cold War. A primarily structural approach still, some studying the

democratic peace depart from the black box approach common in late twentieth century

international relations tradition of neorealism and delve within the state particularly to

consider variations in domestic regime-types. The democratic peace approach posits that

the regime-type of system members influence the propensity to war. With respect to the

dyad under analysis, regime-type is a factor which has varied throughout the independence period with Pakistan oscillating between democratic and dictatorial regime-types. If the democratic peace is to be validated this is a major dyad, in which it is possible to test the theory over a long period of time with a number of state-specific characteristics held constant.

The core origination of the democratic peace thesis comes from Immanuel Kant s *Perpetual Peace* (1795), specifically his First Definitive Article for Perpetual Peace [2]. In Kant s words:

> The republican constitution, besides the purity of its origin (having sprung
> from the pure source of the concept of law), also gives a favorable
> prospect for the desired consequence, i.e., perpetual peace. The reason is
> this: if the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war
> should be declared (and in this constitution it cannot but be the case),
> nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in
> commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities
> of war. Among the latter would be: having to fight, having to pay the costs
> of war from their own resources, having painfully to repair the devastation
> war leaves behind, and, to fill up the measure of evils, load themselves with
> a heavy national debt that would embitter peace itself and that can never be
> liquidated on account of constant wars in the future. But, on the other

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[2] The following references utilized Vincent Ferraro s translation to English of *Perpetual Peace.*

hand, in a constitution which is not republican, and under which the

subjects are not citizens, a declaration of war is the easiest thing in the

world to decide upon, because war does not require of the ruler, who is the

proprietor and not a member of the state, the least sacrifice of the pleasures

of his table, the chase, his country houses, his court functions, and the like.

He may, therefore, resolve on war as on a pleasure party for the most

trivial reasons, and with perfect indifference leave the justification which

decency requires to the diplomatic corps who are ever ready to provide it.

(Kant, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm)

Kant conceives republicanism as that form of government which does not descend into

despotism which is that of the autonomous execution by the state of laws which it has

itself decreed (Kant, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm). This

government, then is representative and juridically-bound by its laws. The legal-rational

institutions so constituted are the source for operationalization by several of the more

recent conceptualizations of the democratic peace, elaborated below. Key arguments made

by Kant deal with the distribution of costs associated with warfare. To use the Hobbesian

term, the Commonwealth, in this case the people being represented, bears the costs of the

diversion of resources into military uses which may be a relatively poor investment

compared to other options. Fears of trade and investment interruptions which war would

bring are especially key to motivate private self-interested actors to devote resources, if

necessary, to maintain constraint on government action. To ameliorate the situation,

institutions are created to constrain those operating the government on behalf of the

Commonwealth from military adventurism. This is self-constraint for a particular state, but does not forswear it from response to provocation. However, if other states are democratic republics, no state elite is free to engage in such belligerent activities. Consequently within a democratic dyad, institutions constrain both states from such actions thereby producing peace.

Of the more than 300 articles among other works on the democratic peace which have appeared in journals in recent years, only a limited and particularly compelling selection can be considered here. This is not exhaustive nor necessarily a representative sample. What follows are brief delineations of several of the ideas put forward in the literature, some of which will be tested.

Andrew Kydd places himself in the midst of a debate between structural (e.g., Mearsheimer as quoted in Kydd) and motivational (e.g., Schweller as cited in Kydd) realism (Kydd 116). Realism, which in its various incarnations has dominated security studies, treats the global environment as an anarchic one in which unitary states seek to enhance their security, and increase the probability of continued sovereign existence (Kydd 121). The perspective from which the realists have come and Kydd here adopts is to conceptualize the states of the world as security-seekers. It is from this that Kydd s notions of the democratic peace will be derived. The context for the adoption of Kydd s approach is this: A paradigmatic research program to which much of the literature of international security either advocates for or reacts to is Neo-Realism as put forward by Kenneth Waltz (1979). This theory holds that in a system defined by anarchy, states are inherently rational security-maximizers to whom relative capabilities are of paramount

importance. For Waltz, capabilities define the structure of the system and the position of states within it. The system s structure affects the interacting units and the produced outcomes (Waltz, 74). These capabilities themselves are derived from the variety of national assets demographic, economic and military which can be employed actively or passively in pursuit of security. For one of the cases below, for example, the seizure of strategically-located mountain peaks in Kargil by individuals not under the sovereign control of the Indian government deprived that state some of its demographic resources the ability to dominate the surrounding area thereby lessening its capabilities relative to another power within the system. Security could be maximized, or at least enhanced, by recapturing the peak within India s Line of Control (LC), established by the 1972 Simla Accord. In this way, Neo-Realism can account for why India may have an interest in devoting national resources for the seizure of mountain ranges above Kargil. The pitfall of this approach, however, is timing. Throughout the fifty-year period of independence of the states in the dyad, such security maximizing interests are constant, yet there has been neither continuous war nor continuous peace. What can direct such variation? Arguments of agency[3] would suggest: Decision-makers can decide *when* security must be maximized. Geoffrey Blainey (1973), following Richard Betts, considers some of the many claims offered for causes of war and settles upon this proposition: war

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[3] While there is likely some role for agency, a careful consideration and test of it is beyond the scope of this present study. Decisions of actors do not happen in a vacuum. Even a focus on agency must take into account the context in which such decisions are arrived at. Structurally-oriented theories such as are tested below offer this sort of context for the development of decisions. Structural factors may provide strong incentives/disincentives for undertaking decisions.

begins when two rival nations disagree on their relative strengths[4] (Betts as cited in Blainey, 293). It is in answering this question that leaders of nations decide upon undertaking war, consciously or not (Blainey, 293). However, structural approaches remain to address the issue. Kydd suggests that security-maximizing states (as all are assumed to be), fearing elimination from the system, seek out ways of reducing uncertainty over both means and motives (Kydd 122).

A major criticism of this literature by Paul R Hensel is just that: ...research has focused on the dynamics of already-established rivalry[5]; little is known about how adversaries become long-term rivals (Hensel, 175). For Hensel, a rivalry context matters in that it shapes conflict behavior differentially than in non-rivalry (Hensel, 190). Conflict becomes entrenched making future conflicts more escalatory and dangerous. Within this context, the literature of which Blainey is an important part is claimed as applicable by Hensel s usage. The post-partition Indo-Pakistani dyadic relationship can be characterized as one of long-term rivalry, Hensel even citing the pair as an example (Hensel, 175).

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[4] During the earlier conflicts relative capabilities - specifically the military and logistical capabilities that India and Pakistan would *use* in conflict - may have been uncertain across the dyad. Yet, after 1971 when Pakistan was rapidly dismembered by hastily-committed Indian forces the balance of capabilities was clearly in India s favor. Even before that time, India held commanding advantages in demographic, technological and material capabilities. Pakistan perceived advantages for itself in leadership, soldiership and the willingness to engage a larger share of its assets. Relative power is largely a question of perception yet it is a balance which was left unquestioned by 1999.

[5] There is potentially a limitless chain of causation in history which be traced backwards attempting to find the source of the enduring rivalry. Hensel s concern is whether the existence of rivalry within a dyad matters, viz., does rivalry produce different outcomes for the dyad than in the counterfactual in which it is absent? Regardless, the existence of rivalry fulfills a scope condition laid down by Betts (Betts as cited by Blainey 293)..

Admitting that the dynamics underlying the creation and character of rivalry are important, this task is beyond the scope of the present analysis. Under Hensel s definition (Hensel, 176), India and Pakistan have what he terms an enduring rivalry. The existence of rivalry in the dyad being established, the relationship under discussion fits into the domain of applicability required by Blainey.

Another needed clarification of Blainey s approach is that while war may begin in such a circumstance, the form and scope may vary widely. Furthermore his analysis is based upon conventional warfare in major wars among major powers. A respecification, which preserves the essence of Blainey s argument, of the claim is in order: conflict occurs when rival groups disagree of their relative *relevant* strengths. The changes from the original are the following: (1) the conflict may be below the threshold of war yet still settle the disagreement; (2) conflict can occur between non-state groups; and most importantly, (3) not all the capabilities possessed by a group may be relevant to the group[6] s evaluating the former s strength. In the context under discussion, the last difference is key: potential infiltrators in weighing whether to seize the LC did not evaluate the Pakistani military apparatus versus its Indian counterpart (India has an enormous advantage in every factor of power: GDP, tanks, ships, etc.) but their[7] light

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[6] While the Indian government claimed the infiltrators in Kargil were elements of the Pakistani military, Pakistan suggested they were indigenous freedom fighters whose people were being suppressed by the Indian security forces. Non-state light infantry with minimal logistical requirements present a different form of threat and must be opposed with different assets than a mechanized multi-divisional force or a nuclear triad. Indian missile, naval and armor forces are an opposition irrelevant to such units whereas helicopter gun ships and mountain specialist light infantry may be effective opposition.

[7] According to India, Pakistan s.

infantry abilities versus the likely response India would be able and willing to field at 18,000 feet of elevation. In this formulation, other factors of power were not perceived as relevant when deciding to challenge control of the Drass region. Blainey would suggest that there would be conflict as India not agreeing with the infiltrators assessment of relative strength would contest the facts-on-the-ground. Where differing outcomes would be predicted by the various forces perceptions of relative capabilities, risks of uncertainty exist. Kydd suggests that states seek to reduce the risks of uncertainty over victory. Disagreements regarding relative strengths from which the probabilities of victory emanate increase the uncertainty over outcomes. A security-maximizing state seeks to reduce uncertainty over the future by creating reasonable expectations of behavior based upon reciprocity (certainty of motives) and knowledge of relative strengths (certainty of capabilities). Hensel would advise the reader that there will be conflict amongst these rivals. If one could assume a primordial rivalry or at least one predating possible testing, this argument advanced by Blainey and Hensel may hold greater explanatory power but the ancient hatreds suggestion is unable to handle rivalry initiation. The inability to deal with the beginning of rivalries - how they start - is a key flaw. There are two problems (1) this is a relatively new interstate rivalry as the two states involved in the dyad are only slightly more than fifty years old, and (2) there has been neither constant war nor constant peace. It is unable to explain the variation. A reasonable supposition is that something else must be varying.

Randall Schweller has recently contributed a criticism of the assumption that states are inherently security seekers; he suggests motivation as a variable. The

uncertainties surrounding the offense-defense balance from the capabilities of weapons and tactics as well as the aims of strategies complicate discerning the motives of a target - the one subject to the actions and strategies of another - state and thus selecting a policy response. Security-seeking states search out ways to reduce their probability of defeat in a particular conflict and elimination from the global system (Kydd 122) in a variety of ways including internal and external balancing and preventive war. Security-seekers war due to uncertainty of motives, or actions to expect, of other actors (Kydd 125), but security-seeking does not intrinsically *lead* to war (Kydd 152). Perception of motive is critical. There are other possible motivations besides security-maximization for a given action, such as power maximization (Kydd 154). In a democracy, policy-making is relatively transparent reducing uncertainty over motivations (Kydd 117). Democratization thus shines light over a large part of the uncertainty in the global arena *ceteris paribus* to reduce the likelihood of conflict due to uncertainty of motives.

William Thompson considers three historical cases for his critique of the direction of causality argued in the democratic peace literature, Sweden-Denmark US-UK and Taisho Japan. Jack Levy has bestowed a law-like status on the notion that democracies do not fight each other (Thompson 141) due to constraints in democratic institutions (Thompson 142). Schweller suggests that democratic elites never seriously consider attacking a democratic challenger (Thompson 163) assuming no threat perceived, a positive-sum game. After disputing Schweller s above assertion, Thompson proposes a further refinement: democracies do not fight other democracies in their home region (Thompson 147). While democratic Britain and France remained at peace in their home

region (Europe) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century conflict and near conflict was not absent between these colonial powers away from the metropole. Similarly, the UK and US in the same time period. Democratic states historically did engage in conflict in low-cost, low-importance[8] colonial wars while remaining at peace at home. Controversially he suggests the testing of a reversed causal arrow shifting from democratic regime --> peace to peace --> democratic regime (Thompson 147). National security crises make [give elites the opportunity to make] states more authoritarian (Thompson 144). Furthermore, regional warfare is not conducive to democratization (Thompson 151).

Gaubatz argues democracies are disinclined to war due to institutional characteristics including stability of foreign policy, public preferences, leadership and institutions themselves (Gaubatz 114). The rule of law (and transparency of the process) (Gaubatz 119) and the transparency of domestic politics (Gaubatz 121) facilitate the reduction of uncertainty. Transnational interactions by non-state actors (people, NGO s, corporations, etc) build ties and thus interests which would be damaged in the event of interstate conflict (Gaubatz 119). Since the time of the Franco-Prussian War, democratic states were no less or more likely than non-democracies to form alliances (Gaubatz 129) but ally for a greater duration (Gaubatz 131) - alliances among democracies are more stable - indicating a stability of foreign policy preferences sufficient for the continuity of

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[8] Wars fought over colonies engaged relatively small forces. The UK in the late nineteenth century at the apex of its power operated land forces numbering around 150,000 for its global empire, controlling 400 million subjugated peoples. In comparison, the BEF casualties were 57,470 on the first *day* of the Battle of the Somme in 1916. Furthermore, a colonial war posed no threat of making the metropole extinct from the state system.

alliance institutions. Juridically-limited majority rule places structural impediments to policy change (e.g. Senate ratification in the US) (Gaubatz 136). This assumes that domestic institutions are stable and states will be willing to use international institutions as an extension of domestic practice. The latter assumption is somewhat easier for the state(s) which created or is privileged by existing international institutions. The argument that conflict is bad for the economy and thus will be opposed by those who will suffer ignores that individuals are differentially affected and have different degrees of access to decision-making. Furthermore, one may question whether these decisions can be assumed to be rational which would require the existence and availability of perfect information.

Hermann and Kegley found that from 1975-1991 democracies were less likely to be a target of coercive diplomacy[9] or to intervene in the military affairs of others (Hermann and Kegley 436). The Kantian/Wilsonian democratic peace assumes when disputes arise between democratic states, they recognize shared norms, institutions and values which predispose them to negotiated resolutions (Hermann and Kegley 437). Using Gurr s Polity data set, they define Regime Type as (DEMOCRACY - AUTOCRACY)*CONCENTRATION. It is important that Hermann and Kegley chose to utilized degrees of democratization rather than the more common dichotomous treatment of it.

Gowa (1999) suggests that the democratic peace is a phenomenon of the Cold War only; no evidence of it before WWI exists (Gowa 3). Common interests - the

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[9] Owing to a paucity of data, this part of Hermann and Kegley s argument will not be tested.

preferences perceived as shared across a group of actors - rather than regime type explains the peace (Gowa 3). Consequently the expansion of democracy will not necessarily enhance US security (Gowa 4). The democratic peace literature has been often empirical and found that democracies rarely engage each other in wars and democratic dyads rarely have serious disputes short of war (Gowa 5). According to Gowa, there are three key arguments in the literature (1) the political culture of democratic states embodies a norm of peaceful conflict resolution established domestically which will prevail in foreign policy (2) trade or cosmopolitan law forces states to calculate the costs of trade disruption as a disincentive to militarized conflict (3) the restricted autonomy of leaders by institutions checks the exercise of force (Gowa 6). Between 1816 and 1914 democratic dyads were no less likely to war[10] than non-democratic dyads (Gowa 44). The common unit in the literature of the dyad-year codes equally for all years of a war s duration; Gowa suggests coding only for the year of war initiation (Gowa 47). She finds that violent disputes do not occur at a lower rate between democratic states (Gowa 66). Yet, in more recent years as seen in this table, democratic governance became correlated with common interests (alliances). The hegemonic struggle between regime-types, or ideologies, as it was marketed in the mid-to-late twentieth century conflated the factors producing empirical evidence for the connections between regime-type and conflict. This proved to be a successful way to sell a conflict. The Cold War bipolar alignment which explicitly focused on regime-type weighs heavily on an undivided historical epic. Yet, Gowa s segmentation

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[10] War is used here by Gowa as in the present paper as the COW definition - a militarized conflict which involves at least one system member and results in total battle deaths for all involved system members exceeding 1000 (Gowa 45).

into the three periods suggests differentiation in terms of the relationship. For her, the democratic peace does not hold while the alliance peace does.

Year	War	MID s (less than war)
1816-1914	Equal Likelihood	Equal Likelihood
1919-1938	Equal Likelihood	Less Likely for Democracy
1945-1976	Less Likely for Democracy	Less Likely for Democracy

Table 2: Democracy and Alliance in Three Epochs (Gowa 67)

Alliances are adopted as a proxy for common interests (Gowa 88), suggested above. She finds the thesis that common interests predict to peace holds while the posited democratic regime-type leads to peace does not. Gowa refutes the criticism from Risse-Kappen that pacific alliances link to peace is simply a function of the democratic regime-type (Gowa 108). The disaggregation of historical periods - dividing with WWI and WWII - allows the removal of the Cold War biasing of results (Gowa 112), which was the basis for the democratic peace paradigm.

Historical Context

While this paper considers the militarized conflicts rising to the level of major war of the Indo-Pakistani dyad for their entire period of independence, the most recent conflict (1999) remains rather understudied by political scientists. As such, special attention must

be given to this event. Before proceeding, an elaboration of the historical context is necessary.

The conflict in Kargil, did not occur in isolation, but was a manifestation of a much longer period of tension. Kargil is one of the districts (equivalent to US counties) which make up the province of Srinagar which together with the province of Jammu form the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian-controlled section of Kashmir[11]. The state of Jammu and Kashmir retains a special status within the union government: as provided by Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, under provisions of which Jammu and Kashmir has its own constitution (adopted in 1956) that affirms the integrity of the state within the Republic of India. The union government has direct legislative powers in matters of defense, foreign policy, and communications within the state and has indirect influence in matters of citizenship, Supreme Court jurisdiction, and emergency powers. The governor of the state is appointed by the president of India. Executive power rests in the elected chief minister and the council of ministers. The legislature consists of two houses: the Legislative Assembly (Vidhan Sabha) of 77 members, representing single-member territorial constituencies; and the Legislative Council (Vidhan Parishad) composed of 36 members. The people of the state directly elect four representatives to the Lok Sabha and two members, elected by the combined Legislative Assembly and Council, to the Rajya Sabha, the upper house of Indian Parliament. The High Court consists of a chief justice and two or more other judges, who are appointed by the president of India.

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[11] This reflects the current political status quo established by the Simla agreement. Pakistani policy would disagree with the administrative placement of the Kargil area within Indian sovereignty.

Jammu and Kashmir is treated in this way by the Indian central government, different than the other states, due to a different history of incorporation after independence. Some contextual elaboration is important. Several attempts were made in the 19th century to define the boundaries of the territory[12], but precise definition was in many cases defeated by the nature of the country and by the existence of huge tracts lacking permanent human settlement. In the far north, for example, the maharaja's authority certainly extended to the Karakoram Range, but beyond lay a debatable zone on the borders of the Turkestan and Sinkiang regions of Central Asia, and the boundary was never demarcated. There were similar doubts about the alignment of the frontier where this northern zone skirted the region known as Aksai Chin, to the east, and joined the better known and more precisely delineated boundary with Tibet, which had served for centuries as the eastern border of the Ladakh region. The pattern of boundaries in the northwest became clearer in the last decade of the 19th century, when Britain delimited boundaries in the Pamir region in negotiations with Afghanistan and Russia. At this time Gilgit, always understood to be part of Kashmir, for strategic reasons was constituted as a special agency in 1889 under a British agent.

As long as the existence of the territory was guaranteed by the United Kingdom, the weaknesses in its territorial definition along its peripheries were not of great consequence; following the British withdrawal from South Asia in 1947, however, they

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[12] As Kydd argues the existence of uncertainty in a dyadic or systemic relationship is a contributing factor to conflict which institutions can ameliorate (Kydd 117). The basic uncertainties surrounding ill-defined borders in Kashmir have made the core issues of sovereignty contestable. A final military solution has not yet been achieved by either side.

became apparent. By the terms agreed upon for the partition of the Indian subcontinent between India and Pakistan, the rulers of princely states were given the right to opt for either Pakistan or India or--with certain reservations--to remain independent. The Hindu maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, initially believed that by delaying a decision he could maintain the independence of Kashmir, but, caught up in a train of events that included a revolution among his Muslim subjects along the western borders of the state and the intervention of Pashtun tribesmen, he signed an Instrument of Accession to the Indian Union in October 1947. This was the signal for intervention both by Pakistan, which considered that the state was a natural extension of Pakistan, and by India, which intended to confirm the act of accession. Localized warfare continued during 1948 and was terminated through the intercession of the United Nations in a cease-fire, which took effect in January 1949. In July of the same year, India and Pakistan defined a cease-fire line that divided the administration of the territory. Regarded merely as a temporary expedient, this partition along the cease-fire line still exists, though warfare between the two contestants was briefly resumed in 1965 and again in 1971, despite the many proposals made to end the dispute. Thus, the "Kashmir problem" has remained intractable.

Although there was a clear Muslim majority in the state before the 1947 partition and its economic, cultural, and geographic contiguity with the Muslim-majority area of the Punjab could be convincingly demonstrated, the accidents of history have resulted in a division of territory that has no rational basis[13]. Pakistan has been left with territory that,

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[13] This is actually common for postcolonial states whose territorial demarcations have been set by the metropole.

although basically Muslim in character, is thinly populated, relatively inaccessible, and economically underdeveloped. The largest Muslim group, situated in the Vale of Kashmir and estimated to number more than half the population of the entire state, lies in Indian-administered territory, with its former outlets via the Jhelum valley route blocked. India thus acquired the lion's share of both territory and population and with them substantial linguistic, ethnic, and religious problems. There have been a number of movements seeking a merger of Kashmir with Pakistan, independence for Jammu and Kashmir from both India and Pakistan, or the granting of union territory status to Buddhist Ladakh. To contend with these movements, confront Pakistani forces along the cease-fire line, and support the administrative structure of the state, the union government has maintained a strong military presence in the Indian sector, especially since the end of the 1980s.

Hypotheses

Kydd argues that the relatively transparent decision-making inherent in democratic institutions reduces the uncertainty of others over motivation. In turn less uncertainty reduces the likelihood of war amongst security-seekers. Transparent democratic institutions promote peace. These institutions include statutory public laws, a voting parliament, and a court system. Under the government of Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan had all of these; Pervaiz Musharraf s martial law regime, established in October 1999, however, suspended the operation of these institutions in decision-making. Kydd, following Kant, has suggested that democratic practice developed domestically can and will be transferred to interstate disputes. While various parties may be willing to compromise on budgetary

allocations, for example, in interstate interaction there are issues which may not be reducible, or available for compromise. Sovereignty is one such issue. Related to this general claim is freedom. Freedom is treated as an aspect of democratic political culture. For the purpose of the subsequent analysis the following hypothesis is posited. *Hypothesis A: Countries with democratic institutions, control of which is determined openly, are less likely to engage in war with other countries with such institutions.* Freedom House s project provides another available operationalization of this line of argument. *Hypothesis B: Free countries are less likely to engage in war with other free countries.*

A further refinement of this general proposition is offered by Thompson. *Hypothesis C: Democracies do not fight democracies in their home region.* This refinement to the democratic peace argument permits democracies to engage in colonial wars (such as the UK and French Republics in the 19th century) while remaining at peace in issues concerning the security of the state itself. India and Pakistan have engaged in militarized disputes in their home region (South Asia) at times when both were democracies in 1948[14] and 1999. Thompson s suggestion which reduces the testable area for conflict to Europe and North America also confines to areas where sovereignty of borders and peoples have become settled over long periods of conflict prior to democratization. Whether stateness questions have been resolved I would argue is more critical than regime-type.

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[14] While the constituent assemblies used a limited franchise from the laws of the colonial period, the definition of democracy (see the Operationalization section) is based upon contestation, not participation, so this would be coded as a democracy.

Hermann and Kegley offer that democracies are less likely to be the target of coercive diplomacy or to intervene in the military affairs of others. When disputes arise between democracies they recognize shared norms values and institutions which predispose them to negotiated resolution. Thus, *Hypothesis D: As states become more democratic, they (a) are less often the target of coercive diplomacy and (b) intervene in the affairs of others less*, they hypothesize. The former claim may be a function of the rich militarily and economically powerful democracies of NATO which are too strong to be made targets of coercive diplomacy (Falklands/Malvinas notwithstanding). Regardless, a more democratic Pakistan engaged in conflict with democratic India as did an authoritarian one; regime-type appears to have played no role in determining the likelihood of peace/war in the dyad

Gowa s literature review notes trade, or cosmopolitan law - the costs of trade disruption form a disincentive to militarized conflict, deterring it. This one may have some merit. Arguments over trade disruption are derived directly from Kant s original contribution on the democratic peace (outlined above). Fears of trade and investment interruptions which war would bring are especially key to motivate private self-interested actors to devote resources, if necessary, to maintain constraint institutions of government action. Trade creates powerful import/export business constituencies whose livelihood would be negatively affected by war. The consequences are such to motivate holders of said interests to advocate for cautious government action. Furthermore, as foreign trade is more likely to take place using hard currency than domestic economic transactions and hard currency is essential for key imports of petroleum, technology and weapons such

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business interests will be even more valued. Over recent governments trade has taken a central place on the peace agenda, with increased trade coinciding with peace. Democratic regimes were not essential as this has been pursued effectively between the BJP and Sharif as well as Musharraf. Thus, *Hypothesis E: Increasing dyadic trade reduces the likelihood of militarized conflict and war.*

Gowa s study also claims common interests (alliance) rather than regime-type commonalities produce peace between states. From this suggestion, here it is posited: *Hypothesis F: When states share alliance membership they are less likely to war with each other.* In order to pursue a test of this hypothesis, several issues must be addressed. What produces the common interests? States decide conflict with a given state is disadvantageous or pending conflict with another state is commonly perceived as a greater threat and negotiate an alliance. Elite action in pursuit of peace (or external balancing against a greater threat) creates the common interests and results in peace. Nevertheless, India and Pakistan do not share an alliance and their interests (each seeks sovereignty over Kashmir) are in conflict. Does this mean there can be no hope for peace? Many of the alliances Gowa uses concerned issue areas of peripheral interest to the contracting parties and did not necessarily impinge upon the core sovereignty interests: Germany/Prussia and France signed no alliance over Alsace. Many of the British-someone alliances were sought to draw back forces to defend the home islands - the primary sovereignty interest. If taken more broadly than security-oriented alliances, common interests may well have explanatory value in terms of the creation of transnational constituencies for trade and otherwise.

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Operationalizations

Empirical tests require a compromise between the complete reflection of the ideal hypothesis and real data limitations. This study has struggled to find data sets which most closely mirror the concepts employed in the literature. Yet, each operationalization is inherently confined to the data available rather than what one may ideally wish to measure. This is necessary to produce *any* empirical findings. In none of the works from which hypotheses have been drawn were the questions of the countries considered here asked. Consequently, a simple replication of operationalizations and data sets from this literature alone could not address the problem. What is provided here is an attempt to offer as reflective a test of the literature as is currently possible while actually being able to undertake the proposed test.

A further issue here encompasses the selection of operational definitions for key variables. These are important assumptions from which the findings may well flow. All critiques of the study should confine themselves to arguing within the bonds of these operating assumptions. For five of the hypotheses, the independent and, for all, the dependent variables are dichotomous. While acknowledging the potentially greater explanatory power of further disaggregated categories, choices have been made to enable the use of existing data set where deemed appropriate. Regime-type is treated, as a dichotomous variable, as the presence or absence of democracy (the authoritarian regime-type falls in a residual category) in a state. This has been a common practice in the comparative politics literature from which the concept is derived. The categories, however, could be contested and if further research is pursued it would be useful to run

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the various tests on scalar rather than dichotomous variables once the data for the latter can be collected. Another controversy is over the basis on which a regime-type judgement may be made. Of the variety of potential sets of characteristics including universal suffrage and civil liberties, this analysis has adopted a focus on contestation - whether a variety of forces can compete for the control of governing institutions with a reasonable chance that the outcomes are not fixed. Once again, this definition is often used in the literature (e.g., Przeworski et al) and may be the more useful part of Dahl s notion of polyarchy. This definitional debate is itself, however, beyond the scope of this thesis. Similarly the dichotomous nature of conflict posited here finds itself echoing the existing literature. The data set adopted is the ever-popular Correlates of War, which has set the threshold for a conflict being counted as a war at 1,000 battle-deaths cumulatively from system members, which presents a comprehensive listing of wars for the period 1816-1992. Using this data set also can facilitate extra-regional tests of the ideas put forward here with the most precise replication of the operationalizations. Again, in future work, this should be enhanced with scalar data. All of these decisions were made on the basis of data availability where consistency with current practice in the literature has allowed it. Furthermore, the hypotheses raise outcome expectations for which dichotomous data is most appropriate.

Kydd s assertion that countries with democratic institutions, control of which is determined openly, are less likely to engage in war with other countries with such institutions would mean that at times when both India and Pakistan are/were democratic no wars will occur in the dyad. This is tested on the dataset published by Przeworski,

Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000), Appendix 1.2, pg 56-69, Classification of Political Regimes, 1950-1990 using their variables Regime, Entry, Exit. Regime is their classification of regime-type. Entry and Exit denote the beginning and ending years of the identified regime-type. To be coded a democracy in this dataset, Przeworski et al have four criteria (1) elected executive (2) elected legislature (3) more than one effective party in the system (4) alternation of party/coalition members in government; Presidentialism and Parliamentarism are subsets of democracy in this scheme. The focus of the study is democratization so Przeworski et al have used authoritarian regimes as a residual category.

Thompson offers a hypothesis which argues that when both are democratic India and Pakistan will not fight in South Asia, their home region. The data from Correlates of War, 1816-1992, in its Interstate Wars list containing conflicts with 1000 or more battle deaths by state system members identifies the occurrence of wars. COW provides a comprehensive data set for the years it covers[15] offering a dichotomous variable of the presence or absence of major war for a given state, also reporting the beginning and ending dates of the conflict. The COW study findings and definition are used across the tests below for the dependent variable data set (presence/absence of major war in the dyad). Thompson s hypothesis as applied to this dyad has a constant independent variable (whether it is in the home region) and a changing one (regime-type) across the period of years examined. Thompson suggests that unlike the Franco-UK colonial wars of years

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[15] The COW study, which currently covers 1816-1992, is expected to be extended by the ongoing MIDS work. The component covering the South Asian region is projected to conclude in 2002.

past, which occurred in the periphery as far as the involved metropoles were concerned, democratic states would not fight each other in their home region - a refinement of the democratic peace thesis. As in Kydd, the Przeworski et al data set will be used for regime-type. Both conditions for Thompson must be met: (1) issues located in the home region; and (2) regime-type for both states is democratic.

Gowa s literature-based theoretical formulation stipulates that when bilateral trade is increasing, there will be a reduced likelihood of war in the dyad. Bidanda M Chengappa[16] provides annual data for the period 1987-1999 concerning the total change in the value of trade over the previous year. These financial data are reported in nominal (Indian) Rs Crore[17] from India s perspective.

Gowa further argues that if two states are members of the same alliance they will not war. Alliances are a collective defense-oriented subset of IGO s. The CIA *World Factbook* reports international organization participation answering whether India and Pakistan members of the same alliance for the reported year. Those of these IGO s which constitute organizations for collective defense are recorded for each country and checked for matching memberships. Following Gowa, this study confines the interpretation of alliances to (military) security alliances.

Herman and Kegley contend a democratic state will be less likely than a non-democracy to intervene in foreign countries militarily. Using Polity s POLITY variable

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[16] Data available at http://www.idsa-india.org/an-jun9-7.html

[17] Rs Crore means ten million (10,000,000) Rupees, the Indian currency. The Indian Rs is currently (2001) worth US$0.021. The terms lahk or lac (100,000) and crore (10,000,000) are commonly used in India when referring to large amounts of money.

which combines 11-point scales of Democracy and Autocracy, the question can be answered. Polity reports a continuous variable of regime-type with this scale.

Free countries are less likely to war with other free countries is an additional implication. Freedom House's Annual Survey of Freedom Country Ratings 1972-2000" provides its Freedom Rating whose thresholds are Free 1.0-2.5, Partly Free 2.5-5.5 and Not Free 5.5-7.0. The Freedom Rating[18] was created by averaging their political rights and civil liberties ratings. The survey included questions addressing rights of expression, association, personal autonomy, economic liberties, the rule of law, stateness, regime institutions and international influence. For each question countries are awarded 0-4 points which are then summed. The raw point totals for political rights and civil liberties are separately broken into seven categories with equal point-spreads. These two indices are then averaged to produce the freedom rating. Higher scores are less free.

Findings

Kydd who argues that countries with democratic institutions, control of which is determined openly[19], are less likely to engage in war with other countries with such

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[18] Freedom House's methodology is available from http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/methodology.htm See Appendix C for the survey questions.

[19] Ideally, the most direct test of Kydd's assertion here to test the transparency of political institutions would be executed. This proved not to be feasible. Several publicly-available indices were consulted: Freedom House which although its surveys query on a number of relevant issues (see Appendix C) offers no raw data for transparency questions alone; Polity III defined no variable as capturing the transparency of political institutions; Transparency International (http://www.transparency.de) Has only data for the 1995-2000 time period and focuses on business and financial transparency not the more political aspects which are relevant to the argument. The data set adopted (Przeworski et al.) does not explicitly test transparency but defines democracy in terms of openness for

institutions. He would expect that when both members of a dyad have transparent democratic institutions there would be no wars between them, the uncertainty over motivations having been reduced, producing a democratic peace. By Przeworski et al s criteria India is coded Parliamentarism, a subset of democracy, from 1950-90; Pakistan was Parliamentarism 1950-55 (by these criteria it would begin 1947) and 1988-90 (and extend to 1999). These extensions can be made as Przeworski s conditions can be met and no regime change occurred between them and the studied years. The wars in 1947-9 and 1999 occurred with both states democratic. Wars occurred at times when the hypothesis would suggest otherwise[20].

Thompson suggested that democratic countries do not fight others of that regime-type within their home region (as opposed to colonial outpost). It would be expected when India and Pakistan - geographical neighbors - were both democratically governed there would be no war between them. The data from Correlates of War, 1816-1992, in its Interstate Wars list containing conflicts with 1000 or more battle deaths by state system members identifies three wars between India and Pakistan[21] in 1947-9, 1965 and 1971 in South Asia, the home region of both states; Kargil (1999) as well can be added. The data in Przeworski et al classify India as democratic during all of these wars and Pakistan as

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contestation by elections which is a key criterion for the transparency of state political institutions.

[20] See Appendix D for a full listing of hypotheses and findings.

[21] See page 1, footnote 1, in this paper for a list of the conflicts.

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well during 1947-49 and 1999. Wars occurred in the home region of the democracies

unlike what Thompson would expect.

Gowa offers a summary of claims in the literature on trade (Gowa 6) which

suggests that as bilateral trade is rising in a dyad war will not occur owing to financial

disincentives placed upon key actors. If Indo-Pakistani trade was increasing the likelihood

of war between them would decline. Indo-Pakistani bilateral trade grew more than twelve

times (in nominal terms) from 1987 to 1999 but declined from 1989-90, 1992-93 and from

1998; there were drops in trade levels in the last period following nuclear testing.

Vajpayee s initiative with Sharif following the test sought to increase trade; trade had

however plunged in the two years leading up to the Kargil Crisis removing or lessening

this constraint upon militancy. Peak trade was less than US$200m which is less than 0.1%

of the combined Indo-Pakistani GDP, at exchange rates. If the hypothesis had demanded

 high trade rather than increasing trade this dyad may not have qualified at all, but the

decline in years preceding war supports the hypothesis. This is of course only one case so

not very compelling. Unfortunately Chengappa does not provide earlier data.

Year	Export[22]	Import	Total	Balance	% Change of Total from prior	A COW-level war?[13]
1987-88	19.12	28.03	47.15	-8.91	N/A	N
1988-89	36.2	72.17	108.37	-35.97	61.22	N
1989-90	51.39	53.79	105.18	-2.4	-3.19	N
1990-91	73.6	84.49	158.09	-10.89	52.91	N
1991-92	98.61	149.98	248.59	-51.37	90.5	N
1992-93	151.26	73.5	224.76	77.76	-23.83	N
1993-94	200.66	136.48	337.14	64.18	112.38	N
1994-95	179.71	165.61	345.32	14.1	8.18	N
1995-96	256.8	150.8	407.6	106	62.28	N
1996-97	558.12	128.36	686.48	429.76	278.88	N
1997-98	537.14	139.68	676.82	397.46	-9.66	N
1998-99	184.84	463.92	648.76	-279.08	-28.06	Y

Table 3: Indo-Pakistani Bilateral Trade, 1987-1999 (Chengappa)

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[22] All currency values are given in nominal (Indian) Rs. Crore. Import/Export terms are given from India s perspective. From Bidanda M Chengappa, India-Pakistan Trade Relations (available at: http://www.idsa-india.org/an-jun9-7.html). Rs Crore means ten million (10,000,000) Rupees, the Indian currency. The Indian Rs is currently (2001) worth US$0.021. The terms lahk or lac (100,000) and crore (10,000,000) are commonly used in India when referring to large amounts of money.

[13] See pg 1 n1 for a listing of identified wars.

Gowa provides her own argument on alliances (used as a proxy for the commonality of interests) which argues that states sharing common security alliances will not war. if India and Pakistan are allied they do not war. Of course, India and Pakistan have not shared alliance ties. As they were not aligned, this approach is unable to explain the events of peace and war between India and Pakistan. For much of the period under consideration Cold War divisions placed India in the Non-Aligned Movement and Pakistan in the US-aligned CENTO (Baghdad Pact) alliance. Even after the Cold War s exit from South Asia India and Pakistan did not forge alliance ties. Yet there have been periods of both conflict and peace between them. A more generic common interests between them may be embodied in the SAARC institution, created in 1985, but this organization specifically addresses itself to issues other than dyadic security. This supports Gowa that similar regime-types which lack common interests may war. This hypothesis is not helpful for explaining the Indo-Pakistani dyad as Gowa has confused and conflated common interests with alliance membership. The concept of common interests needs to be disaggregated, beyond the common *security* interests encompassed by alliances. If extended to include SAARC as a stabilizing institution, the claim can be considered more thoroughly. Conflict occurred only once during the 15 plus year period of membership in SAARC (Kargil in 1999), but also occurred only once in the previous 15 years. The purpose of SAARC at its founding was to shift the focus of strategic attention from a dyadic to a multilateral regional approach with interest placed in common development economics. The organization, however, was unable to prevent the Kargil conflict. Gowa s alliance argument seems to work only for strategic alliances in the face of a stronger extra-

alliance threat, e.g., France and the FRG were more threatened by Russia than each other. Hermann and Kegley argue that countries with democratic institutions are less likely to intervene in the military affairs of others, regardless of the target s regime type. In the present case one would expect when democratic institutions exist in India and Pakistan the state would be less likely to intervene militarily in the other, or war. As mentioned above, Hermann and Kegley base their argument on norms, values and institutions of democratic states. To avoid critique that the operationalized variable does not reflect their hypothesis, here it come from the same variable in the same Polity data set[14] that the authors used. India scores in the 8-11 range in 1947-74 and 1977-99 but between 4 and 7 in 1975-76 (The Emergency). COW found wars in 1947-49, 1965 and 1971; during all India was a democracy. Pakistan scores 8-11 in 1956-57, 1972-76 and 1988-96; between 4-7 during 1949-55 and 1997-98; 0-3 for 1962-68 ; and -7--4 back in 1958-61. The figure during the 1971 was -77 for Pakistan which is off the scale; that war followed an election for MPs in Pakistan which was to transition the country from military rule to democracy. Other wars occurred when coded 2, 4, 1. The Kargil Crisis (which according to official reports killed over 1000 system members) occurred under the Sharif government which was coded by Polity as 7 (democracy) In contrast to the expectation, India intervened militarily in the affairs of its neighbors (Pakistan of both regime-types, Sri Lanka, Goa, Hyderabad, Sikkim, etc) while it was a democracy. Pakistan as a democratic state in 1947-49 and 1999 intervened militarily in India.

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[14] See Appendix A for Polity scores.

Freedom House[15] suggests that freedom - in terms of political rights and civil liberties - is the key the creation of pacific dyads and system. When both Pakistan and India are more free, they will not war. However, the relationship does not appear confirmingly obvious. India was free 1972-75, 1977-91 and 1998-00 and partly free 1975-77 and 1991-98. Pakistan is coded partly free 1972-79 and 1985-99 and not free during 1979-85 and 1999-00. Only one war occurred during the period covered, Kargil in 1999 with India coded free and Pakistan coded partly free According to Freedom House Pakistan was not a Free state between 1972 and 2000 but warred with free India in 1999 while partly free[16]. While Pakistan was not free during the years coded, India and Pakistan did not war. The hypothesis suggested an increased likelihood of war if the variable is taken continuously as Freedom House reports it. The hypothesized relationship does not appear to exist in this dyad at first glance. This is statistically tested below

Analysis

As was mentioned above, Kydd argues that the relatively transparent decision-making inherent in democratic institutions reduces the uncertain of others over motivation. In turn less uncertainty reduces the likelihood of war amongst security-seekers. Transparent democratic institutions promote peace. These institutions include statutory public laws, a voting parliament and a court system. Countries with democratic

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[15] Freedom House is an American institution, founded in 1941 by Eleanor Roosevelt and Wendell Wilkie. There is a strong suggestion of US institutions in the questions they ask.

[16] See Appendix B for Freedom House scores.

institutions, control of which is determined openly, are less likely to engage in war with other countries with such institutions. This operationalization is tested using data from the Correlates of War, 1816-1992, and Przeworski et al (2000). To be coded a democracy in this dataset, Przeworski et al have four criteria (1) elected executive (2) elected legislature (3) more than one effective party in the system and (4) alternation of party/coalition members in government. This forms the independent variable, regime-type. The Interstate Wars list specifies conflicts with 1000 or more battle deaths by state system members as wars. This is the dependent dichotomous (war, no war) variable across all six hypothesis tests. There are trade-offs to using a dichotomous rather than scalar variable for conflict as the categories become less precise than otherwise. This choice was made on the grounds of data availability: The COW study uses a dichotomous variable. In future iterations of this study, the construction of a scalar data set will be a priority. There are two possible interpretations of Kydd s hypothesis and actually all of these hypo0theses. In the first case, the claim is that democracies simply do not fight other democracies. This is an absolute claim that could be rejected with a single counter-example. It applies to stricter interpretations of all of the hypotheses. If a non-zero number appears in the cell and the intersection of the war column and the row for which the independent variable has been fulfilled for both states in the dyad, this hypothesis in its absolute interpretation is not supported by the data. This turns out to be the case for all of the hypotheses. Returning to the interpretation of the Kydd hypothesis as an example, it would be expected that during periods when both states were democratic (1947-1955, 1988-1999) there would be no wars in the dyad. Table 4 which reports observed frequencies has recorded four years

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during which both states had democratic regimes and there was war between them. The claim would not expect that during the periods when both states in the dyad were democracies they warred in 1947-48 and 1999. Where four years are recorded, zero years would be expected by the hypothesis. Another interpretation is that the expected proportion of time spent by the states in conflict would be less than the proportion in conflict for the entire set of observed frequencies which includes both regime-types. Again, all the hypotheses which rely upon dichotomous independent variables could and have been interpreted in this manner. This is tested through a comparison of the proportional tendencies (Table 4) using the chi-squared statistical test (Table 5). Under this interpretation, one would expect a the democratic dyad to spend proportionally less years in conflict than were spent during the entire period. For the entire time period one in nine years were spent in conflict (0.111); at this rate during the 21 years when both India and Pakistan were democratic it would be expected that the states would war for no more than 2.333 years. However, a frequency of four years is reported for a proportion of more than one in six (0.190). This proportion during democratic regimes actually exceeds the general trend which does not conform to the expectations of the hypothesis. The hypothesis using either interpretation is not supported as operationalized in this manner (See Table 4 and 5).

A more informative statistical test that the reporting of frequencies alone is performed here using chi-squared test for contingency, a test of significance. As this uses dichotomous nominal variables, regression and many other more powerful statistical tests are not available (many of these need interval variables). The null hypothesis is that the

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two sets of characteristics (regime-type, conflict) are unrelated. One attempts to reject the

null hypothesis by means of the chi-squared test[17].

	War	Not War	Total
Both Democratic	4	17	21
Not Both Democratic	2	31	33
Total	6	48	54

Table 4: Frequencies[18] of Conflict By Regime-Type

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[17] Before beginning the rejection attempt the relevant question is: What kind of a table would be expected if the null hypothesis were true? These are the observed frequencies. The next issue is: Assuming that the null hypothesis is true and that the marginal totals in the observed frequency table (Table 4) actually reflect those marginals in the population, what are the expected frequencies? The expected frequencies are calculating from dividing the product of the row and column marginals by the grand total. In a two by two table, as below, it is necessary to calculate only one expected frequencies as others can be obtained by subtraction from the marginal totals. This characteristic is used in the actual significance test. The number of expected frequencies needed before one can defer to the marginal totals is the test s degrees of freedom which is a calculated figure. The degrees of freedom is the product of the quantity of one less than the number of rows by the quantity of one less than the number of columns. So for a two by two tables, the degrees of freedom is one. In making a decision to reject the null hypothesis or not a table is used that provides the mathematically determined critical values of chi-squared at selected probability levels for a wide range of degrees of freedom. All statistical tests performed in this study are done using SPSS 10 for Windows. Machine outputs are reported.

[18] Regime-type classification come from Przeworski et al (65-67). Conflict is from COW with the adaptation mentioned above (1n1).

	Regime-Type (Prz.)
Chi-squared	2.667
degrees of freedom	1
Significant at	.102

Table 5: Chi-squared Test Statistic

The test reveals it is not significant at the 95% confidence level but is just below the 90% level. With the standard $p < .05$ requirement, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. There is no *statistically*-significant relationship as deduced from the data. The Indo-Pakistani dyad cannot provide significant support for the thesis which postulates a relationship between regime-type and conflict.

Thompson argued that democracies do not fight democracies in their respective home region. In the sense of the multiple interpretations suggested above this is an absolute claim. As Table 6 indicates, there are six years of counter-examples to refute the claim in its absolute sense. There should be zero years of war according to the hypothesis expectation. Going beyond what Thompson says a proportional test is also offered here. This refinement to the democratic peace argument reflects the existence of cases in which democracies engaged other democracies in colonial wars while remaining at peace for the region of metropoles. Following this, Thompson would expect that a democratic India and a democratic Pakistan would not fight each other in their home region, South Asia. Region is a geopolitical and geostrategic construct of an arena for potential interaction

beyond state sovereignty but smaller than the state system. Home region is that region in which the political, demographic and material assets of a state are concentrated including government institutions. Lacking extra-regional dependencies, India and Pakistan have no region but their home region South Asia where they concentrate all their assets. To test the Thompson hypothesis the same variables and data sets were adopted as used above with Kydd. The findings show India and Pakistan did in fact war in their home region against the hypothesis. Furthermore, they warred in their home region when they shared the democratic regime-type.

	War	Not War	Total
Home Region	6	48	54
Total	6	0	54

Table 6: Frequencies of Conflict in the Home Region[19]

	War	Not War	Total
Both Democratic	4	17	21
Not Both Democratic	2	31	33
Total	6	48	54

Table 7: Frequencies of Conflict in Home Region by Regime-Type

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[19] A chi-squared test of this is unnecessary in the sense that as Region does not vary (see frequencies in Table 6), the nonparametric test cannot be performed. However, Thompson s hypothesis lays out region as a factor.

	Regime-Type (Prz.)
Chi-squared	2.667
degrees of freedom	1
Significant at	.102

Table 8: Chi-squared Test Statistic

The test reveals it is not significant at the 95% confidence level but is just below the 90% level. With the standard $p < .05$ requirement, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. There is no *statistically*-significant relationship as shown by this data. The Indo-Pakistani dyad cannot provide significant support for the thesis which postulates a relationship between regime-type and conflict in the home region of involved states.

The cosmopolitan law of trade suggests the fears of trade disruptions likely to occur with war constrain government actions. The hypothesized expectation is that increasing dyadic trade reduces the likelihood of war: when trade is trending upwards there will be no war in the dyad. Since trade levels increased, it would be expected this would coincide with the absence of war. Using Chengappa s data for trade levels in the dyad and COW for conflict, the finding is that as trade trended upwards no war was initiated in the dyad; when trade declined for two successive years, war occurred (see Table 9). A cautionary note: Due to data availability the time period (1987-1999) studied for this hypothesis is shorter than any of the others provided here but still capture times of peace and of war.

As seen in Figure 1, during the period under consideration, bilateral trade[20] between India and Pakistan rapidly and curvilinearly grew until 1997-98 when it declined slowly. Prior to then trade never declined in two (or more) successive years. The year 1998 marked a time of increasing tension in the dyad as the BJP was swept into office in India on a platform of rebuilding the national security apparatus including the explicit campaign promise of weaponization of India s nuclear capability. By May of that year both countries conducted tests, prompting economic sanctions from extra-regional powers.. One year later, during continuing declines in bilateral trade levels, the India engaged in the Kargil conflict with what it claimed[21] were Pakistani forces. Increased tension and declining trade coincided with each other but this may be more along the lines of correlation rather than the claimed causation. Temporal coincidence does not imply direction or a process relationship. However, the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee may have believed the claim[22]. Following the nuclear tests, he engaged

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[20] Trade levels are reported in Rs Crore. Rs Crore means ten million (10,000,000) Rupees, the Indian currency. The Indian Rs is currently (2001) worth US$0.021. The terms lahk or lac (100,000) and crore (10,000,000) are commonly used in India when referring to large amounts of money.

[21] Pakistan claimed these forces were independent, indigenous freedom-fighters of Kashmir.

[22] While it is possible Vajpayee believed a connection exists between trade levels and conflict, or the lack thereof, as the cosmopolitan law would suggest, this has not been empirically tested here. The Prime Minister may have been using trade to signal his intension to redress tensions in the relationship. As such trade would be used as a confidence-building measure to create in the mind of the target a perception that a channel would exist for the pursuit of grievances apart from militarized conflict. Whether this was tactical or not is quite apart from the argument at hand. The Premier undertook steps *as if* the trade claim held empirically and was being pursued.

Pakistan s Nawaz Sharif in discussions initially through the SAARC institution to build confidence and reduce tensions. Included in these measures were trade incentives whereby India would purchase energy and primary products from Pakistan, stimulating trade.

Figure 1: Indo-Pakistani Trade over Time

```
Independent:   Time

  Dependent Mth    Rsq  d.f.        F  Sigf        b0        b1

    V4        EXP  .934     10  142.11   .000 58.2359    .2258
```

Total Value of Trade (Rs Crore)

Figure 2: Indo-Pakistani Trade with Curve Estimation

As can be seen in the above Figure 2, the plotted exponential curve, whose formula is given above[23], generally describes the observed data for most of the years under consideration. However, the observations depart from the graphed expectation at the last few observations. This substantial change begs for explanation as it coincides with conflictual relations in 1998 and militarized conflict in 1999. A statistical test is presented below in Table 9. A key issue is: What is the direction of this relationship between trade and conflict? While no ultimate definitional answer has been or could be given at this point, the true relationship may be interactive. An increase in the conflict in a relationship may depress trade (investors lose confidence in the stability of future returns) which reduces the financial stake of actors in restraining governments from militarized conflict in the dyad. This study does not attempt to capture what triggers an initial trade decline. Declines in trade clearly preceded the Kargil conflict of 1999. This would suggest that trade may be the driving force influencing propensities for or against militarized conflict. Yet, anecdotally, a year before Kargil Indo-Pakistani relations took a conflictual turn short of war. Conflicts short of war will be a useful dependent variable for tests in future work. Neither the economic not event data used in this study is precise enough to provide a final answer of directionality - that is a task for future research. This may be tested in future work on the subject. What can be said is that a change in trade relations came about when no changes occurred in regime-type in either country, global economic climate, international trade regime or foreign exchange reserves. Furthermore, governments addressed negatively-perceived conflictual relations with trade talks.

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[23] The exponential curve in Figure 2 is a graph of the formula listed in that figure.

A further statistical test is performed for the relationship between trade levels and conflict. Over the period of years a dummy dependent variable is coded for conflict (war = 1; no war = 0) from the data reported on Table 3 and paired to each year s total dyadic trade. As this is categorical data on the one side, the appropriate statistical test in Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). The logic of ANOVA is based upon partitioning the distance to the grand mean into distances explained by the category means and those which are not. It squares distance to eliminate negative numbers and works on the sums of these squared distances. Output includes both the within and between groups sums of squares. In the current context the sums of squared distances are translated into those for regression and residual.

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	.171	1	.171	2.301	.160
	Residual	.745	10	7.452E-02		
	Total	.917	11			

Table 9: ANOVA

The F-statistic is a measure of how well the categories of the independent variable (here, trade volume) explain variation in the categories of the dependent variable (conflict). If the categories of the independent variable are totally useless in explaining the variation of the scores of the dependent variable, F will be 0. F grows as more of the dependent variable variation is explained. The relationship between the independent and dependent variables is strongest as F approaches infinity (the asymptotic limit). The next number to look at in Table 9 is Sig (Significance). Standard practice is to call a variable as having statistically significant explanatory value at the 95% (.05) or 90% (.10) level; the

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reported statistic of .16 meets neither criterion. The null hypothesis, that there is no statistically significant relationship between the variables, cannot be rejected. Insufficient empirical evidence exists to support the hypothesis.

Gowa contends that common interests rather than regime-type commonalities produce peace between states. Gowa expects that when states share alliance membership they will not war with each other. She uses military alliances as a proxy for the hypothesized common interests. Gowa argues if two states are members of the same alliance they will not war. The CIA *World Factbook* is used to identify alliance membership; COW is used for the conflicts. India and Pakistan never shared alliance ties so Gowa s contribution would be unable to explain the variation. As the two countries were not allied all Gowa could offer would be that this institutional linkage would not be available to provide a disincentive for war.

	War	Not War	Total
Both Allied	0	0	0
Not Both Allied	6	48	54
Total	6	48	54

Table 10: Frequencies of Conflict by Alliance Membership

	Alliance
Chi-squared	NA
degrees of freedom	NA
Significant at	NA

Table 11: Chi-squared Test Statistic

Again, as joint alliance membership for dyadic participants does not vary, a chi-squared statistic cannot be tested. The wider applicability of Gowa s argument is in question as military alliance penetration in the post-Cold War period in the developing world is rather limited. Furthermore, Przeworski et al has suggested that militarized conflict in the developed world is relatively unlikely, in fact the authors suggest that while war will not the eliminated it will be limited to the African continent (Przeworski et al 273). Like South Asia, war-prone Africa lacks the alliance institutions which overlap potential conflict which the West has (France/Germany, Greece/Turkey). Gowa is useless for explaining these cases of likely conflict.

As suggested above, Gowa s use of alliances as a proxy for common interests only incompletely capture the hypothesized concept. So, a potential extension is to query whether membership in a regional IGO which affords institutions for the discussion of sovereignty and security issues. The expectation of this hypothesis is that when both India and Pakistan were members of SAARC there would be no war as opposed to other times. The states engaged in war three times before and once after joining SAARC.

	War	Not War	Total
Both in SAARC	1	15	16
Not Both in SAARC	5	33	38
Total	6	48	54

Table 12: Frequencies of Conflict by SAARC Membership

	SAARC
Chi-squared	8.963
degrees of freedom	1
Significant at	.003

Table 13: Chi-squared Test Statistic

The test reveals it is significant at the 95% confidence level. With the standard $p <$ .05 requirement, the null hypothesis can be rejected. There is a *statistically*-significant relationship as deduced from the data. The Indo-Pakistani dyad can provide significant support for the thesis which postulates a relationship between SAARC membership and conflict. Again, this is extension of Gowa s argument looks a non-military IGO (i.e., not an alliance) and finds a role for it. Perhaps such institutions are a solution for resolving

continuing conflictual ties. Anecdotally, after bomb testing and again after Kargil India and Pakistan interacted largely through the SAARC institutions to rebuild ties. These meetings facilitated direct contact among governing elites rather than being filtered through the ministries of external affairs. Consequently, these types of institutions may be a policy avenue to be pursued. During years when India and Pakistan were both members of SAARC they spent proportionally fewer years warring with each other. From SAARC s first summit (1985) focused on multilateral cooperation in the region to address common problems of development. The seven South Asian states to gain collective self-reliance in nine fields which did not include security affairs. Each state was given equal responsibilities and rights with the aim to shift the paradigm from the Indo-Pakistani dyad to a regional focus. However, SAARC also afforded Indian and Pakistani leaders the opportunity discuss their bilateral relationship apart from dyadic summits at which the focus was wholly security-oriented. The SAARC institution appears to have ameliorated the relationship. The sort of institution that has been created may be a useful model to follow for other conflictual regions of the developing world.

Hermann and Kegley suggest that democracies are less likely to intervene in the military affairs of other democracies. When India and Pakistan have democratic regimes, the expectation is that they will not militarily intervene in foreign countries. When disputes arise between democracies they recognize shared norms, values and institutions. As states become more democratic they intervene in the affairs of others less. Using Polity and COW data this has been tested. As war - including extraterritorial military intervention - occurred when the regime-type was the same, the assertion does not hold.

	War	Not War	Total
Both Democratic	2	30	32
Not Both Democratic	1	20	21
Total	3	50	53

Table 14: Frequencies of Conflict by Regime-Type (Polity, 1950-1999)

	Regime-Type (Polity)
Chi-squared	2.667
degrees of freedom	1
Significant at	.102

Table 15: Chi-squared Test Statistic

The test reveals it is not significant at the 95% confidence level but is just below the 90% level. With the standard $p < .05$ requirement, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. There is no *statistically*-significant relationship as deduced from the data. The Indo-Pakistani dyad cannot provide significant support for the thesis which postulates a relationship between regime-type and conflict.

Freedom House has compiled data quantifying the status of political and civil liberties. Free countries are less likely to engage in war with other free countries. The

hypothesized expectation is that when India and Pakistan are both free, they will be less likely to war than they are not both free. This should be evidenced through the comparison of proportional frequencies. On this 8-point scale, India was free or partly free throughout the times studied; Pakistan was classified partly free during the 1999 Kargil conflict.

	War	Not War	Total
Both Free/PF	1	20	21
Not Both Free	0	7	7
Total	1	27	28

Table 16: Frequencies of Conflict by Status of Freedom

	Freedom
Chi-squared	7
degrees of freedom	1
Significant at	.008

Table 17: Chi-squared Test Statistic

The test reveals it is significant at the 95% confidence level. With the standard $p <$ .05 requirement, the null hypothesis can be rejected. There is a *statistically*-significant relationship as deduced from the data. The Indo-Pakistani dyad can provide significant support for the thesis which postulates a relationship between the status of freedom and

conflict, viz., free states do not fight each other. This may stem either from the

operationalization of this freedom concept or when comparing to the Kydd, Thompson,

and Hermann and Kegley arguments may be detecting a difference by focusing of a

different (smaller subset time period). The latter warning can be rejected as when the

Kydd test is run on the time period 1972-1999, the following is produced.

	Regime (Prz.)
Chi-squared	.571
degrees of freedom	1
Significant at	.450

Table 18: Chi-squared Test Statistic

The test reveals it is not significant at the 95% confidence level, nor at the 90%

level. If fact, to reach a level at which this statistically significant confidence levels must

descend far beyond any reasonable extension. This period for regime produces the

weakest argument of any hypothesis here tested in this way. With the standard $p < .05$

requirement, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. There is no *statistically*-significant

relationship as deduced from the data. The Indo-Pakistani dyad cannot provide significant

support for the thesis which postulates a relationship between the status of regime-type

and conflict in the period 1972-1999. Consequently, it is not the time period covered by

freedom data but their substantive content which yield more compelling results for conflict expectations based upon freedom rather than regime-type.

Conclusion

At this point it will be useful to review what has been attempted in the present study as well as to make several suggestions for further research. This has been a hypothesis test of recent literature related to the democratic peace research program as applied to the Indo-Pakistani dyad. The development of the democratic peace literature has neglected these cases in the past by concentrating on a subset of the states in the global system whose divergence in terms of conflict may be explained by factors other than regime-type. As such, it is important to extend the discourse, gradually broadening the range of states.

While not claimed to be exhaustive, tests in the dyad have been executed based upon six hypotheses which appear in the world politics and policy literature. These have been operationalized and then quantitatively tested using six different data sets. Two additional hypotheses which were prompted during the course of study have also been tested. Freedom and nonmilitary IGO membership were shown as statistically significant explanatory factors for empirically-found variation on the relevant variables. There is policy relevance to these findings.

Firstly, freedom as operationalized by the Freedom House surveys has a relationship to conflict. States and other organizations seeking to diminish the propensity of war within a dyad may encourage the types of institutions which encapsulate the political rights and civil liberties that Freedom House studies. As is specified in Appendix

C, freedom includes the common criteria of participation and contestation which appear in the regime literature. Yet, the operationalization of freedom goes beyond that to include many aspects of individual liberties, freedoms of association and group identity rights which are overlooked by both regime-oriented data sets used here. While Freedom House provides a listing of their survey questions, data is not provided from the individual responses to these questions. A useful further study would be to isolate the various aspects of freedom and to assess their individual relationships to the propensity for war. Yet, as much as a relationship can be statistically demonstrated, it was the *opposite* of the hypothesized expectations. In fact, the one war in the measured period occurred when India was free and Pakistan was Partly Free. Further study is before the predictive nature of freedom can be assessed yet Freedom House s more multifaceted assessment of states may be more powerful than the paradigmatic contestation and participation operationalizations of regime-type.

Secondly, a statistically significant relationship (the most significant of those tested) was found between membership in the nonmilitary regional IGO SAARC and conflict. During years when India and Pakistan were both members of SAARC they spent proportionally fewer years warring with each other. From SAARC s first summit (1985) focused on multilateral cooperation in the region to address common problems of development. The seven South Asian states to gain collective self-reliance in nine fields which did not include security affairs. Each state was given equal responsibilities and rights with the aim to shift the paradigm from the Indo-Pakistani dyad to a regional focus. However, SAARC also afforded Indian and Pakistani leaders the opportunity discuss their

bilateral relationship. The SAARC institution appears to have ameliorated the relationship. The sort of institution that has been created may be a useful model to follow for other conflictual regions of the developing world.

The most intriguing finding of this study has been that of the development-oriented IGO. This has been a sort of institution whose potential responsiblity for ameliorating conflict has been largely overlooked. Of the literature that has been surveyed above, Gowa s critique of the democratic peace comes the closest to positingg expectations to which outcomes have conformed. Recall that she argued that it was common interests rather than regime-type which was a useful predictor to whether wars and militarized disputes short of war occurred. Gowa then operationalized common interests as military alliance membership. This argument was unable to explain the period of varying war and peace in the history of the Indo-Pakistani dyad as there was no variation on the independent variable. Membership in SAARC was tested as a different operationalization on Gowa s hypothesis of common interests. This IGO is a expression of common interests as from its founding the signatory states committed to work collectively to address common development interests. Rather than uniting against a common enemy image, economic development was the subject of attention. Where Gowa s operationalization of her hypothesis attempted to explain an interstate security relationship with an interstate security relationship, here the independent variable is institutional non-security (often economic) interaction. This basic idea is Gowa s hypothesis appears to be ontrack (moreso than any of the other hypotheses) but her operationalization was too restrictive. The findings from the SAARC test leads to reevaluation of contexts in which peace has

been attributed to security alliances where other regional IGO s are present. More concretely, in western Europe was peace in the Franco-German dyad due to NATO (as Gowa s operationalization would suggest) or the European Union/EEC (as posited here)?

The next step for longer-term research would be to disaggregate the categories of data into a greater number of and more precise categories on the independent side and to capture either the conflictuality of a relationship or sub-war MIDs on the dependent side. The 2002 publication of the MIDs for South Asia will help along the latter part. Secondly, the study of states in South Asia should extend beyond the Indo-Pakistani dyad to consider relations with other states (Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan). Thirdly, any conclusions should be taken back to the developed states and also developing regions for further testing or to determine whether there is something specific about South Asia. Finally, there should be a focused study to move beyond the presence/absence of IGO s to discover what specific institutional forms matter, if any and whether they can be constructed elsewhere as conflict-mitigating actors.

<u>Appendix A: Polity Data</u>
India

<u>Year</u>	<u>Democracy</u>	<u>Autocracy</u>	<u>Polity</u>
1950	9	0	9
1951	9	0	9
1952	9	0	9
1953	9	0	9
1954	9	0	9
1955	9	0	9
1956	9	0	9
1957	9	0	9
1958	9	0	9
1959	9	0	9
1960	9	0	9
1961	9	0	9
1962	9	0	9
1963	9	0	9
1964	9	0	9
1965	9	0	9
1966	9	0	9
1967	9	0	9
1968	9	0	9
1969	9	0	9
1970	9	0	9

1971	9	0	9
1972	9	0	9
1973	9	0	9
1974	9	0	9
1975	7	0	7
1976	7	0	7
1977	8	0	8
1978	8	0	8
1979	8	0	8
1980	8	0	8
1981	8	0	8
1982	8	0	8
1983	8	0	8
1984	8	0	8
1985	8	0	8
1986	8	0	8
1987	8	0	8
1988	8	0	8
1989	8	0	8
1990	8	0	8
1991	8	0	8
1992	8	0	8
1993	8	0	8
1994	8	0	8
1995	9	0	9
1996	9	0	9

Year	Democracy	Autocracy	Polity
1997	9	0	9
1998	9	0	9
1999	9	0	9

Pakistan

Year	Democracy	Autocracy	Polity
1947	1	5	-4
1948	3	1	2
1949	4	0	4
1950	4	0	4
1951	5	0	5
1952	5	0	5
1953	5	0	5
1954	5	0	5
1955	5	0	5
1956	8	0	8
1957	8	0	8
1958	0	7	-7
1959	0	7	-7
1960	0	7	-7
1961	0	7	-7
1962	3	2	1
1963	3	2	1
1964	3	2	1
1965	3	2	1
1966	3	2	1
1967	3	2	1

1968	3	2	1
1969	-88	-88	-88
1970	-88	-88	-88
1971	-77	-77	-77
1972	-88	-88	-88
1973	8	0	8
1974	8	0	8
1975	8	0	8
1976	8	0	8
1977	0	7	-7
1978	0	7	-7
1979	0	7	-7
1980	0	7	-7
1981	0	7	-7
1982	0	7	-7
1983	0	7	-7
1984	0	7	-7
1985	0	4	-4
1986	0	4	-4
1987	0	4	-4
1988	8	0	8
1989	8	0	8
1990	8	0	8
1991	8	0	8
1992	8	0	8
1993	8	0	8

1994	8	0	8
1995	8	0	8
1996	8	0	8
1997	7	0	7
1998	7	0	7
1999	0	6	-6

(Source: Polity III)

Appendix B: Freedom House Data

Year	Freedom Rating for India	Freedom Rating for Pakistan
1972-73	2.3 F[24]	3.5 PF
1973-74	2.3 F	3.5 PF
1974-75	2.3 F	3.5 PF
1975-76	2.5 PF	5.5 PF
1976-77	2.5 PF	4.5 PF
1977-78	2.2 F	6.4 PF
1978-79	2.2 F	6.5 PF
1979-80	2.2 F	6.6 NF
1980-81	2.3 F	7.5 NF
1981-82	2.3 F	7.5 NF
1982-83	2.3 F	7.5 NF
1983-84	2.3 F	7.5 NF
1984-85	2.3 F	7.5 NF
1985-86	2.3 F	4.5 PF
1986-87	2.3 F	4.5 PF
1987-88	2.3 F	4.5 PF
1988-89	2.3 F	3.3 PF
1989-90	2.3 F	3.3 PF
1990-91	2.3 F	4.4 PF
1991-92	3.4 PF	4.5 PF

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[24] F=Free; PF=Partly Free; NF=Not Free

1992-93	3.4 PF	4.5 PF
1993-94	4.4 PF	3.5 PF
1994-95	4.4 PF	3.5 PF
1995-96	4.4 PF	3.5 PF
1996-97	2.4 PF	4.5 PF
1997-98	2.4 PF	4.5 PF
1998-99	2.3 F	4.5 PF
1999-2000	2.3 F	7.5 NF

(Source: Freedom House.   Freedom in the World.
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/FHSCORES.xls)

<u>Appendix C: *Freedom House* Survey Questions</u>
Political Rights Checklist
Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through free and fair elections? *[25]
Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? *
Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling, and honest tabulation of ballots?
Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real power?
Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?
Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?
Are the people free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group?
Do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable self-determination, self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal consensus in the decision-making process?
Additional discretionary
Political Rights questions:
For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the system provide for consultation with the people, encourage discussion of policy, and allow the right to petition the ruler?
Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of another group?
To answer the political rights questions, Freedom House considers the extent to which the system offers the voter the chance to make a free choice among candidates, and to what extent the candidates are chosen independently of the state. Freedom House recognizes that formal electoral procedures are not the only factors that determine the real distribution of power. In many Latin American countries, for example, the military retains a significant political role, and in Morocco the king maintains considerable power over the elected politicians. The more that people suffer under such domination by unelected forces, the less chance the country has of receiving credit for self-determination in our

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[25] Questions marked with an asterisk (*) deal with issues of transparency. Unfortunately, Freedom House does not provide the accompanying raw data from each individual survey question.

Survey.

The Civil Liberties Checklist

<u>Freedom of Expression and Belief</u>

Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? (Note: in cases where the media are state-controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the Survey gives the system credit.)

Are there free religious institutions and is there free private and public religious expression?

<u>Association and Organizational Rights</u>

1. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion?

Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization? (Note: this includes political parties, civic organizations, ad hoc issue groups, etc.)

Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations?

<u>Rule of Law and Human Rights</u>

Is there an independent judiciary?

Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Is the population treated equally under the law? Are police under direct civilian control?

Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies? (Note: freedom from war and insurgencies enhances the liberties in a free society, but the absence of wars and insurgencies does not in and of itself make a not free society free.)

Is there freedom from extreme government indifference and corruption?

<u>Personal Autonomy and Economic Rights</u>

Is there open and free private discussion?

Is there personal autonomy? Does the state control travel, choice of residence, or choice of employment? Is there freedom from indoctrination and excessive dependency on the state?

Are property rights secure? Do citizens have the right to establish private businesses? Is private business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, or organized crime?

Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners, and size of family?

Is there equality of opportunity, including freedom from exploitation by or dependency on landlords, employers, union leaders, bureaucrats, or other types of obstacles to a share of legitimate economic gains?

When analyzing the civil liberties checklist, Freedom House does not mistake constitutional guarantees of human rights for those rights in practice. For states and territories with small populations, particularly tiny island nations, the absence of trade unions and other types of association is not necessarily viewed as a negative situation unless the government or other centers of domination are deliberately blocking their formation or operation. In some cases, the small size of these countries and territories may

result in a lack of sufficient institutional complexity to make them fully comparable to larger countries. The question of equality of opportunity also implies a free choice of employment and education. Extreme inequality of opportunity prevents disadvantaged individuals from enjoying full exercise of civil liberties. Typically, very poor countries and territories lack both opportunities for economic advancement and other liberties on this checklist. The question on extreme government indifference and corruption is included to highlight that the human rights of a country s residents suffer when governments ignore the social and economic welfare of large sectors of the population. Government corruption can pervert the political process and hamper the development of a free economy. [26]

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[26] These questions and explanations are available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/methodology3.htm

Appendix D: Hypotheses and Operationalizations

Literature	Expectations	Results	Theoretical/Empirical Comparison
Kydd: *The relatively transparent decision-making inherent in democratic institutions reduces the uncertainty of others over motivation. In turn less uncertainty reduces the likelihood of war amongst security-seekers. Transparent democratic institutions promote peace. These institutions include statutory public laws, a voting parliament and a court system.*	At times when both India and Pakistan are/were democratic no wars will occur in the dyad.[27]	India: Parliamentarism 1950-90 Pakistan: Parliamentarism 1950-55 (by these criteria begins 1947); 1988-90 (and extend to 1999) These extensions can be made as Przeworski s conditions can be met and no regime change occurred between them and the studied years. Wars in 1947-9 and 1999 occurred with both states democratic.	Wars occurred at times when the hypothesis would suggest otherwise

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[27]Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000), Appendix 1.2, pg 56-69, Classification of Political Regimes, 1950-1990" Variables: Regime , Entry , Exit . To be coded a democracy Przeworski et al have four criteria (1) elected executive (2) elected legislature (3) more than one effective party in the system (4) alternation of party/coalition members in government; Presidentialism and Parliamentarism are subsets of democracy

Thompson: *Democracies do not fight democracies in their home region*	When both are democratic India and Pakistan will not fight in South Asia[28]	Identifies three wars between India and Pakistan in 1947-9, 1965 and 1971 in South Asia, the home region of both states; Kargil (1999) as well can be added[29]	Wars occurred in the home region of the democracies unlike what Thompson would expect.
Gowa: *Trade, or cosmopolitan law - the costs of trade disruption forms a disincentive to militarized conflict*	When bilateral trade is increasing, there will be a reduced likelihood of war in the dyad[30].	Indo-Pakistani bilateral trade grew more than twelve times (in nominal terms) from 1987 to 1999 but declined from 89-90, 92-93 and from 98; there were drops in trade levels in the last period following nuclear testing. Vajpayee s initiative with Sharif following the test sought to increase trade; trade had however plunged in the two years leading up to the Kargil Crisis removing or lessening this constraint upon militancy.	Peak trade was less than US$200m which is less than 0.1% of the combined Indo-Pakistani GDP, at exchange rates. If the hypothesis had used high trade rather than increasing trade this dyad may not have qualified at all, but the decline in years preceding war support the hypothesis. Data is available for a shorter time period than other tests. Unfortunately Chengappa does not provide earlier data.

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[28] Correlates of War, 1816-1992's Interstate wars list which includes conflicts with 1000 or more battle deaths by state system members

[29] Kargil (1999) will certainly be included in the next COW/MIDS, the deaths of 524 for India (*Free Press Journal* 17 Jan 2000, according to Indian sources) and 500 for Pakistan (*The Hindu* 20 June 2000 quoting Begum Koolsum Nawaz Nawaz Sharif s wife, a high-ranking Pakistani) being sufficient. As these numbers reflect self-reporting it is expected that both of these are low estimates. Even with these most conservative estimates Kargil passes COW s threshold to qualify as a major war.

[30] Bidanda M Chengappa, http://www.idsa-india.org/an-jun9-7.html reporting the variables year and the total change in the value of trade over the previous year

Gowa: *Common interests (alliance) rather than regime-type commonalities produce peace between states*	If two states are members of the same alliance they will not war[31]	India and Pakistan have not shared alliance ties. Yet there have been periods of both conflict and peace between them. A more generic common interests between them may be embodied in the SAARC institution, created in 1985, but this addresses issues specifically other than dyadic security. This supports Gowa that similar regime-types which lack common interests may war.	This hypothesis has problems explaining the Indo-Pakistani dyad as Gowa has confused and conflated common interests with alliance membership. The concept of common interests need to be disaggregated, beyond the common *security* interests encompassed by alliances

[31]CIA *World Factbook* reports the international organization participation variable. Are India and Pakistan members of the same alliance for the reported year?

Hermann & Kegley	A democratic state	India 8-11: 47-74, 77-99;	Unlike the
Democracies are less likely to be the target of coercive diplomacy[32] or to intervene in the military affairs of others	will be less likely than a non-democracy to intervene in foreign countries militarily[33].	4-7: 75-76 COW found wars in 47-49, 65 and 71; during all India was a democracy Pakistan 8-11: 56-57, 72-76, 88-96; 4-7: 49-55, 97-98; 0-3: 62-68; -7--4: 58-61 The figure during the 1971 was -77 for Pakistan which is off the scale; that war followed an election for MPs in Pakistan which was to transition the country from military rule to democracy. Other wars occurred when coded 2, 4, 1. The Kargil Crisis (which according to official reports killed over 1000 system members) occurred under the Sharif government which was coded by Polity as 7 (democracy)	expectation, India intervened militarily in the affairs of its neighbors (Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Goa, Hyderabad, Sikkim, etc) while it was a democracy. Pakistan as a democratic state in 1947-49 and 1999 intervened militarily in India.

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[32] Due to a lack of available data for the countries in question, this portion of their argument does not receive treatment here.

[33] Polity dataset using POLITY variable which combines 11-point scales of Democracy and Autocracy

Freedom is treated as an aspect of democratic political culture. *Free countries are less likely to engage in war with other free countries*	Free countries are less likely to war with other free countries[34].	India Free 72-75, 77-91, 98-00 PF 75-77, 91-98 Pakistan PF 72-79, 85-99 NF 79-85, 99-00 Only one war occurred during the period covered, Kargil in 1999 with India coded free and Pakistan coded partly free	According to Freedom House Pakistan was not a Free state between 1972 and 2000 but warred with free India in 1999 while partly free. While Pakistan was Not Free during the years coded, India and Pakistan did not war. The hypothesis suggested an increased likelihood of war if the variable is taken continuously as Freedom House reports it.

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[34]Freedom House Annual Survey of Freedom Country Ratings 1972-2000" Freedom Rating which defines countries as Free 1.0-2.5, Partly Free 2.5-5.5 and Not Free 5.5-7.0.

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